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The Silk Road linking the ancient world’s civilizations wound 
through deserts and mountain passes, traversed by caravans laden 
with the world’s treasures. The modern Silk Road winds its way 
through undersea fiber-optic cables and satellite links, ferrying elec-
trons brimming with information. This electronic Silk Road makes 
possible trade in services heretofore impossible in human history. 
Radiologists, accountants, engineers, lawyers, musicians, filmmakers, 
and reporters now offer their services to the world without passing a 
customs checkpoint or boarding a plane. Like the ancient Silk Road, 
which transformed the lands that it connected, this new trade route 
promises to remake the world.
INTRODUCTION
tracing a silk Road through cyberspace
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Today the people of the world are engaged in international trade 
with a greater intensity than ever before in human history. The sub-
jects of international trade, too, are far more personal than ever 
before. They implicate our habits and hobbies, our travels, our com-
munication, our friends, our politics, our health, and our finances. As 
our lives increasingly are reflected online, the range of activities 
subject to international trade grows. Services now join goods in the 
global marketplace, with workers in developing countries able to 
participate in lucrative Western markets despite immigration 
barriers and Western enterprises able to reach a global audience, 
often free of tariffs or local bureaucracies.
In 2012, Apple announced that leading carmakers from across 
the world, from Mercedes-Benz to Toyota, would soon install but-
tons in their vehicles allowing direct access to Siri, Apple’s voice 
command system. Siri interprets natural human speech, thus allow-
ing the driver to ask the computer assistant to send messages, select 
music, check stock prices or the weather, or even make restaurant 
reservations. These buttons will also bring Apple’s music and video-
retailing service, iTunes, into automobiles around the world. Siri is a 
cloud-based service, meaning that it performs the bulk of its 
processing not on the user’s computer (or in the user’s car) but far 
away in some computer farm. Apple’s Siri processes the commands 
it receives in California. Debuted in English, Siri now understands 
Mandarin and a host of other major human languages. Drivers on 
roads from Marrakesh to Mandalay will soon be talking directly to 
Cupertino, California, to get directions or plan dinner.
This radical shift in the provision of services becomes possible 
because of advances in telecommunications technologies. This is the 
rapidly growing phenomenon I call net-work—information services 
delivered remotely through electronic communications systems. 
Net-work encompasses not just the services outsourced to Accra, 
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Bangalore, or Manila but also the online services supplied by Silicon 
Valley to the world. Apple, eBay, and Yahoo!, too, are exporters of infor-
mation services, revealing the Internet to be a global trading platform. 
Silicon Valley enterprises serve as the world’s retailers, librarians, 
advertising agencies, television producers, auctioneers, travel agents, 
and even romance matchmakers. Silicon Valley’s ambition is no less 
than to become middleman to the world.
Many of the services made possible by the Electronic Silk Road 
are so new that they are hardly recognizable as trade. After all, many 
of the services appear to be free, more gifts than exchange. A com-
puter voice assistant like Siri does not resemble any traditional 
service, except perhaps a butler. To add to the mystery, even the word 
services defies definition. The leading international treaty on services, 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), forgoes a 
definition. The Economist magazine offers a quip, in lieu of a defini-
tion, calling services the “products of economic activity that you can’t 
drop on your foot.” Disputes brought before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) now often turn on whether something is a 
service. In Canada-Periodicals, Canada argued that because 
magazine advertising was a service, not a good, any obligation not to 
impose taxes on US goods did not apply to taxes on magazine 
advertising.1 In China-Audiovisual, China claimed that electronic 
distribution of US audio products did not constitute “sound record-
ing distribution services.”2 Both claims proved unavailing, as we will 
see in chapter 6. The economist Jagdish Bhagwati observes that as 
late as the 1970s many in his profession did not believe that services 
were susceptible to international trade on the belief that they must 
be consumed at the point of service, an idea he ridicules as the 
“haircuts” view of services.3
Even as they defy easy characterization, such services are power-
ing economic development across the world. India has emerged 
In
t
R
o
D
U
c
t
Io
n
4
unexpectedly as a powerful global trader, with new global multina-
tional corporations often based in Bangalore offering advanced 
information services to companies around the world. American 
firms, largely centered in Silicon Valley, use the Internet to offer old 
and new services to the world’s consumers. Increasingly, if a 
company in Germany or Ghana wants to reach its own compatriots, 
it needs the help of a firm in Silicon Valley. In such cases, advertising 
is hardly the only economic activity crossing borders. Some of the 
activity has traditional precedents, such as travel agencies, news 
services, or brokerage services. Other activity lacks analogs in 
traditional commercial services, such as information search services, 
dating services, restaurant reservations, or software (or “app”) 
clearinghouses. Having emerged as its home country’s biggest music 
retailer in the span of merely five years from launching into the 
business, Apple hopes to become the world’s leading audiovisual 
entertainment retailer as well.4
The existing infrastructure of trade, developed over millennia for 
a paradigm of goods, proves inadequate either to enable or to regulate 
this emerging Trade, version 2.0. The WTO and regional arrange-
ments such as the European Union, North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) commit nations to liberalize barriers to trade in services, but 
these broad mandates have found little elaboration to date. Net-work 
companies, lacking legal precedents or authoritative guidance, must 
innovate not only technological methods and business models but 
also legal structures that span the globe. Net-work trade has yet to 
develop counterparts to the medieval lex mercatoria that helped 
resolve commercial disputes among European traders, the bills of 
lading that helped resolve shipping disputes during the last century 
of international trade, and other conventions on contracting that 
emerged over centuries of experience with trade in goods.
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The risks to interests such as privacy and financial security from 
net-work are evident. Google’s privacy officer observes that “every 
time you use a credit card, your details are passed through six differ-
ent countries.”5 The difficulty of enforcing rights—or even demar-
cating them—across the World Wide Web is enormous. If an event 
in cyberspace occurs both “everywhere and nowhere” (in the words 
of a former Grateful Dead lyricist), whose law governs?6 But there is 
a more fundamental risk. While there have been earlier eras of glo-
balization, characterized by cross-border flows of people, goods, and 
capital, the globalization of services today poses a unique challenge 
to regulation.7 When individuals migrated to provide services, they 
could be expected to conform to the laws of their new home. When 
people desired goods banned locally, they would have to make a run 
across a county line and smuggle them home. But cybertrade enables 
individuals to provide or receive services across the globe without 
leaving home. Will work be performed from jurisdictions without 
adequate protections? Is law itself at risk, now avoidable by a mere 
single click?
The jurisdiction-hopping implicit in cybertrade poses hurdles 
for the enforcement of law. Consider two famous examples from the 
past decade. Kazaa, long the leading peer-to-peer file trading 
system, was founded in the Netherlands by a Swede and a Dane, 
programmed from Estonia, and then run from Australia while 
incorporated in the South Pacific island nation of Vanuatu.8 The 
online gambling site PartyGaming was founded by an American 
lawyer and an Indian expatriate programmer and run from head-
quarters in Gibraltar, using computer servers on a Mohawk Indian 
reserve in Canada, a London marketing office, and a workforce 
based mainly in Hyderabad, India.9 Where regulation is oppressive 
and contrary to universal human rights, such evasion should be 
encouraged, not condemned (an issue we turn to in chapter 9). But 
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for liberal democratic states, the ability to exploit the Internet to 
perform an end run around local law is troubling. Left unattended, 
cybertrade from everywhere and nowhere might imperil domestic 
laws, replacing local law with the regulation, if any, of the net-work 
provider’s home state. I argue that the importing of services should 
not require us to import law as well.
At the same time, trumped-up fears of foreign service providers 
can support protectionist policies, shielding domestic industries 
from the bracing glare of global competition. In response to a cam-
paign by a public sector union, the Canadian province of British 
Columbia now requires public entities that send personal informa-
tion abroad for processing or storage to do so only with the specific 
permission of the data subjects. This rule makes it practically impos-
sible for a British Columbia public university to use Gmail even if 
students have consented to the use of Google’s services. The 2012 
provincial guidelines implementing the law declare that if a student’s 
“email contained the personal information of the friends she made 
during spring break, the public body would have to get their consent 
too.” Fear of foreign service providers has been used against enter-
prises from Bangalore as well. In 2005, New Jersey passed a law 
requiring that “all services under State contracts or subcontracts 
be performed within the United States.” Other states, including 
Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee, have legislated a preference for local 
suppliers in their government procurement contracts. Ohio gover-
nor Ted Strickland instituted such a preference by executive order. A 
proposed federal bill, promoted by the Communications Workers of 
America, would deny federal loans to American companies that 
send call-center jobs overseas.
By recognizing the phenomena of outsourcing and the informa-
tion services as being different species of net-work, it becomes 
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possible to recognize the stake we all have in promoting trade. It 
unites Silicon Valley and Bangalore in a common cause for free 
trade. It also makes it harder to vilify one or the other, as many of the 
countries of the world increasingly hope to be exporters of one or 
both types of net-work. Countries vying to nurture the next Silicon 
Valley or Bangalore might be reluctant to encumber such trade.
The pressure on law from both kinds of net-work is clear. Con-
sider some transnational flashpoints from the first decade of the 
twenty-first century: Antigua’s WTO challenge to US rules barring 
online gambling; the outsourcing of radiology to India; Brazil’s 
demands to Google to identify perpetrators of hate speech; an Alien 
Torts Statute suit in the United States charging Yahoo! with abet-
ting torture in China; a WTO complaint brought by the United 
States against Chinese state media controls on foreign movies, 
financial information, and music such as iTunes. These cases reveal 
the unsettled legal issues at stake in cybertrade, from jurisdiction to 
protectionism, from consumer protection to human rights.
Services constitute an increasing bulk of human economic 
activity.10 In 2011, the value of trade in commercial services in official 
reports was more than $4 trillion, nearly one-fifth of all world trade.11 
Yet for much of its history, the legal regime governing international 
trade neglected services in favor of liberalizing commerce in goods. 
But as Western economies became increasingly service-oriented, 
they began to recognize the opportunities for export in telecommu-
nications, media, financial, and other services. Business leaders from 
three proudly “American” corporations—American Insurance Group, 
American Express, and Pan Am—propelled the US government in 
the 1970s to seek to liberalize trade in services.12 Such efforts in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations resulted—over developing 
nation opposition—in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
forming one pillar of the World Trade Organization established in 
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1995. GATS subjected services for the first time to the international 
trade regime’s far-reaching disciplines.13 Regional arrangements go 
further still. The European Union has ambitiously declared a Single 
European Market, seeking “an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured.”14 Both NAFTA and the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) require national treatment and market 
access for service providers across their respective regions.15 America’s 
new bilateral free trade agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, 
Colombia, Morocco, Oman, Peru, and Singapore all include broad 
obligations to liberalize services. Southeast Asian nations have 
promised to create a free trade zone including services by 2015.
Free trade’s apostle was David Ricardo, an Englishman who in 
1817 offered one of the most influential insights economists have 
yet brought. Contrary to the reigning mercantilism of his day, 
Ricardo showed that countries that traded with each other would 
each stand to gain from the trade. Ricardo began by hypothesizing 
two countries, England and Portugal, each of which produced both 
wine and cloth, with closed borders. A bit of simple multiplication 
and addition is all one needs to show that if each state produced the 
good for which it had a comparative advantage, there would be a 
greater total amount of both wine and cloth (or at least more of one 
of the two and an equal amount of the other), which could now be 
traded to mutual advantage. The same arithmetic can show the 
superiority of specialization and trading anything for which humans 
create, from accounting to engineering.16
Yet with the advent of trade in services such as these, a vocal 
minority has raised doubts about free trade in services. Some worry 
that liberalization will erode the wages or threaten the livelihoods of 
workers now forced to compete on a global stage. A few hold that 
Ricardo’s insight about the mutual benefits of trade in goods cannot 
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be readily extended to services. Economists Alan Blinder and Paul 
Samuelson, the latter a Nobel laureate, have raised questions about 
the benefits of cross-border outsourcing of services to rich countries 
like the United States. Blinder, however, does not counsel protec-
tionism but rather advocates increased support for displaced work-
ers.17 It must also be kept in mind that critics of such trade do not 
include the benefits to American enterprise and American workers 
from trade in such services conducted by Silicon Valley. Google and 
Facebook earned 54 and 50 percent, respectively, of their income abroad 
in the first half of 2012.18 It will be difficult for the United States to 
decry the entry of information service providers from Bangalore 
while pressing for the liberalization of information service providers 
from Silicon Valley. And the same is true of India. The great majority 
of economists believe strongly in free trade in both goods and 
services. As the Wall Street Journal has noted, the few critics repre-
sent a “minority among economists, most of whom emphasize the 
enormous gains from trade.”19 Ricardo’s theory itself applies to all 
trade, whether trade in food and clothing or trade in information. 
Countries across the world now vie to be both the next Silicon 
Valley and the next Bangalore, and they must embrace the flow of 
trade in both directions. At the same time, governments must retrain 
persons dislocated by the disruptive force of technology and provide 
a social safety net to take care of those who are most imperiled.
The promise of Trade 2.0 is enormous. The changes wrought to 
commercial practices are no less revolutionary than those described 
by Alfred D. Chandler Jr. in his classic twentieth-century business 
study, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business. Sellers of both goods and services now can have direct 
contact with their consumers around the world, and vice versa. 
Individuals and companies can find new purchasers for their services 
across the globe. Consumers now find their choice of providers 
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increased manyfold. Like the globalization of manufacturing, the 
globalization of services promises to boost efficiency, facilitating 
economies of scale and spurring investments in human capital. 
Increasingly, the bulk of humanity will find itself involved in trade 
along this Electronic Silk Road.
Through the Khyber Pass or around the Cape of Good Hope, 
merchants have long made arduous journeys laden with the world’s 
treasures. Trade law developed with such merchants in mind. Law 
accommodated trade conducted over the high seas, the Silk Road, 
and the Grand Trunk Road, not through undersea fiber or via satel-
lite links. Trade depends on the legal environment in two crucial 
ways: first, the law must dismantle protectionist legal barriers erected 
through history (this is the standard focus of teaching and writing in 
international trade law); second, the law can facilitate cross-border 
trade by erecting a legal infrastructure to reduce uncertainty in interna-
tional transactions (this is the standard focus of teaching and writing 
on international business transactions).20 Let us label both features of 
the legal environment, taken together, the Trade Plus regime. A Trade 
Plus regime crafted for goods is unlikely to serve well the demands of 
the burgeoning trade in services delivered through the ether.
This book proceeds as follows. The first part reviews controver-
sies in cybertrade, which demonstrate both the need to remove legal 
obstacles to cybertrade and the need to protect the capacity of states 
to regulate themselves. The second part offers principles that seek to 
achieve this balance. Freeing cybertrade requires a commitment to 
two principles: (1) a technological neutrality principle that rejects 
attempts to bar net-work because of its electronic nature; and 
(2) a dematerialization principle by which states undertake to 
dematerialize the services infrastructure—that is, to make physical 
presence unnecessary for authentication, notification, certification, 
inspection, and even dispute resolution.
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The footloose nature of cybertrade raises the specter of two races 
to the bottom: a deregulated world in which service providers 
decamp to minimally regulated jurisdictions from which they supply 
the world; and an overly regulated world in which some service pro-
viders eager to maximize revenues become complicit in state repres-
sion. To curtail the race to the deregulated bottom, I suggest the 
occasional necessity of legal glocalization—requiring a global service 
to conform to local rules, where both the rules and their assertion to 
a particular transaction are consistent with international legal norms. 
Glocalization rejects protectionism yet maintains local safeguards 
over culture and security; it resolves the dilemma of net-work, 
navigating between the Scylla of protectionism and the Charybdis 
of laissez-faire.
But will this assertion of local law tear apart the global web into 
local fiefdoms? The key to avoid this tearing apart of the web is to 
limit local demands on global e-commerce to important issues. 
International and domestic US law constrains excessive extraterrito-
riality while international trade law counsels us to work toward 
global standards. In order to promote a flourishing cybertrade 
beneficial to both the world’s service providers and its consumers, 
states will have to work toward legal harmonization wherever agree-
ment may be found. Thus I suggest this rule: harmonization where 
possible, glocalization where necessary.
To disrupt the race to the oppressive bottom, I argue that 
cybertraders should establish ground rules to, at a minimum, do no 
evil. Here, I flesh out the maxim that Google officially embraces. 
Given that authoritarian regimes function by repressing informa-
tion, information service providers will always be the locus of such 
repression—and the potential route for subversion.
The book is divided into two parts. In the first chapters I illus-
trate the challenges of Trade 2.0 through case studies. In the second 
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part I offer a framework for breaking down barriers to free trade 
while protecting public policy objectives. To help readers interested 
in different sections of the book, I sketch below the arguments in 
each chapter of the book.
Chapter 1. The New Global Division of Labor
Where the industrial age led to a global division of labor in manufac-
turing, the information age expands that global division into services. 
Once theorized as nontradable, services now join goods in the global 
marketplace, allowing workers in developing countries to participate in 
lucrative Western markets despite immigration barriers and Western 
enterprises to reach a global audience, often free of tariffs and even 
absent a local distribution network. This marks a major shift in the 
organization of production, as technology shifts the calculus determin-
ing the boundaries of the firm and spurs firms to buy services cross-
border. At the same time, however, the emergence of trade in services 
creates insecurity among people worldwide who must now face global 
competition. The efficiencies of net-work counsel liberalization of trade 
in services, as well as the creation of a robust and widely accessible 
infrastructure for making and enforcing contracts across borders.
Chapter 2. Western Entrepôt: Silicon Valley
The information technology revolution has not only enabled a global 
division of labor, it has also spawned entirely new kinds of services, 
often with global ambitions. Information search services such as 
Google and Yahoo! and social networking services such as Facebook 
and MySpace have become popular far outside their home jurisdic-
tion. Such services have often acted with indifference to borders until 
forced to reckon with them by local authorities. Yahoo! and Google, 
for example, have run afoul of laws that criminalize speech that is 
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legal in their home jurisdictions. In this chapter I survey the kinds of 
legal difficulties that global cyberspace companies are beginning to 
encounter. To better understand the challenges, the chapter describes 
three legal conflicts in particular. Yahoo!’s encounter with French 
laws barring Nazi paraphernalia generated lawsuits on both sides of 
the Atlantic, with Yahoo!’s lawyer decrying the “French imperialism” 
of a Parisian court order against Yahoo!’s California-based enterprise. 
A Brazilian judge reproached Google for evincing a “profound disre-
spect for national sovereignty” when its Brazilian subsidiary professed 
an inability to produce information identifying perpetrators of hate 
speech and other crimes using Google’s first social network, Orkut. 
Both Yahoo! and Google have stumbled in China, where they have 
been accused of aiding state political repression, most directly in an 
Alien Torts Statute claim against Yahoo! accusing it of acting as an 
auxiliary to torture. Faced with compromising its role as a global 
information provider, Google ultimately retreated from China.
Chapter 3. Eastern Entrepôt: Bangalore
Where China has become the factory to the world, India and other 
developing countries may become the world’s back office. In the span 
of a decade, Indian companies have integrated themselves into the 
global supply chain, providing services from accounting to information 
technology. While electronic networks have been necessary to Trade 
2.0, a kind of network as old as human migration has helped power this 
trade. Diaspora networks that connect Silicon Valley to the Deccan 
Plateau have reduced information costs across continents, enabling 
Indian companies to find Western buyers, and Western buyers to find 
Indian suppliers. Indian outsourcing giants have grown into multibil-
lion-dollar, multinational companies. Indian outsourcing companies 
now scour the world for talent, establishing or acquiring operations in 
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Latin America, eastern Europe, China, and even the United States. 
Developing nations from Africa to Latin America seek to replicate 
India’s success, at times establishing the services counterpart to the 
export-processing zone popular for manufacturing. But a review of the 
political and legal issues raised with respect to the outsourcing of radi-
ology from Massachusetts General Hospital to Bangalore shows that 
these enterprises face important legal challenges.
Chapter 4. Pirates of Cyberspace
Offshore havens now offer not only freedom from taxes or bank regu-
lations but also potentially freedom from law itself. Because of the 
global reach of the Internet, an entrepreneur can take advantage of the 
seeming safety of an offshore haven to offer services that might violate 
local law where the services are consumed. Two cases help make this 
point plain. In the 1990s, Antigua set out to become the Las Vegas 
of cyberspace. American entrepreneurs set up companies on that 
Caribbean island to offer gambling principally to American consum-
ers. When the United States began prosecuting these entrepreneurs, 
Antigua turned to a perhaps unexpected venue: the World Trade 
Organization. Antigua charged the United States with violating its 
free trade commitments by barring online gambling. If Antigua is the 
Las Vegas of cyberspace, Russia may well be the Wild West. Taking 
advantage of Russian rules that allow only minimal royalty payments 
for music, a website called AllofMP3.com permits users worldwide to 
download entire albums for the price of a single iTune. The United 
States declared AllofMP3.com “the world’s largest server-based pirate 
website” and even threatened to block Russian entry into the WTO 
because of it before the site was shut down. Cross-border trade 
in services also raises special legal problems, including risks to 
information privacy and the difficulty of enforcing rights abroad.
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Chapter 5. Facebookistan
Who rules how Facebook connects more than a billion monthly 
users, some 80 percent outside the United States? In this chapter I 
review why countries might want to regulate Facebook and describe 
how countries have actually sought to do so. National efforts to 
assert control have been stymied by confusion about who has juris-
diction over Internet enterprises such as Facebook. I conclude that 
the world of Facebook is currently governed by a complex of nation-
states, users, and Facebook’s corporate officers.
Chapter 6. Freeing Trade in Cyberspace
In this chapter I return to Antigua’s claim against the United States 
before the WTO. Given the United States’ further strengthening of 
prohibitions against online gambling since the debut of the com-
plaint, is international trade law powerless against barriers to net-
work trade? I suggest that the decision in the case carries the seeds of 
a net-work revolution, with world trade rules deployed to break down 
legal barriers to net-work. Indeed, the United States successfully filed 
its own WTO complaint against China to dismantle some regulatory 
impediments to the distribution in China of American audiovisual 
products, including downloads from Apple’s iTunes store.
Chapter 7. Handshakes Across the World
The architecture of real-world transactions promotes security, privacy, 
monitoring, trust, and enforceability between parties, which in turn 
fosters marketplace contracts with strangers. In order to foster trade 
in services, governments, corporations, and state and industry asso-
ciations will need to re-create security and trust in cyberspace. They 
will need to establish the electronic counterparts to handshakes, ink 
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signatures, demeanor evidence, word of mouth, and the ready ability 
to seek legal redress. I argue for a dematerialized architecture for cyber-
space trade and describe incipient efforts toward that goal.
Chapter 8. Glocalization and Harmonization
Like liquor stores across the county line, computer servers permit 
individuals to evade local regulations by a simple exercise, here a few 
keystrokes. The nature of net-work increases the likelihood that a 
service provider might relocate to take advantage of regulatory envi-
ronments that it finds favorable. The strategy of legal glocalization—
requiring a global service to conform to local rules—removes one 
principal mechanism for regulatory competition by short-circuiting 
the attempt of a company to choose its governing law simply through 
its choice of situs. Flags of convenience and the regulatory arbitrage 
they entail lose force if they are met by states unwilling to cede regula-
tory authority to foreign jurisdictions. At the same time, international 
law limits state exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Excessive 
assertions of local law may unduly Balkanize the Internet; I suggest 
limits to glocalization to maintain the worldwide nature of the web. 
Specifically, states should seek to harmonize their rules where possible, 
maintaining heterogeneous rules only after due consideration.
Chapter 9. Last Stop: Middle Kingdom
The ancient Silk Road helped transmit the culture and technology of 
China to the world. Today, however, Chinese authorities stand as 
guardians along the new Silk Road, censoring knowledge flowing 
within, into, and out of China. History’s most efficient platform for 
information dissemination faces its greatest test at the gates to the 
Middle Kingdom. In the wrong hands, the Internet can bring the 
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specter of a pernicious Big Brother closer than ever possible in 
George Orwell’s time. When allied with willing Internet service 
providers, websites, software providers, and financial intermediaries, 
a government can gain an omniscience heretofore unknown. Eager 
to supply the world’s most populous Internet market, service provid-
ers have bent to official Chinese demands, censoring themselves and 
even passing along information that uncovers dissenters. In this 
chapter I consider the challenge of totalitarian states to the global 
Internet. At a minimum, service providers should seek to “do no evil” 
if they engage with totalitarian states. I explore what this might 
mean by contrasting Yahoo!’s and Google’s strategies for China, 
asking whether liberal home states should impose any extraterrito-
rial regulation on their new media services abroad to compel 
behavior consistent with human rights. I also suggest that liberal 
governments can seek to use the tools of international trade law 
to bolster political freedom around the world. Unexpectedly, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services might emerge as a human 
rights document.
This is a book about how law can both foster and regulate trade in 
services. We must protect local control of global Internet trade with-
out jeopardizing either human rights or the worldwide nature of the 
web. Globalization with a human face will require us to manage 
cybertrade to allow us to engage with the world yet at the same time 
feel that we are not at the world’s mercy.
18
Adam Smith could never have dreamed of the global division of labor 
that is quickly coming to pass. It would take two centuries after The 
Wealth of Nations for the global manufacturing process to be 
perfected. Where the twentieth century saw the rise of the global 
supply chain in manufacturing, in the twenty-first century technol-
ogy now permits the rise of a global supply chain in services. 
Relying on suppliers around the world, a garage entrepreneur can 
coordinate the production and delivery of a service from anywhere. 
Firms can transfer processes to foreign third-party vendors, relying 
on the discipline of the market rather than the discipline of 
supervisory management. The search for talent has gone global, 
1
THE NEW GLOBAL DIVISION OF LABOR
What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that 
age was which came to an end in August, 1914! . . . The inhabitant of 
London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the 
various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see  
fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep.
—John Maynard Keynes, The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace
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hurdling the barriers to labor factor mobility posed by restrictive 
immigration laws.
Not only can firms find inputs anywhere, but they can find buy-
ers everywhere. Firms can offer their services directly to consumers 
across the world without investing in extensive local distribution 
networks. They can leverage this worldwide consumer base to achieve 
economies of scale. Firms can locate their headquarters where they 
might have most ready access to capital, especially venture capital, 
and their servers where they can find cheap and plentiful energy. 
They might locate their operations in a jurisdiction that provides tax 
incentives to encourage job creation. Because technology now allows 
firms and consumers to turn to service providers far from home, 
suddenly the local information broker—from the reporter to the 
auctioneer to the yenta—must now compete with suppliers across 
the world.
This organizational revolution puts pressure on law. The move-
ment from make to buy, from status to contract, will require a robust 
transnational legal framework to facilitate cross-border contracts and 
information flows. The risks to security and privacy as information 
crisscrosses the world between consumers and service providers will 
require a legal response. Rather than the Silk Road’s disputes among 
merchants or modern goods traders’ disputes regarding bills of lading 
and shipping documents, disputes in this new international market 
for services will grow among household buyers and sellers located 
across the globe, between ordinary citizens and global websites.
In this chapter, I describe this evolution in the organization of 
production, arguing that we will likely see increasing cross-border 
contracting between unaffiliated parties as firms move internal 
processes to third-party vendors. Where there are contracts, there 
are eventually contractual disputes, requiring a legal infrastructure of 
dispute resolution. The open-source programming that drives much 
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of this trade itself relies on the enforceability of contract and prop-
erty rights across borders—supplemented by reputation and reward 
systems. In the final section of this chapter, I describe the close and 
mutually beneficial connection between outsourcing and open-
source production methods.
Butcher, Baker, Information Broker
“In the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered about 
in so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer 
must be butcher, baker, and brewer for his family.”1 Adam Smith 
began his 1776 study of the wealth of nations by examining the divi-
sion of labor. The division of labor, he observed, depended in large 
part on the size of the market, which in turn depended largely on 
geography and technology. In remote locations, the absence of 
extensive markets limited the division of labor. But those with better 
access to means of transportation could reach larger markets, and 
thereby improve efficiency: “by means of water carriage a more 
extensive market is opened . . . and industry of every kind naturally 
begins to subdivide and improve itself.”2 Specialization would 
improve productivity by reducing the time wasted in transferring 
among multiple tasks, increasing the dexterity of the individual 
worker at a specific task, and spur the invention of machines that 
perform specified functions.3 Smith critiqued the reigning mercan-
tile political economy of his day, which sought to encourage exports 
but discourage imports. While Smith spoke in terms of absolute 
advantage and not comparative advantage, he argued that liberal 
rules for both export and import would deepen the division of labor 
and enrich nations.
Smith wrote at a time when the medieval age’s dusty silk 
roads and wooden ships were soon to give way to the railroads and 
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steamships of the industrial age. Industrial revolutions in mechani-
zation, transportation, and communications technology deepened 
the national and international division of labor. Technology eroded 
the decisive role of geography in the organization of production. 
Mass-production techniques and the modern management systems 
they spawned swelled the international trade in goods.
The economic benefits of this globalization have been distrib-
uted widely—but many have also borne the pain and dislocation 
that follow from global competition.4 Merchandise producers 
reduced their costs by shifting manufacturing to advantageous 
locations, often in maquiladoras or other export-processing zones in 
the developing world.5 This shift led to the loss of blue-collar jobs in 
the industrialized nations, the rise of sweatshops in the developing 
world in some cases, and the dazzling array of affordable merchan-
dise available at the local superstore.
As economic historian Alfred Chandler describes, technological 
innovation shifted not just the location of production but also its 
organization. By enlarging both output and markets, the nineteenth 
century’s industrial revolution required the creation of the manage-
rial hierarchies (managers who manage managers) characteristic of 
the modern business enterprise.6 These colossus corporations, 
increasingly capitalized through the public markets, brought inside 
the corporate walls functions that had historically been provided by 
third parties. These corporations integrated mass production and 
mass distribution within the firm and its subsidiaries, replacing the 
invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of management.
The multidivision corporation (dubbed the “M-Form” corpora-
tion) would rapidly extend itself internationally to become the mul-
tinational corporation that came to dominate the twentieth century.7 
Even at the dawn of the twentieth century, some Europeans labeled 
this the “American invasion” and fretted about the “Americanisation 
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of the world.”8 The multinational corporation would become a prin-
cipal vehicle for cross-border trade in services. Hollywood began to 
recognize the global audience available for its media products. 
Software enterprises, too, sought global markets. Microsoft has 
subsidiaries in more than 110 countries, from Albania to Zimba-
bwe.9 Financial institutions extended themselves around the world; 
Citigroup today has offices in nearly a hundred countries world-
wide.10 Western telecommunications companies similarly found 
opportunities for growth in the developing world. The global wave 
of privatizations of government services beginning in the 1980s 
increased the local presence of multinational corporations in a vari-
ety of fields from banking to telecommunications to water services.
But with the exception of finance, this cross-border trade in 
services did not generally require the real-time transmission of large 
volumes of data across borders.11 Microsoft and Disney developed 
their products in one country—typically the United States—and 
then disseminated that product globally. Local subsidiaries were 
simply translators and distributors. Thus, while service providers in 
certain industries in the developing world faced competition from 
Western corporations with local distribution channels, service pro-
viders in advanced, industrialized nations did not face a reciprocal 
competition from service providers in the developing world.
Unlike merchandise, which typically can tolerate the lag between 
product design and product production imposed by international 
shipping, many services require a real-time exchange of information 
between the service provider and its consumer. Accordingly, for the 
bulk of human history, services had to be performed on-site or near-
site. The digital revolution disrupted this requirement through two 
related innovations: the creation of global digital networks and the 
digitization of information itself. First, the introduction of the 
Internet and other high capacity transcontinental electronic data 
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networks made possible remote collaboration on a real-time basis, 
with parties separated by continents able to share data almost as 
readily as if they had adjoining cubicles.12 Second, the digitization of 
information spurred its wide dissemination. The adoption of com-
puters as a tool for work meant that information was often created 
originally in digital form. The World Wide Web established one 
common information-sharing platform, taking advantage of both 
digital networks and digitized information. Information that had 
been held locally now found wide distribution. Take, for example, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database, 
with its immense storehouse of information about publicly traded 
companies, and the Patent and Trademark Office’s databases, which 
make every patent and registered trademark searchable. It was not 
long ago when accessing SEC or PTO public records required 
hiring a runner to photocopy files in a Washington area basement, 
delivering a copy by either Federal Express or fax. With the rise of 
the World Wide Web, these databases became available for free to 
people across the world.13 The global information platform allowed 
the creation of new services, such as search engines, video and other 
information-sharing depositories, and personal social networks.
Today, cross-border outsourcing includes “typists, researchers, 
librarians, claims processors, proofreaders, accountants and graphic 
designers.”14 Cross-border trade in services also includes engineer-
ing,15 architectural services,16 legal services,17 animation, and movie 
special effects.18 The jobs are both “big—100-page investment 
reports requiring weeks of work—and small.”19 Chennai-based 
“Iayaraja Marimuthu, for instance, is designing a program for [the] 
wedding of Ann and John, a Texas couple proclaiming their joy in 
being ‘together for life.’ ”20 (The flower arranging, alas, cannot be 
outsourced cross-border, even if the flowers themselves come from 
the tropics.) Today, telecommuting can occur across hemispheres. A 
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Wall Street Journal article offers a vivid example of what it calls 
“extreme telecommuting”: although Paolo Conconi’s “work is in 
Europe and China, his office is a table by the pool of his villa in Bali, 
Indonesia. As he goes through his mail, he sips his favorite Italian 
coffee. An attendant lights his cigarette.”21
Manufacturing, too, has been transformed by electronic net-
works. Even a trade as ancient as Persian carpet weaving “is guided, 
these days, in part by e-mail missives on the tastes of rich customers 
in the West.”22 This is an example of the design services that are a 
key input into the manufacturing process.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) estimates that one-fifth of all service jobs in the 
developed economies will be affected by cross-border trade in ser-
vices.23 This does not mean that such a large fraction of jobs will 
soon be outsourced but, rather, that the terms of these positions will 
change as a result of international competition. The deepening divi-
sion of labor represented by cross-border outsourcing of services 
increases efficiency, just as the international division of labor in man-
ufacturing increased efficiency. An inefficient service sector func-
tions as “a prohibitive tax on the national economy.”24 By removing 
this unproductive tax, trade in services should improve growth across 
the world. Of course, even while many more will gain, many will 
lose. The personal misfortunes that will result will be enormous. 
Retraining and adjustment programs are necessary measures, but 
not all countries can afford them.
Vendor or Captive? Reinterpreting “Make or Buy”
The first claim to fame of the economist Ronald Coase was his 1937 
inquiry into why firms existed at all, rather than individuals who 
contracted with one another in the marketplace. The question has 
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been translated into the query: Make (inside a firm) or buy (through 
a market)? Often overlooked is that Coase placed technology at the 
heart of his explanation of the determinants of the boundaries of the 
firm, recognizing that technology would influence both the transac-
tions costs of marketplace contracting and the organization costs of 
internal hierarchy.25 In 2000, the New York Times linked the organi-
zational shift to a prediction of Coase’s theory: “Sixty years [after 
Coase’s paper], transaction costs have plunged, thanks to the Inter-
net. . . . As a result, companies can get complete information about 
potential suppliers and business partners within a few clicks, and can 
therefore set up supplier agreements or form alliances with other 
companies for a fraction of what it would have cost even a decade 
ago.”26 Electronic data networks reduced not only the costs of mar-
ketplace transactions but also the costs of managerial hierarchies. 
The first effect—the reduction of transaction costs—tends to reduce 
the size of the firm by increasing the use of the marketplace for pur-
chasing inputs into the production process. However, the second 
effect—the reduction of hierarchy costs—tends to increase the size 
of the firm as the costs of internalizing production inputs fall. In his 
original paper, Coase was uncertain whether improvements in com-
munications technology (he offered the example of the telephone) 
would put greater downward pressure on market transaction costs or 
internal organization costs.27 Today, the standing view seems to be 
that the greater effect has been on market transaction costs, imply-
ing an increase in third-party outsourcing.28
Yet the choice of employing a service provider abroad does not 
necessitate a turn to the market. Many Western corporations 
outsource by establishing local subsidiaries rather than by employing 
independent vendors. In the parlance of international businesspeo-
ple, nonchalant about the evocation of colonial rule, these are 
“captives.” Restated in the language of organizational economics, the 
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Western corporations that outsource through captives choose “make” 
over “buy.” (Economists consider obtaining an input from a foreign 
subsidiary “making,” not “buying,” the input because it is produced 
in-house by a corporate arm.) The General Electric Company pio-
neered this type of outsourcing in India, in large part by accident. In 
1997, as GE was establishing an Indian office to process credit 
applications from Indians for a credit card joint venture with an 
Indian bank, the “light went on.” “We started to think, we can do 
this for the rest of the world,” says Pramod Bhasin, a former GE 
Capital executive who helped create GE Capital International 
Services (“Gecis”) and serves as its chief executive. Now Gecis 
reviews credit card applications from New Delhi to New York. “By 
the late 1990s,” the Wall Street Journal reports, “GE began turning its 
attention from simply buying software from India to using the coun-
try as a base for data entry, processing credit-card applications and 
other clerical tasks.” GE realized “savings on backroom operations 
alone” of about $300 million a year. By 2000 the outsourcing had 
deepened further, as GE established the John F. Welch Technology 
Centre in Bangalore, named after its storied CEO, employing 
“thousands of researchers working on everything from new refrig-
erators to jet engines.”29
New institutional economists have refined Coase’s insights into 
the determinants of the organization of the firm. Today economists 
explain the decision to make rather than buy as turning in part on 
the existence of asset specificity. Certain types of marketplace con-
tracts might be subject to post-contractual opportunistic behavior, 
leading companies to bring those functions within the corporate 
hierarchy. When either party invests in assets specialized to that par-
ticular contract, the counterparty can exploit that investment by 
renegotiating the terms of the contract, recognizing that the party 
making a specialized investment cannot readily divert its resources 
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to alternative productive uses.30 In cross-border outsourcing, either 
the vendor or the procurer of services may face the risk of exploita-
tion: the vendor might be required to engage in extensive informa-
tion gathering about its client or create processes and systems 
narrowly tailored to the client’s needs; the client, meanwhile, might 
come to rely on proprietary systems owned and supported by a par-
ticular vendor. The vendor’s investment in knowledge may leave the 
client vulnerable, at least in the short run, if such knowledge will be 
difficult for another vendor to replicate readily in the future. At the 
same time, the vendor may be vulnerable because of its extensive 
asset-specific human and other capital investment in the project of 
the procurer, an investment that will be amortized only over a long 
term.
Firms faced with asset-specific inputs might avoid the possibil-
ity of exploitative behavior by entering into long-term contracts that 
provide remedies for exploitative behavior. However, such contracts 
might be quite expensive, both to write and to enforce.31 This prob-
lem is compounded by the difficulty of pricing idiosyncratic inputs. 
Because neither the buyer nor the seller will find it easy to predict 
exactly how many resources the input will ultimately require, the 
contractual price may be subject to adjustment under the contract 
terms. The price escalation clause makes it difficult to distinguish 
legitimate pricing adjustments due to unexpected cost increases 
from behavior exploiting the counterparty’s asset-specific invest-
ments. At times, one party will accept the risk of exploitation by the 
other side, a risk that it will presumably price. Reputational sanc-
tions and the withdrawal of expected future business often prove a 
means to discipline exploitative behavior.
The principal alternative to contracting as a response to the 
difficulties posed by asset specificity is vertical integration—that is, 
buying or building the supplier instead of buying the supply. Rather 
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than rely on contracts with third-party vendors, corporations might 
choose to bring the function in-house. They can do so even with 
inputs to be delivered across borders, typically through establishing 
a local subsidiary in the foreign country. General Electric did exactly 
this when it expanded its financial services operations in India.
But vertical integration increases hierarchy costs and fails to take 
full advantage of the market. Managing subsidiaries cross-border is 
an especially expensive proposition. More important, keeping a func-
tion in-house reduces the opportunities for benefiting from econo-
mies of scale. Of course, a firm could create a subsidiary that serves 
not just that firm but also other companies. But third-party vendors 
can more readily serve multiple clients. This represents a division of 
labor across firms rather than within them. The approach is the 
opposite of the twentieth-century firm described by Alfred Chan-
dler, either the conglomerate that makes everything from tires to 
rolls of bathroom tissue (similar only to the extent that both are cir-
cular) or the vertically integrated multidivisional firm. Contempo-
rary organization theorists see investments through public and 
private markets, rather than managerial hierarchy, as the superior 
mechanism in most cases for diversifying risk and investing in 
opportunities in diverse markets. A stand-alone enterprise not con-
fined to one buyer finds it easier to scale up by offering its service to 
multiple demanders. A diversity of demanders also increases the effi-
ciency with which that service is used, as slackened demand by a 
customer here (say, as a result of regional or sectoral recession) can be 
compensated by increased demand elsewhere. By providing services 
to multiple companies, third-party vendors also develop specialized 
expertise not readily available to a supplier for a single entity. As one 
expert notes, captive centers must “derive one’s own learning, unlike 
in a third-party scenario where they would have picked up best 
practices from other clients and processes.”32 The efficiencies of 
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third-party vendors hold a financial payoff: the Economist magazine 
reports that captives may tend to be more expensive than indepen-
dent vendors, with costs up to 50 percent higher.33
Indeed, the pioneer in outsourcing to India, GE, has spun off its 
Gecis subsidiary, selling a majority stake to US-based private equity 
firms.34 The sale “allowed Gecis to begin working for companies 
other than GE, including Japan’s Nissan Motor Co.”35 One of the 
many India-based outsourcing companies to list on the New York 
Stock Exchange, WNS (Holdings) Limited, followed a similar path, 
beginning life as the in-house services provider for British Airways, 
until the American private equity group Warburg Pincus purchased 
a majority stake. Today the company, which is incorporated in Jersey, 
Channel Islands, continues to serve British Airways but also serves 
Air Canada, Virgin Atlantic Airways, and numerous financial insti-
tutions.36 The trend seems to be continuing. Citigroup, for example, 
sold its Indian subsidiary Citigroup Global Services to Tata Consul-
tancy Services at the end of 2008 for half a billion dollars. Tata took 
on the twelve thousand employees of the subsidiary and agreed to 
provide services to Citigroup for the next decade. Citigroup then 
sold another Indian services subsidiary to Wipro, simultaneously 
agreeing to a five-year contract to outsource certain services to 
Wipro. The Swiss bank UBS sold its Indian business-process 
outsourcing unit to outsourcing firm Cognizant.
The decision to outsource a function through a foreign subsid-
iary rather than a third-party vendor often turns on yet other factors 
beyond asset specificity or efficiency. Companies are especially wary 
of turning “strategic” or “core” functions over to third-party entities. 
The concern is especially evident when such functions involve 
proprietary and secret information, given the fear that the foreign 
vendor might appropriate such information and use it to enhance a 
competitor. But some management consultants argue in a Harvard 
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Business Review article that even “critical functions like engineering, 
R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can—and often should—be 
moved outside.”37 Even the definition of what is “strategic” and 
“core” is susceptible to change over time. The history of the inte-
grated circuit chip industry reflects this dynamic:
In the 1980s, large U.S. integrated circuit chip (“chip”) design 
companies began moving manufacturing of their chips to 
offshore fabrication facilities (or “fabs”) that also leveraged 
economies of scale to produce large volumes of chips for 
many chip companies. . . . The benefit for these companies 
included reducing their costs to produce their chips, while 
freeing up capital and time to develop newer and better 
chips. Today, almost every new U.S. chip company is  
“fabless”; they design their semiconductor products and turn 
to offshore fabrication facilities to produce them.38
Intel remains an important exception to this rule, maintaining plants 
across the world. Outsourcing production of even a company’s most 
valued products is commonplace: Apple outsources its star products—
iPhone, iPod, and laptop production—to Taiwanese vendors. In 2012, 
Apple’s CEO Tim Cook visited the Chinese plant where 120,000 
workers employed by the Taiwanese company Foxconn build Apple’s 
products.39 Apple also announced plans to renew limited manufactur-
ing in the United States. Over time, the pressure to minimize costs 
may increase demand for third-party vendors with respect to services, 
but only as long as issues of intellectual property, privacy, security, 
and contract enforcement are adequately resolved. As outsourcing to 
third-party entities deepens, we may see a reversal of the trend 
famously noted by Alfred Chandler: a move from the visible hand of 
management to the invisible hand of the market.
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From Open Source to Outsource
Outsourcing shares much in common with open-source production 
processes, an increasingly important mode of organizing production. 
Harvard theorist Yochai Benkler describes what he calls “commons-
based peer production,” whereby individuals, usually working as vol-
unteers, contribute to a communal project in a “self-selected and 
decentralized, rather than hierarchically assigned” manner, rewarded 
principally only in reputation or in the use of the final product. 
Benkler suggests that these volunteers can “beat the largest and 
best-financed business enterprises in the world at their own game.”40 
Both outsourcing and open sourcing require that a larger task be 
divisible across numerous persons who are geographically dispersed, 
a division made immeasurably easier by the emergence of the Inter-
net. Both thus embody the increasing deconstruction of the firm, with 
the functions of the firm disaggregated via piecemeal work per-
formed remotely.41 In this section, I explore the relation between the 
two, suggesting that outsourcing can benefit from the adoption of 
open source and open standards.
Open-source production can be understood as a species of net-
work: in commons-based peer production, the person originating 
the project outsources development to others around the world, 
though without the command directive or purchasing conditions 
typically present in a traditional outsourcing transaction. Consider 
Linux, the exemplar of the peer production and open-source move-
ment. The kernel to this operating system was developed by Linus 
Torvalds from his home in Finland, built atop code developed by 
Richard Stallman. Since 1991, when he released his source code to 
an Internet newsgroup, Torvalds has coordinated a global produc-
tion process, now from the West Coast of the United States.42 The 
Linux kernel today contains more than fifteen million lines of code 
and powers the great bulk of the world’s top supercomputers.43
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In computer software, languages evolved to promote modular 
programming, which facilitates collaboration.44 Programming now 
often involves extending a “library” of functions, each performing a 
well-defined operation upon the receipt of specified parameters. The 
rationalization of business processes, too, has increasingly standard-
ized some corporate functions.
In peer production, the ability to collaborate depends on a related 
fundamental characteristic: the decision to publish the necessary 
standards (and often the underlying code) for modifying or extend-
ing the given project. Opening up the source and the interfaces 
enables a largely spontaneous division of labor across unaffiliated 
parties. The web itself has been called “the apotheosis of open 
standards.”45 The web’s principal designer, Tim Berners-Lee, sought 
to ensure that the programming underlying a webpage would 
be publicly available (thus the feature of most desktop web 
browsers that allows one to look at the page’s programming).46 
The decision of some companies to open their application program-
ming interfaces (even without necessarily revealing the underlying 
code) to the world enables others to access the application’s func-
tionality and extend the application in unforeseen ways. Today a 
website can mash up the mapping service offered by Google with 
the photography service offered by Flickr mixed in with Amazon’s 
sales services.
One of the principal attractions of the open-source process is that 
it reduces opportunistic behavior exploiting asset specificity.47 Propri-
etary standards for any given system limit the potential market for 
suppliers who might manage or extend that system. At least in the 
absence of reverse engineering (which is both costly and potentially 
imperfect), only the original supplier of the proprietary system or its 
licensees will have the information required to modify that system. 
Where a system is open source, in contrast, many suppliers can 
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potentially modify that system. Consider the journey of IBM, 
which practically invented proprietary computing systems, to its 
current embrace of open source. Its CEO, Samuel Palmisano, 
now evangelizes open standards: “Everywhere, economic activity 
is turning outward by embracing shared business and technology 
standards that let businesses plug into truly global systems of 
production.”48
Open-source projects have gone viral across borders without 
paying much attention to the legal niceties usually accompanying 
cross-border licensing. Yet given their global scope, open-source 
projects rely on the global enforceability of licenses. They do not 
limit themselves either to contributions from coders from jurisdic-
tions likely to enforce the license or to users from such jurisdictions. 
Eben Moglen and Richard Stallman, the authors of one of the most 
popular open-source licenses, the GNU public license (GPL), 
acknowledge that version 2 of the GPL was “a license constructed by 
one US layman and his lawyers, largely concerned with US law.”49 
Even its current third version neither chooses governing law or 
forum nor offers variations based on jurisdiction. The Creative Com-
mons licenses, by contrast, have been “ported” to more than fifty 
jurisdictions. Version 3 of the GPL was, however, written with the 
substantive harmonization requirements of international intellectual 
property treaties in mind. The GNU license disclaims warrantees 
and asserts claims over the distribution of derivative works without 
reference to any particular jurisdiction’s laws.50 Thus far, this failure 
to consider choice of law and local property and contracting prob-
lems does not appear to have proven detrimental, perhaps because of 
the disciplinary force of informal reputation sanctions in the 
programming community. In drafting the third version of the 
GPL, which they characterize as a “Worldwide Copyright 
License,” Moglen and Stallman observed that, despite the lack of 
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international foundations, the “GPL version 2 performed the task of 
globalization relatively well.”51
The economic logic of net-work—specifically, the increase in pro-
ductivity arising from a deepening division of labor—supports the 
lowering of protectionist barriers against trade in services.52 But 
more is required. International trade flourishes in a legal infrastruc-
ture of enforceable contracts. This is ever more urgent as firms turn 
increasingly to buying over making, as they outsource production 
processes to third-party vendors in alien jurisdictions. The increased 
legal risks of the market mechanism operating cross-border might 
be reduced through better transnational dispute resolution frame-
works. I turn to these issues in chapter 7.
Despite the efficiencies of global commerce, national borders 
remain crucial. Law, after all, is defined largely at the national level. 
States will be loath to abandon their law in the face of offerings 
mediated by the Internet. In the coming chapters I show how the 
nations of the world are reconfiguring themselves for global 
e-commerce and how the law can both facilitate and regulate such 
commerce. Adam Smith deplored the mercantilism of his day, which 
would erect barriers to imports so that no specie left the homeland. 
In this book, I argue that we must dismantle the logistical and 
regulatory barriers to net-work trade while at the same time ensur-
ing that public policy objectives cannot easily be evaded through a 
simple jurisdictional sleight of hand or keystroke.
35
2
WESTERN ENTREPÔT
silicon Valley
We can glimpse Silicon Valley’s global ambitions on the tiny screen 
of the iPhone. Each icon on the display is a portal to a service offered 
by a distant provider. With a few taps of her finger, a Londoner 
might purchase Persian rugs via eBay, download an e- book by the 
latest Booker Prize winner from Amazon, write her work reports 
using Microsoft’s online enterprise software, manage customer rela-
tionships via Salesforce, find business clients via LinkedIn, and 
manage her London stocks investments via Fidelity.
Pulling out his phone in Japan, a resident of Tokyo might search 
for information on local history on Google, organize a party via 
Evite, make a restaurant reservation via OpenTable, keep in touch 
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with friends via Facebook, purchase tickets for a local concert via 
Tickets.com, find a date via Match.com, read the news on CNN’s 
Japan service, play word games with friends via Zynga, store his 
emails and photos on Google’s servers and his health records on 
Microsoft’s HealthVault, all the while humming along to the latest 
iTune by a US pop star. The iPhones of both the Londoner and the 
Tokyoite might be populated by services headquartered mostly along 
the West Coast of the United States.
This montage reflects the increasingly international penetration 
of American companies on the wings of the Internet. Apple offers 
its iTunes download store in some 50 countries in the industrialized 
world (even charging different prices for the same iTune, with 
British and Japanese music aficionados paying twice the usual 
price).1 Ticketmaster offers its ticket- brokerage services in 18 coun-
tries.2 eBay’s financial intermediary PayPal is available in more than 
190 countries and regions, and in twenty- five currencies.3 PayPal 
wants you to use its service “whether you’re buying soccer shoes from 
Chile, a cell phone from China, or selling surfboards in Costa Rica.”4 
MySpace hosts garage bands from Mexico City to New York, 
all seeking a global audience.5 From its Dallas headquarters and its 
Beijing, Rio, and Tokyo offices, Match.com offers dating services in 
57 countries, in more than a dozen languages. A handful of years 
ago, when Google was already “available in 160 different local coun-
try domains and 117 languages,” its founders lamented that it had 
physical “business operations in just 20 countries.”6 Today, Google 
has business operations in more than 50 countries, regions, and ter-
ritories.7 Via the Internet, Silicon Valley firms seek to become the 
intermediaries for the world.
Despite common perception to the contrary, the globalization of 
services does not entail a one- way drive toward developing country 
suppliers. Silicon Valley has emerged as the world’s leading net- work 
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provider. While some companies, especially in the developing world, 
use the Internet to provide traditional services like radiology, 
accounting, or gambling across borders, Silicon Valley enterprises 
such as Facebook, Yahoo!, and Google offer a newer breed of infor-
mation services to the world. Yahoo! and Google in particular help 
organize the world’s information, and they earn a handsome living 
in the process. In 2011, Google drew 54 percent of its total revenues 
from its operations outside the United States. Google attributes 
these revenues in part to “increased acceptance of our advertising 
programs” and “our continued progress in developing localized ver-
sions of our products for these international markets.” More than 
half of Google’s traffic came from users outside the United States. 
Yahoo! meanwhile provides services “in more than 45 languages and 
in 60 countries” and earns more than half of its revenues outside the 
Americas.8
These companies’ operations outside the United States contrib-
ute to their enormous market value. Google boasts a market capital-
ization of $200 billion, Yahoo! $18 billion, and Microsoft $275 
billion, which we might compare to the $45 billion, $34 billion, 
and $27 billion market values of Indian net- work providers TCS, 
Infosys, and Wipro, respectively. Indeed, I calculated these figures 
while in Shanghai on March 15, 2012, using Yahoo! Finance and 
Yahoo! Currency Converter. Apple, which earns income through 
both hardware and software, is currently valued at $550 billion 
and has far surpassed ExxonMobil as the biggest company in the 
world (which has a market capitalization of $405 billion). Microsoft 
continues to dominate sales of “office” software around the world, 
while Google and others vie to create virtual offices in the sky. 
Silicon Valley’s ambitions to encompass the wide range of human 
services are clear: “Hundreds of companies in Silicon Valley are 
offering every imaginable service, from writing tools to elaborate 
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dating and social networking systems, all of which require only a 
Web browser.”9
Despite public perception to the contrary, the United States 
actually exports far more services (counting both electronically 
mediated and other services) than it imports. The United States had 
a net surplus in commercial services trade of $187 billion in 2011, 
increasing from $157 billion in 2010 and $139 billion in 2009.10 
India imported ($130 billion) almost as much as it exported ($148 
billion) in 2011, a net export surplus of $18 billion, representing a 
turnaround from 2010’s net deficit of $7 billion. At the moment, at 
least, the United States has a stronger claim to being the world’s 
back office than India—and strong reason therefore to disfavor ser-
vices protectionism. For that matter, even the United Kingdom 
might be more likely to merit the services silver medal title than 
India, with a net services surplus of $103 billion in 2011 (compared 
to $71 billion in 2010 and $80 billion in 2009).
If Indians staff the world’s back office, Americans are supplying 
personal services directly to the world’s masses—America as 
financial intermediary, matchmaker, librarian, newspaper editor, 
investment adviser, advertising agency, and record keeper. When 
aggregated across millions of consumers worldwide, these personal 
services can be even more lucrative than the silk and spices ferried 
across the ancient Silk Road.
A century ago, American companies might have conquered the 
local market before seeking customers abroad. Today the global 
rollout is central to the business plan at the get- go. IBM unveils a 
recent initiative to the world in Shanghai and names an initial cus-
tomer: the government of Vietnam, in a project with a “non- US 
automaker.”11
So far, I have described what appears to be a process of 
globalization driven largely by the twin forces of technology and 
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economics. The rise of Silicon Valley is typically attributed to this 
techno- economic good fortune. However, while the global forces 
leading to trade from Silicon Valley might seem to be indifferent to 
law, law is in fact very much in the picture.
Governments have adopted industrial policies to promote infor-
mation services. In 1997, President Bill Clinton and Vice President 
Al Gore released their Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, 
setting out the government’s approach to regulating the Internet. 
The title demonstrates a global ambition early on. Announcing the 
initiative, Clinton observed, “If we establish an environment in 
which electronic commerce can grow and flourish, then every com-
puter can be a window open to every business, large and small, 
everywhere in the world.” Clinton made it clear that he hoped 
that this would open up global markets to American enterprise: 
“This vision contemplates an America in which every American—
consumers, small business people, corporate CEOs—will be able to 
extend our trade to the farthest reaches of the planet.” In his remarks, 
Clinton described himself as a “technophobe” and joked that for 
people like him a “floppy disk” meant a Frisbee. Despite his pro-
fessed ignorance, his administration adopted a set of policies that 
favored Silicon Valley innovation.12
President Clinton declared that the Internet should be a “global 
free- trade zone.”13 Thus, the United States has been pressing its 
trading partners to commit to the liberalization of e- commerce. 
Since the United States–Jordan Free Trade Agreement, signed in 
2000, every free trade agreement entered into by the United States 
has included provisions for e- commerce. I turn to the content 
of those free trade agreements in chapter 6, but one provision—a 
moratorium on customs duties—deserves early mention.
A central goal of US trade policy over the past two decades has 
been to eliminate tariffs on products delivered electronically. At the 
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urging of the United States, the World Trade Organization in 1998 
adopted a moratorium on “customs duties on electronic transmis-
sions.”14 That moratorium has been renewed repeatedly over the past 
fifteen years, though some countries remain uneasy about the poten-
tial loss of customs revenues owing to the increasing delivery of 
entertainment and other information via the Internet. The United 
States has made this a key pillar of its bilateral and regional trade 
agreements as well. As mentioned, since the US agreement with 
Jordan in 2000, every subsequent US free trade agreement has con-
tained an e- commerce chapter banning customs duties on digital 
products, delivered either online or on a carrier medium (such as a 
CD or DVD). Thus, if a Chilean downloads an album by the Black 
Eyed Peas or streams a Disney film from the United States, Chile 
cannot collect any customs duties on that action. The same would 
apply to the purchase of Chilean music or movies by Americans, of 
course, but countries with large entertainment or software industries 
stand to be the principal beneficiaries of this policy.
Many countries across the world have worried that they 
have failed to develop indigenous Internet industries that could rival 
Silicon Valley. In 2006, President Jacques Chirac of France called on 
Europeans to develop an indigenous information search capacity to 
respond to “the global challenge posed by Google and Yahoo.”15 
Japan, too, has established public- private partnerships to promote 
next- generation search technologies.16 No strong government- 
funded alternative has yet emerged to challenge the dominance of 
West Coast firms. However, locally operated companies such as 
Naver and Yandex hold a significant share of the local language 
search market in countries such as Korea and Russia.
My goal in this chapter is to show the crucial role of the law both 
in enabling Silicon Valley’s global success and in complicating its 
global ambitions. Law figures in at least three important ways. First, 
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a framework of laws permits Silicon Valley enterprises to raise enor-
mous sums of capital for highly risky ventures. Second, the law 
largely insulates Internet intermediaries hailing from the United 
States from liability, at least in their home jurisdiction. Third, the 
laws of foreign jurisdictions can threaten the global reach of Silicon 
Valley enterprises by erecting significant barriers to trade or impos-
ing special responsibilities on information service providers.
Three cases involving Internet giants Yahoo! and Google dem-
onstrate the legal conflicts that occasionally arise as Silicon Valley 
enterprises extend themselves across the world. Yahoo!, Google, and 
their peers provide platforms for people to communicate, whether 
for discussing politics or sports, selling goods or services, or, on 
occasion, facilitating crime. Because speech regulations vary across 
countries, both Yahoo! and Google sometimes find themselves in 
the difficult position of juggling inconsistent demands. Because both 
companies are based in the United States, where freedom of speech 
is especially broad, their global reach has on occasion tested the lim-
its of speech in other jurisdictions. The first case, the Yahoo! conflict 
in France, may be familiar, but it represents the most fully elaborated 
international cyberlaw conflict and thus merits careful review.
Yahoo! in France
The most famous international dispute involving cyberspace centers 
on a clash between two different legal cultures—one cherishing free 
speech and the other criminalizing hate speech.
Yahoo!’s encounter with French laws barring Nazi paraphernalia 
produced the most elaborate judicial consideration to date of the 
potential conflicts of law arising from net- work. Yahoo!’s efforts to 
provide information services to France from the United States pro-
duced a titanic clash between two liberal approaches. The conflict 
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drew a sharp response from both sides of the Atlantic. The French 
judge in the case hyperbolically declared Yahoo! “the largest vehicle 
in existence for the promotion [of ] Nazism.”17 Yahoo!’s lawyer for 
his part decried what he perceived to be the “French imperialism” 
implicit in a Parisian court order against Yahoo!’s California- based 
enterprise.18 Across the ocean, some federal judges in the United 
States would declare efforts to enforce that order as unwarranted 
extraterritorial intrusions of French law into the United States.19
Yahoo! is founded and run from a country with broad constitu-
tional protections against state infringement of speech. The terrify-
ing histories of other lands, however, have led them to bar certain 
types of speech.20 Like many countries across Europe, French laws 
bar speech invoking or glorifying Nazism.21 More specifically, the 
French penal code declares it a crime to display or exchange Nazi 
memorabilia. Yahoo! provides a number of services that potentially 
run afoul of this law: its search engine services allow people to locate 
the websites of Holocaust deniers; its (now defunct) Geocities web-
page service allowed someone to post Mein Kampf and The Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion; and its auction services, which match buyers 
and sellers around the world, permitted the traffic of material glori-
fying Nazism. In April 2000, the French Jewish Students Union 
(UEJF) and the International League Against Racism and Anti- 
Semitism (LICRA) filed a complaint in Paris seeking to enjoin 
Yahoo! from hosting auctions featuring Nazi material.
In May 2000, Judge Jean- Jacques Gomez of the Paris Tribunal 
de Grande Instance offered his first interim ruling, ordering Yahoo! 
to “take all measures necessary to block access by Internet users in 
France through yahoo.com to the disputed sites and services.  “Yahoo! 
insisted that this was technically impossible because the nature 
of the Internet made it impossible for it to deny access to French 
citizens without simultaneously denying access to Americans. 
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Yahoo! sought, undoubtedly, to place itself within an earlier prece-
dent, a case in which a French superior court judge had ruled that 
“since it was technically impossible to block or filter foreign- based 
Internet sites, . . . ISPs could not be held criminally or civilly liable 
for objectionable United States–based content accessed by French 
citizens.”22 Responding to Yahoo!’s claim of technical incapacity, 
Judge Gomez appointed an international expert panel to determine 
whether Yahoo! could identify French web users, in order to deny 
them certain content. The panel consisted of American Internet pio-
neer (and currently Google’s chief Internet evangelist) Vint Cerf, 
Ben Laurie of the United Kingdom, and François Wallon of France. 
The panelists concluded that technological means known as “geolo-
cation” allowed “over 70% of the IP addresses of surfers residing in 
French territory to be identified as being French,” and two of the 
three panelists (not Cerf ) suggested that asking surfers to declare 
their nationality would raise the success rate of identifying French 
residents to approximately 90 percent (though this latter opinion 
seems more appropriate for sociologists than computer experts).23 
Geolocation relies largely on the Internet Protocol (IP) address of 
the user to determine that user’s physical location, associating phys-
ical location with the particular Internet service provider to whom 
that IP address is allocated.
This was sufficient for Judge Gomez, who ruled that “effective 
filtering methods” were available to Yahoo!. A crucial aspect of Judge 
Gomez’s approach deserves special notice. Judge Gomez did not 
rule that French law required Yahoo! to desist from making Nazi 
material available to French persons regardless of the effect on US 
users. He first established (at least to his own satisfaction) that 
Yahoo! could specifically deny French residents access to the mate-
rial without removing it more generally. Of course, Judge Gomez 
believed that a “moral imperative” should motivate Yahoo! to remove 
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this material universally, but he did not order this. Rather, his order 
was drawn to deny access only to those within France, though 
whether this is in fact possible is highly questionable. Judge Gomez’s 
approach thus reflects the international law principle of comity, that 
is, respect for the laws of other nations exercised within their own 
territory. While Judge Gomez himself believed that banning Nazi 
materials would satisfy “an ethical and moral imperative shared by 
all democratic societies,” he cabined his order to effects felt within 
France. Nonetheless, as we will see in chapter 8, the practicalities 
of implementing the order might well compromise speech in the 
United States.24
Not only did Yahoo! face an injunction and a penalty of, at first, 
100,000 euros (later reduced to 100,000 francs) per day, but both the 
company and its American CEO faced criminal charges. In 2001, 
prosecutors, acting on a complaint by groups concerned about rac-
ism and anti- Semitism, brought charges against Yahoo! and its 
CEO, Tim Koogle, for “justifying a crime against humanity” and 
“exhibiting a uniform, insignia or emblem of a person guilty of 
crimes against humanity,” crimes punishable by up to five years in 
jail for Koogle and fines of 45,735 euros.25 The charges arose from 
the same facts underlying the earlier civil action. In 2002, the Paris 
criminal court held that it had jurisdiction in this criminal case 
but acquitted the defendants based on a lack of evidence that the 
defendants had praised Nazi atrocities.26 Koogle’s acquittal was 
upheld on appeal in 2005 on the ground that “the simple act of host-
ing auctions of Nazi memorabilia from a Web site based in the 
United States did not meet the tight standards French courts have 
previously used when ruling in Holocaust negation cases.”27
After losing in the French civil court, Yahoo! sought protection 
from the French judgment in its home jurisdiction, seeking a decla-
ration that the French order was unenforceable in the United States. 
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Yahoo! had, in the interim, slightly modified its policies (of its own 
accord, and not in response to the French ruling, Yahoo! insisted) to 
bar the sale of items promoting hate, but the policies made an excep-
tion for books and films and did not affect Yahoo!’s search engine 
services, which still allowed users to search for Holocaust denier 
material.28 Yahoo! said that possible enforcement of the French 
orders hung over it like a “Damocles sword.”29 Finding a genuine 
case or controversy, District Judge Jeremy Fogel ruled on the merits 
that the French orders were unenforceable by a US court because 
they violated public policy embedded in the First Amendment.30 
LICRA and UEJF appealed, and a divided Ninth Circuit panel dis-
missed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the French 
defendants.31
Emphasizing the critical issues at stake, the Ninth Circuit 
reheard the case en banc. In a set of six heavily divided opinions, the 
court dismissed the case, but without a rationale that drew majority 
support. Three judges voted to dismiss for lack of ripeness (that is, 
the conflict is not ready for adjudication as it turns on future events 
that may or may not occur as anticipated). They argued that it was 
not yet clear that Yahoo! faced any risk from the French judgment 
because Yahoo! had voluntarily amended its policy and it was not 
clear that the French court would penalize it further. Three other 
judges voted to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that 
the defendant French groups had not taken sufficient affirmative 
steps targeting Yahoo! in California to justify having to defend 
themselves in California (that is, the court lacks the power over these 
particular defendants in such a case). These votes sufficed on an 
eleven- person en banc panel to dismiss the case.32 The dissenting 
judges would have reached the merits. Judge Raymond Fisher, writ-
ing for himself and four other judges, would have held that enforc-
ing the French order would impose a prior restraint on Yahoo! and 
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would do so in an overly vague and broad manner—and thus 
would be repugnant under the First Amendment.33 However, Judge 
William Fletcher, writing for himself and two other judges, was not 
so certain. He distinguished between two forms in which the First 
Amendment repugnancy claim could arise: (1) the French court 
might require Yahoo! to take additional steps that did not restrict 
access to users in the United States; or (2) the French court might 
require Yahoo! to take additional steps that had the necessary conse-
quence of restricting access by users in the United States. In suggest-
ing that “the answers [to the questions of whether each of the two 
forms is constitutional] are likely to be different,” Judge Fletcher 
seemed to suggest that the first form might not be repugnant under 
the First Amendment, while the second form might well be. Yahoo!, 
for its part, would have declared even the first fact scenario to pre-
sent an unconstitutional intrusion, asking rhetorically “whether for-
eign nations can enlist our citizens and courts as reluctant policemen 
to insure that their own citizens are not exposed to ideas the foreign 
governments consider offensive.”34 Judge Fisher agreed and would 
have declared the order constitutionally repugnant because it 
required Yahoo! “to guess what has to be censored on its Internet 
services here in the United States . . . even if limited to France- based 
users.”35
This momentous case thus ended with a whimper, leaving the 
fundamental issues about international conflicts in cyberspace unre-
solved. In chapter 8, I argue in favor of Judge Fisher’s view, that the 
First Amendment forbids a US court from enforcing a foreign cen-
sorship order. In practical terms, the case demonstrates that net- 
work companies will, at least at times, change their offerings in 
concert with the demands of a foreign jurisdiction. Rather than 
change its site for one country and leave it unchanged everywhere 
else, Yahoo! changed its offerings globally.
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Google in Brazil
In their introduction to their company’s 2006 annual report, Google’s 
founders proudly declared that “Orkut,™ our experiment with social 
networking, is now part of the social fabric for the majority of online 
users in such countries as Brazil and[,] more recently, India.” The 
annual filing also revealed uncertainty as to Google’s “ability to gen-
erate revenue from services in which we have invested considerable 
time and resources, such as YouTube, Gmail and orkut.” Legal risks 
were also on the company’s mind: “Our business is subject to a vari-
ety of U.S. and foreign laws that could subject us to claims or other 
remedies based on the nature and content of the information 
searched or displayed by our products and services.”36
Indeed, Google faced a significant legal challenge in 2006. Orkut’s 
embedding into the Brazilian social fabric meant that it was being 
used there to create online communities on all manner of human 
activities, dismayingly including child pornography, incitements to 
commit crime, neo- Nazism, cruelty to animals, racism, religious intol-
erance, homophobia, and xenophobia.37 Brazilian law declares such 
activities illegal. When the Brazilian prosecutors sought Google’s 
Brazilian subsidiary’s assistance in identifying the participants in 
Orkut groups devoted to such banned activities, that subsidiary pro-
fessed a lack of control over the information demanded. The informa-
tion, the subsidiary reported, resided on the parent company’s servers 
in the United States. Unhappy with this answer, a Brazilian judge 
reproached Google for evincing a “profound disrespect for national 
sovereignty.”38 Brazilian authorities readdressed the subpoena to 
Google’s Silicon Valley headquarters, and Google promptly complied.
Why might Brazilian data be stored on computer servers in the 
United States rather than in Brazil? Google reportedly maintains 
a “policy of keeping data about its users in the US to protect it 
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from disclosure to foreign governments.”39 Call this the Safe Server 
Strategy—locating a server in a jurisdiction where constitutional 
guarantees of free speech will prevent that jurisdiction’s courts from 
enforcing an order supporting state suppression of information. 
In this case, Google decided that the Brazilian request to 
root out hate speech and child pornography did not justify trying 
to forestall turning over the information through the possible 
shield of American free speech law. I return to this issue in 
chapter 9, when considering the responsibilities of social media 
services in repressive countries. The Safe Server Strategy is hardly 
foolproof. Witness Yahoo!’s decision to change what its US- based 
servers provided, perhaps as a result of French pressure. Yet it does 
complicate a government’s efforts to enforce law, which might be 
especially useful to avoid the Balkanization of the Internet resulting 
from excessive national regulatory efforts, a point I return to in 
chapter 8.
Yahoo! in China
Yahoo! was one of the early American Internet pioneers in China. 
Its CEO and cofounder, Jerry Yang, had been born in Taiwan. In 
2000, Yahoo! webcast a fashion show featuring Swatch watches 
from atop the Great Wall of China. Swatch offered that it “chose 
Yahoo! to broadcast this event online because of Yahoo!’s global 
reach and scale and its ability to help us target Swatch wearers in 
Asia and throughout the world.”40 Before the end of the first decade 
in the twenty- first century, Yang would find himself in the US 
Capitol, bowing deeply in apology to the mother of the imprisoned 
Chinese dissident journalist Shi Tao. Yahoo! would also be accused 
of abetting the torture of Chinese dissident Wang Xiaoning in a 
California federal court. Fast- forward a few years still, and Yahoo!’s 
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investments in China (and Japan) would prove to be its crown 
jewels, providing the bulk of its market value.
The risks of net- work providers operating in China is perhaps 
made clearest in the Yahoo! case involving Shi Tao. After receiving a 
complaint alleging that Yahoo! had improperly disclosed email sub-
scriber’s Shi Tao’s personal information to the Chinese authorities, 
Hong Kong’s privacy commissioner investigated. The commissioner 
found that Yahoo! supplied information on Shi Tao to Chinese 
authorities pursuant to an order from that country’s State Security 
Bureau.41 He observed that the Chinese court (the Changsha Inter-
mediate People’s Court) had cited information supplied by Yahoo! 
in reaching its verdict against Shi Tao, with the court reporting:
Account holder information furnished by Yahoo! Holdings 
(Hong Kong) Ltd., which confirms that for IP address 
218.76.8.201 at 11:32:17 p.m. on April 20, 2004, the corre-
sponding user information was as follows: user telephone 
number: 0731–4376362 located at the Contemporary  
Business News office in Hunan; address: 2F, Building 88, 
Jianxiang New Village, Kaifu District, Changsha.42
Despite this, the privacy commissioner absolved Yahoo!’s local Hong 
Kong subsidiary of complicity. The commissioner concluded that 
connecting an IP address to a physical location did not constitute a 
revelation of “personal data” under the ordinance because the IP 
address might not “relat[e] directly or indirectly to a living individ-
ual” as required by the ordinance.43 In any case, the commissioner 
concluded, the supply of information was in fact made by Yahoo!’s 
Chinese operations without the direction or control of Yahoo!’s 
Hong Kong subsidiary.44 This suggests that the servers that held the 
relevant data were located in mainland China, which then turned 
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the data over to the authorities. The commissioner concluded that 
the California parent company did indeed exercise control over the 
Chinese operations but determined that the California parent was 
outside the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong privacy commissioner.45
Shi Tao’s was not the only case that implicated Yahoo!. In August 
2007, Yu Ling filed suit in federal court in Oakland under the Alien 
Torts Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act, alleging that 
Yahoo! and its subsidiaries had violated international law by helping 
the Chinese government uncover the identity of her husband, Wang 
Xiaoning, a political dissident. Using a Yahoo! email account 
(bxoguh@yahoo.cm.cn) and a Yahoo! Group (aaabbbccc), Wang 
Xiaoning had for years distributed political writings anonymously 
from his home in Beijing. When the authorities discovered Wang’s 
identity, they detained and, according to the lawsuit, tortured him. 
The suit alleged that the authorities beat and kicked him, forcing 
him to confess to engaging in “anti- state” activities. The Beijing 
Higher People’s Court held him guilty of sedition. It determined 
that “Wang had edited, published and contributed articles to 
42 issues of two political e- journals, advocating for open elections, a 
multi- party system and separation of powers in the government.”46 
Wang was imprisoned in Beijing Prison No. 2, sentenced to a 
ten- year term for “incitement to subvert state power.”47
“Yahoo betrayed my husband,” Yu charged, arguing that Yahoo! 
facilitated her husband’s arrest and conviction. Yahoo! disputed her 
claims, but the Chinese judgment demonstrates at least some level 
of Yahoo!’s involvement in the case. A review of the Chinese judg-
ment by the group Human Rights in China reveals the following:
The evidence against him included information provided by 
Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd. stating that Wang’s 
“aaabbbccc” Yahoo! Group was set up through the mainland 
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China–based email address bxoguh@yahoo.com.cn. Yahoo 
Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd. also confirmed that the email 
address ahgq@yahoo.com.cn, through which Wang sent mes-
sages to the Group, was a mainland China–based account.48
Yahoo! argued that its Chinese operations had to comply with 
lawful official requests for information and that it cannot know how 
authorities will use information that it shares with them: “Yahoo 
China will not know whether the demand for information is for a 
legitimate criminal investigation or is going to be used to prosecute 
political dissidents.”49 Despite the Chinese court’s judgment, which 
cited Yahoo!’s Hong Kong subsidiary’s cooperation in the case, 
Yahoo! insists that there was “no exchange of information” between 
its Hong Kong subsidiary and “mainland security forces.”50
Yahoo! reached a settlement with the Shi and Wang families in 
2007. It also set up a human rights fund to provide “humanitarian 
relief ” to families of dissidents imprisoned for expressing their views 
online. Noting that he had not been CEO during the period of the 
disclosure, Yang declared, “Yahoo! was founded on the idea that the 
free exchange of information can fundamentally change how people 
lead their lives, conduct their business and interact with their gov-
ernments.” He continued, “We are committed to making sure our 
actions match our values around the world.”51
Yahoo! had already reconsidered its strategy in China. In 2005, 
it transferred its Chinese operations to the leading Chinese 
e- commerce company, Alibaba. But that did not mean that it was 
quitting the market entirely: it simultaneously invested $1 billion 
into Alibaba, gaining a 40 percent stake in the company.52 In 2012, 
it sold half of that stake to Alibaba for $7 billion. The year 2012 also 
marked Wang’s release from prison. Shi Tao, however, remains 
imprisoned.
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Yahoo!’s foray into China raises a central issue for net- work: 
How can a company supplying services around the globe comport 
itself to the laws of repressive regimes without fouling human rights? 
The issue is especially salient for net- work providers as they traffic in 
information—precisely the target of repressive regimes. Human 
Rights Watch identifies a “race to the bottom” in which Western 
corporations seek to outdo each other in assisting Chinese political 
repression.53 Yahoo! has chosen to withdraw, at least behind a minor-
ity shareholding, which it has recently reduced. Yahoo! has also 
joined the Global Network Initiative, which commits it to protect-
ing freedom and expression and privacy around the world, subject to 
external audits. I discuss this initiative further in chapter 9.
The various difficulties faced by Google and Yahoo! in their 
global offerings preview some of the difficulties that will attend the 
rise of the current wave of computing. I now turn to the emergence 
of cloud computing.
Trade from the Clouds
“Cloud computing”—the use of enormous computers to store and 
process data at a distance—has risen to prominence in recent years. 
In one sense it represents a return to the era when terminals simply 
provided connections to a big computer, an era before personal com-
puters like the IBM PC and the Apple IIe reinvented computing. 
The terminals of the 1960s and 1970s simply served as input- output 
devices for a large brain in some well- cooled backroom. I can recall 
the enormous Hewlett Packard 3000 “minicomputer” to which I 
connected as a child through a line of terminals in the 1970s at my 
local Midwestern university. But now rather than residing in a back-
room to which the wires run, the large brain today is pulsing far 
from the user, often in a different state or even a different country. 
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Even in the 1960s and 1970s, one could use telephone modems to 
log in remotely to one’s account on a big computer in the main office. 
The widespread deployment of the shared communication protocols 
of the Internet, however, make it possible for all of the world’s 
Internet- enabled computers to connect with the remote computer 
virtually instantaneously. With cloud computing, your computer—
whether your desktop, laptop, or smartphone—becomes simply an 
on-ramp onto this electronic highway of information.
By its very nature, cloud computing typically involves crossing 
borders. Cloud computing can represent a paradigmatic instance of 
offshore outsourcing: moving a computer service to remote comput-
ers, typically with the user both largely unaware of the jurisdiction or 
jurisdictions from which the service is actually supplied. Also like 
offshore outsourcing, cloud computing offers the advantage of allow-
ing a business employing the service to quickly scale up or down, 
depending on demand.
Cloud computing entails remote computers performing the 
entire range of computer- assisted functions from “analyzing risk in 
financial portfolios, delivering personalized medical information, 
even powering immersive computer games.”54 Cloud computing is 
already a daily reality. Google’s search services offer a model for the 
architecture for cloud computing—with endless arrays of computer 
servers holding enormous quantities of data (measured in terabytes) 
and supercomputers searching those arrays to supply us almost 
instantaneously with the information we seek. Google has ambitious 
plans to expand that model, as summed up by one reporter: “If there 
is one common theme to Google’s latest moves, it’s that the com-
pany wants all Internet users to do everything online, and store 
everything they do online, from sharing digital pictures to creating 
spreadsheets.”55 Google is hardly alone. IBM, Microsoft, and 
Amazon, too, have deployed enormous cloud services.
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Mobile computing will likely accelerate this shift. The limits of 
storage and processing on handheld units, the convenience of data-
bases that are automatically shared across multiple devices, and the 
risks of losing data stored on a broken or misplaced tablet or smart-
phone are spurring users to turn to cloud computing.
Cloud computing seems to defy law. Like most cloud providers, 
Google tells users that it “processes personal information on our 
servers in many countries around the world.”56 Thus, users often 
cannot know in what country their data are being stored and pro-
cessed. Google will not want to use jurisdictions that place its users’ 
data at risk, but given that it has a global client base, it wants the 
flexibility to employ different jurisdictions as techno- legal- economic 
conditions warrant.
The move to place computing metaphorically in the clouds would 
seem to offer an escape from the earthly shackles of burdensome 
regulation. When one’s attention is turned toward the heavens, law 
would seem a distant afterthought. But the reality, of course, is that 
the computer servers holding the data, the computers performing 
functions on that data, the people whom the data processing affects, 
and the users of those computers reside very much on terra firma.
Declaring the cloud to be law- free seems appealing, but only at 
first glance. Consider the following examples, all ripped from exist-
ing controversies: What if the cloud holds details of the names and 
addresses of doctors who perform abortions, with those who have 
been murdered crossed out?57 What if the cloud holds a video 
showing the brutal treatment of an autistic child because of the 
child’s autism, when targeting people on the basis of their disability 
is considered a hate crime? What if a website collects links to 
fast downloads of illegal copies of Hollywood or Bollywood movies? 
What if the cloud holds the complete health dossiers of individuals? 
These examples demonstrate that anyone concerned about the 
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ability of countries to govern themselves—to protect their people or 
to protect property interests—cannot allow the cloud to become a 
legal black hole.
Contrary to the effort to deny the importance of physical loca-
tion, it is notable that the leading cloud computing enterprises with 
global ambitions are based largely in the United States. Cloud com-
puting exemplifies Silicon Valley’s ambitions to supply the world’s 
people both business and personal services online. Although the 
Indian outsourcing firms have established their cloud computing 
servicing capacities, they have not offered themselves as the long- 
term storehouses of the world’s information. Rather, they present 
themselves as the processors of that information, generally on an as- 
needed basis. China, too, is investing heavily in cloud services, but it 
is too early to say whether these services will attract large numbers 
of users outside China. I examine some aspects of the Chinese 
Internet industry in chapter 9.
How Law Made Silicon Valley
It is probably not much of an exaggeration that every company set 
up in a bedroom in Silicon Valley hopes to take over the world. There 
is reason for such optimism. Again and again, it is Silicon Valley 
firms that have become the world’s leading providers of various web 
services—from social networks to search engines to game services to 
news reporting to payments. Why did this happen?
Popular explanations revolve focus on two features—money and 
education. It is not a coincidence that the heart of American venture 
capital is in Silicon Valley, where America’s software industry is 
located. Both industries profit from each other in a symbiotic rela-
tionship. The availability of venture capital at an early stage allows 
these firms to build up their infrastructure, test their products, and 
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market themselves. Venture capitalists must be willing to accept 
the failure of many of their investments. American corporate law 
helpfully supports the risk- taking represented by venture capital.
Silicon Valley also bestrides the great academic centers of 
Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley, and 
is near the artistic and intellectual hub of San Francisco. With these 
universities in the vicinity, and other University of California 
campuses such as Santa Cruz and Davis nearby, start- ups and 
established firms find easy access to a local talent pool of leading 
designers, computer programmers, business managers, publicists, 
and innovators.
Other features of the United States more generally contribute to 
the leading role of American firms in global e- commerce. A large 
domestic American marketplace enables American firms to justify 
large investments. The enormous free trade zone of the United 
States, with its largely uniform commercial laws, makes it easy for a 
start- up to set up shop in one locality yet supply an enormous mar-
ket. Until the recent enlargement of the European Union, the United 
States by itself was the world’s largest free trade zone, in terms of the 
wealth of its population. The fact that the common language of this 
domestic market is English—increasingly the second language of 
much of the world—makes it easier to find people to localize a web-
site for foreign markets. America’s polyglot immigrant workforce 
also helps these corporations extend themselves around the world—
including in the 60 percent of humanity that is Asia. Google’s lunch-
room in Mountain View, with its multiple different cuisines to serve 
that global workforce, epitomizes the Valley’s global roots. The US 
government has championed free trade in services over the past few 
decades, helping open up such trade in a variety of forums, including 
the World Trade Organization, regional free trade agreements 
such as NAFTA, and bilateral free trade agreements. A culture of 
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risk- taking and an acceptance of failure have also been crucial. Many 
of the leading American Internet firms were start- ups just a few 
years ago: Yahoo! formed in 1994, Google in 1998, Facebook in 
2004, and Twitter in 2006. Steve Jobs’s famous failure with the Next 
computer did not rule him out for further leadership in the industry.
An additional contributor to Silicon Valley’s success is perhaps 
the most surprising. This last element is not based on the location of 
these enterprises in a particularly blessed corner of the United States 
and thus is not unique to Silicon Valley enterprises but applies to all 
net- work enterprises based in the United States generally. Both 
Congress and US courts have sought to provide a legal framework 
that embraces Web 2.0 enterprises. This permissive legal framework 
offers the United States as a sort of export- processing zone in which 
Internet entrepreneurs can experiment and establish services. In 
particular, the combination of (1) the First Amendment guarantee 
of freedom of speech; (2) the Communications Decency Act’s 
Section 230, granting immunity to web hosts for user- generated 
information; (3) Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), granting immunity to web hosts for copyright infringe-
ment; and (4) weak consumer privacy regulations has created breath-
ing room for the rise of Web 2.0. That is, Silicon Valley has prospered 
with laws that exempted web hosts from liability for the actions 
of users yet did not interfere with web hosts who exploited user 
information extensively.
In Web 2.0, Internet service providers offer platforms for others 
to create, often for free. Human beings use these services for creative 
expression or more banal work, but they sometimes include material 
that violates someone else’s rights or is otherwise prohibited by law. 
Will the net- work provider be liable for inevitable human misuse of 
the tools they supply? The wrongful material would, after all, be pub-
lished on the net- work provider’s site. Moreover, what if the misuse 
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brings more users to the site and thus indirectly generates additional 
revenues from advertising? The possibility of liability in such cases 
might deter many from opening up such an open- ended shop. Thus, 
the DMCA offers immunity from copyright infringement for 
content supplied by users if the host service follows specified rules, 
such as taking down potentially infringing material upon notice. 
Meanwhile, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
offers immunity from many other claims—including defamation 
and invasion of privacy.
The absence of privacy rights proved particularly important 
because of the business model used by many consumer- oriented 
websites. Web 2.0 providers earn money through advertising or 
through selling additional services. If the net- work provider can tai-
lor advertisements precisely to the interests of the user, then it can 
justify higher advertising rates. In other words, the more the net- 
work provider knows about you, the more it can earn. Rules protect-
ing user privacy can, accordingly, interfere with a company’s ability 
to gather information about you. Thus, the absence of a broad array 
of effective privacy- enhancing restraints leaves net- work suppliers 
largely free to exploit user information for maximum profit. As long 
as the suppliers do not promise more privacy than they actually 
deliver, net- work companies in the United States can act with 
remarkable impunity with personal information, unless it falls into 
specific financial or health categories or knowingly involves children 
under the age of thirteen.
Law is crucial to the continued success of global e- commerce. 
The amazing revolutions in connection, including Facebook’s social 
network, Google’s information services, and the highly efficient 
business processes of Infosys and Wipro, all depend on the legal 
environment. In the next chapter, I turn to the rise of Bangalore.
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3
EASTERN ENTREPÔT
Bangalore
Today an American family can outsource tutoring to an Indian 
engineer, tax preparation to an Indian accountant, and medical 
diagnosis to an Indian radiologist, and then sit for a portrait by an 
artist in coastal China.1 An American corporation, for its part, 
can outsource human resources management to the Philippines, 
engineering to China, customer service to Jamaica, and regulatory 
compliance management and information technology to India.2 
Little seems immune: today even prayers for Kansans are outsourced 
to priests in Kerala.3 Where China has become the factory to the 
world, India and other developing countries may become the world’s 
back office.4
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China once anchored the eastern end of the ancient Silk Road. 
The Chinese shepherded their monopoly in the manufacture of 
silk as a trade secret, decreeing death to anyone smuggling either 
live silkworms or the seeds of the mulberry trees needed to sustain 
these industrious creatures.5 Europeans spun elaborate myths 
explaining the origin of silk, never suspecting that it might be the 
product of a humble worm. In his agricultural poems The Georgics, 
Virgil imagined the people of Asia, whom the Greeks called 
the Seres (the People of Silk), harvesting the fabric from trees: 
“The Seres comb from off the leaves / Their silky fleece.”
Today, the Eastern epicenter of cybertrade is in Bangalore, 
though it faces challengers from Shanghai to Manila. What are the 
secrets of today’s Eastern entrepôt to the Electronic Silk Road? Why 
did Bangalore, and India generally, emerge as a services powerhouse, 
and not China? What can other nations do to copy Bangalore’s 
secrets? What are Bangalore’s vulnerabilities?
The Rise of the Indian Multinational
The millennial turn had a literal significance for the cross- border 
outsourcing of services. Computer programs written decades earlier 
had been expected to be long obsolete before the clock rolled over to 
the year 2000. These computer systems were susceptible to cata-
strophic failure when the year struck 2000, a number for which many 
computer programs were not prepared. This problem became known 
as the Y2K bug, with the K borrowed from kilobyte (representing a 
little more than a thousand bytes, with each byte a unit of computer 
information). The millennial turn threatened the operation of every-
thing from hospital records to the telephone. The task of reviewing 
millions of lines of computer code for this vulnerability was gargan-
tuan. With their lower labor cost base, Indian software companies 
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recognized an opportunity to attract new clients, especially from the 
United States. The relationships and experience developing from 
the millennial programming spurred Indian companies to expand 
their services domain. The Economist magazine declared, “Once the 
Indians had saved the world, they set out to conquer it.”6 Indian 
companies began to perform business processes such as procure-
ment, finance and accounting, human resources, and data process-
ing.7 At Internet speed, Indian outsourcing pioneers grew into 
multibillion- dollar, multinational companies.8
The industry is broadly divided between information technology 
(IT) services and business process outsourcing (BPO). IT services 
consist primarily of software development and support. BPO ser-
vices consist in performing a business process, such as accounting, 
customer service (including, famously, call centers), and human 
resources management. IT services, of course, are technically also 
business processes, but they are typically excluded from BPO calcu-
lations entirely because they constitute such a major share of out-
sourced services. There is a long history of outsourcing IT services to 
specialist firms. IT also opened the door to other services; Indian 
firms typically gained their initial entry into international services by 
providing IT services. IT services account for more than half of the 
services export revenues of the Indian outsourcing companies.9
Three firms lead the industry—Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), 
Infosys, and Wipro—though the industry also includes a host of 
other large corporations and small start- ups. The largest, TCS, is a 
subsidiary of the Tata conglomerate, with roots to a company founded 
by Jamsetji Tata in 1868. TCS was initially formed a hundred years 
later in 1968 to provide services to the Tata group of companies such 
as Tata Steel, but it soon began to serve customers outside Tata. TCS 
won contracts to supply services to European, American, and Indian 
customers over the 1970s and 1980s.10 These contracts were often in 
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financial services, perhaps unsurprising because of the early global-
ization and digitization of the finance industry.
Infosys was founded famously with just ten thousand rupees by 
seven entrepreneurs in Narayan Murthy’s seven- hundred- square- 
foot apartment in Pune, India.11 India’s notorious License Raj was 
very much in evidence as these entrepreneurs began. Murthy recalls 
that “it took us nine to twelve months and as many as 15 visits to 
Delhi to get permission to import a computer.”12 However, because 
of the services nature of their business, such hurdles proved sur-
mountable. Infosys’s employees traveled to their customer’s worksite 
and performed the services on location. (Even this was not without 
complication: in order to convert Indian rupees into the hard 
currency necessary for foreign travel, Infosys had to obtain the per-
mission of the Indian central bank.) This “bodyshopping” was useful 
for another reason: the newness of the relationship meant that the 
clients had not yet developed confidence in their supplier. But with 
the foreign employees on-site, “the client could strictly control the 
parameters of the project and closely monitor the software develop-
ment process.”13 GE became an Infosys customer in 1989. In March 
1999, Infosys would become the first Indian company in history 
to list its shares on an American stock exchange. (By contrast, the 
first Chinese company to list its shares on an American exchange 
was Brilliance Automotive, which listed in 1992 on the NYSE; 
Hong Kong–based ChinaDotCom became the first Chinese com-
pany to list on the Nasdaq in July 1999.) It was a meeting with 
Infosys visionary Nandan Nilekani that convinced New York Times 
columnist Thomas Friedman that “the world is flat.” Inside Infosys’s 
Bangalore headquarters, where watchful clocks announced the time 
around the world, Nilekani argued to Friedman that the playing 
field for international competition was being leveled by electronic 
communications.14
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Wipro’s history offers a microcosm of India’s own economic evo-
lution. Wipro was founded as a vegetable oil company in 1947, the 
year of India’s independence. The current customers of Wipro’s 
highly sophisticated business services might be surprised to learn 
that Wipro is apparently an acronym for “Western India Palm 
Refined Oils.” Its current CEO, Azim Premji, took the reins of the 
company at the age of twenty- one, when he, then a student at Stan-
ford University, was called home suddenly to run the family business 
on his father’s death.15 He began expanding the business into new 
industrial and consumer sectors. Wipro formed a software services 
unit in the 1970s. In 1990, GE established a joint venture with 
Wipro to design, manufacture, and distribute a low- cost ultrasound 
machine. Over the coming years, ultrasound machines would cer-
tainly prove an important diagnostic tool for medical professionals 
in India, but they would also gain notoriety because of their wide-
spread illegal use in gender- selective abortions.
The United States serves as the most important single market 
for these three companies. For the Indian IT- BPO industry, exports 
count for some $69 billion of a total of $100 billion in revenues in 
fiscal year 2012.16 TCS generates slightly more than half of its 
revenue in the Americas (51 percent), with important shares also 
generated in the United Kingdom (19 percent), and the rest of 
Europe (11 percent). It generates less than a tenth of its revenues at 
home in India (8 percent). Infosys generates two- thirds of its income 
in North America (67 percent), with the bulk of the remainder 
generated in Europe (22 percent). India makes up little more than 
1 percent of the company’s revenues. Wipro, by contrast, draws 
nearly a quarter of its revenues from India (24 percent). Wipro’s 
leading customer is still the United States, constituting nearly 
half (44 percent) of Wipro’s revenues, and Europe makes up an 
additional quarter (24 percent).17
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Legal developments, not technical developments alone, made 
the rise of these Indian multinationals possible. The Indian entrepre-
neur had historically faced a maze of regulation and prohibitions 
that hampered any global reach and forestalled international aspira-
tions. Many enterprising Indians simply sailed for foreign shores 
more friendly to individual achievement, resulting in an enormous 
brain drain of highly educated individuals. Forbes characterized the 
British legacy for corporate India: “When the British gave India 
back to the Indians in 1947, they left behind a culture in which 
elected officials and civil servants, many of them the products of 
British schools, controlled the economy.”18 The License Raj that 
succeeded the British Raj continued extensive state controls on the 
economy but changed its philosophical underpinnings from imperi-
alism to socialism. S. Ramadorai, CEO of TCS from 1998 to 2009, 
writes of some of the travails TCS faced in the 1970s as a result of 
the law. When his company wanted to import a product (such as 
computer systems), TCS had to undertake to export twice the cost 
of the imported inputs over a five- year period. Failure to meet this 
obligation would lead to the confiscation of the imported machine, 
as well as financial penalties.19 To add to the risk, the United States, 
too, reserved the right to confiscate the machine if it was used in 
ways other than those approved of in the US export license. Because 
the Indian government did not permit Infosys to borrow in dollars, 
Infosys was forced to borrow in rupees, obtain a forward currency 
contract to protect itself against adverse exchange rate fluctuations, 
earn income in dollars from exports, convert the dollars to rupees, 
and then repay the loan in rupees.
In 1991, the Indian government, under then–finance minister 
(and now prime minister) Manmohan Singh, began to loosen the 
restraints on corporate India. The reforms “allowed firms to open 
offices abroad, travel easily, and hire foreign consultants.”20 The 
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Indian government also lowered import tariffs and made it easier for 
Indian companies to access capital markets. “Now we are our own 
masters,” Anil Ambani of Reliance Industries declared.21
Economic liberalization proved crucial for firms such as Infosys. 
According to Murthy, “The Indian economic reforms of 1991 came 
as a heaven- sent opportunity for us at Infosys.”22 The liberalization 
paved the way for Infosys’s 1993 initial public offering on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (since renamed the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange by a more assertive regional government, which sought to 
restore what it claimed was the city’s original name in the local 
language). Access to the capital markets permitted companies 
like Infosys to grow, allowing them to achieve the scale necessary to 
handle enormous applications for multinational enterprises.
Two American enterprises helped the fledgling Indian software 
enterprises, one by its presence, the other by its absence. First, the 
departure of IBM from India in 1977 created a vacuum that Indian 
companies stepped in to fill. IBM quit India rather than capitulate 
to new Indian laws that required local subsidiaries to be majority 
controlled by Indians.23 This created a breach in servicing the com-
puter hardware already installed in the country. Both TCS and 
Wipro benefited by beginning to service IBM hardware already 
deployed throughout the country. GE was the second enterprise that 
gave a fillip to the Indian IT industry. GE’s early contracts with 
Indian firms gave these firms credibility at a time when many com-
panies saw India as a “risky backwater.”24 GE provided not only 
credibility but cash: “At one point during the 1990s, Wipro’s soft-
ware unit, Wipro Systems Ltd., received 50 percent of its revenue 
from GE. At TCS and another leading technology company, Infosys 
Technologies Ltd., the figures were between 20% and 30%, the com-
panies say.”25 Trade proved a positive sum game, as GE, famous for 
its efficiency, saved some $300 million a year.
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As GE’s early act of confidence in Indian enterprise shows by its 
rarity, Indian companies with global ambitions had to overcome a 
significant prejudice—the disbelief that an enterprise rooted in the 
developing world could provide high- quality services. As Forbes 
magazine described it in an early article on Infosys, “Despite a roster 
of big- name North American clients, Infosys was battling the crass 
Western perception that a smart, honest, reputable company could 
never come out of a country where cows still run in the street.”26 As 
Infosys’s head Murthy puts it, “When in the early ’90s we went to 
the US to sell our services, most CIOs [Chief Information Officers] 
didn’t believe that an Indian company could build the large applica-
tions they needed.”27 Indian companies lacked the long track record 
of globalized American companies and thus had to prove themselves 
to skeptical customers.
Indian companies found an ingenious method to demonstrate 
their fidelity. They listed stock on the American exchanges. They did 
this less to raise capital than to bond themselves through a commit-
ment to American disclosure law. As mentioned earlier, Infosys 
became the first Indian company to go public in the United States 
with its Nasdaq listing in 1999. Wipro followed in 2000 with a New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing. Wipro’s long collaboration 
with GE was evident when GE’s CEO Jack Welch joined Wipro’s 
Azim Premji to ring the NYSE bell on the first day of Wipro’s trading 
in the United States. By listing securities in the United States, these 
companies declared that they would subject themselves to the sword 
of American shareholder litigation. If subsequent events called their 
public accounts into question, they would face the wrath of American 
securities lawyers. This commitment would be sorely tested by Satyam 
Computer Services, whose chairman confessed in 2009 to greatly 
exaggerating the company’s financial position. The Indian authorities 
replaced Satyam’s board and appointed new officers within a month 
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of the revelation. The US securities law bonding proved effective as 
Satyam paid $125 million to settle the claims of its US shareholders.
The most successful multinational corporations have diversified 
their markets, with footholds on every continent. The Indian multi-
nationals, too, have diversified, increasing their presence in Latin 
America, east Asia, and Europe. TCS is perhaps the leader among 
Indian corporations in its global reach. It is rapidly expanding its 
polyglot workforce in Latin America, eastern Europe, and China, 
seeking to access the world’s talent and serve the world’s enterprises 
in their vernaculars.28 TCS is offering its expertise, for example, to 
the government of Mexico, with a $200 million deal to manage IT 
services for the Mexican social security system. Mexico selected 
TCS after falling out with American services giants Accenture and 
Electronic Data Systems (EDS), which had previously provided IT 
services to the Mexican social security system.
One Infosys project demonstrates the global hopscotching of 
services today. Seeking to design software to manage a loan program 
for Spanish- speaking customers in the United States, an American 
bank hired Infosys, which had recently opened an office in 
Monterrey, Mexico. A Mexican team, the bank argued, would have 
both the language skills and the cultural knowledge to serve 
Hispanic Americans. As the New York Times observed: “Such is the 
new outsourcing. A company in the United States pays an Indian 
vendor 7,000 miles, or 11,200 kilometers, away to supply it with 
Mexican workers situated 150 miles south of the U.S. border.”29
For all the focus on the Indian outsourcing giants, it is easy to 
lose sight that many of the world’s biggest services outsourcing com-
panies are American. Consider that nine of the ten largest IT out-
sourcing deals announced in May 2010 were awarded to American 
firms.30 The largest IT outsourcing deal—for California’s public 
health system—went to ACS, now a unit of Xerox Corporation. 
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Because seven of the ten largest deals involved US state or federal 
government agencies, there may well have been public pressure to 
keep the outsourcing onshore. Yet IBM even won a deal to provide 
back- office services for an insurance company in Brazil. IBM will 
now “be responsible for . . . issuing policies, registration updates, 
document transfers and claim management” for the Brazilian insurer. 
American companies have beaten Indian companies for contracts 
even in the Indian companies’ backyard. Earlier in 2010, the Indian 
telecom firm Bharti selected IBM in a ten- year, $750 million deal.
IBM will likely perform much of its work for Bharti in Bharat 
(the Hindi name for India). IBM is heavily international not just in 
its revenues but also in its workforce. Like its major American ser-
vices competitors, IBM routes significant parts of its global work to 
its staff in India. The New York Times even declares IBM a “postmul-
tinational global corporation” because the firm not only sells to the 
world but also runs much of its operation from outside the United 
States: “The global purchasing and procurement unit is in China; 
human relations tasks like expense report processing are done in the 
Philippines; and back- office financial processing is done in Brazil.”31 
IBM, having left India ingloriously in 1977, has now returned with 
a huge Indian workforce (its largest workforce outside the United 
States) and with major Indian clients. In 2008, Business Week pro-
vocatively asked, “IBM vs. Tata: Who’s More American?” IBM, the 
business magazine noted, generated the bulk of its revenue outside 
the United States, while Tata Consulting Services generated the 
bulk of its revenues in the United States.32
Despite their ability to go toe- to- toe with leading American 
services companies in certain domains, Indian companies face a fun-
damental deficit in competing with their American counterparts: 
they are not yet trusted, household names. While Silicon Valley 
enterprises serve both corporations and consumers in India, 
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Bangalore enterprises earn the great bulk of their revenue from 
corporations alone. Wipro, Infosys, and TCS are relegated largely to 
the back office—or to the unseen phone—accents and corporate 
identities hidden to the greatest extent possible. With back- end out-
sourcing, consumers do not gain experience with a particular Indian 
company, and thus these companies fail to build a consumer brand.
The global dominance of Western media, which benefit from the 
economies of scale available in the wealthiest countries, helps cement 
this brand disparity. For many years, Google, likely the world’s big-
gest advertising company, did not itself buy advertising. It had no 
need to. The media breathlessly announced every new product. 
Google ran its first television advertisement in 2009, a decade after 
its founding. Apple’s hardware, and to a lesser extent its software, has 
received even more obsessive and fawning media attention.
Indian companies have not fared as well in the Western media. 
Much of the attention has been focused on the growing alarm over 
outsourcing, especially the threat to Americans who might lose their 
jobs to foreign competition. At the same time, Western media have 
oscillated between declaring the end of American jobs and the end 
of outsourcing. A 2004 story in Business Week argued that outsourc-
ing was becoming “outmoded,” a likely victim of rising wages in 
Asia. A 2010 story in the same magazine titled “The End of Out-
sourcing (As We Know It)” suggested that, because of cloud com-
puting, “In the next five years outsourcing as we know it will 
disappear. The legion of Indian service providers will be sidelined or 
absorbed.”33 The hyperbole of the newspapers notwithstanding, 
American jobs and Indian outsourcing are likely to coexist, as are 
outsourcing companies and cloud computing enterprises. Indeed, 
services outsourcing companies often rely on remote databases held 
at the client site and thus have long practiced a form of cloud com-
puting. Cloud computing represents the outsourcing of basic data 
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storage and processing functions to a remote entity and thus reflects 
an opportunity for outsourcing companies generally.
The experience of other large Asian economies may be relevant. 
Japanese companies, too, once faced a reputation for cheap, inferior- 
quality products. Yet relentless efforts over decades to improve qual-
ity led Japanese products to be perceived as often better than rival 
American products. Chinese companies have had to overcome a 
perception for inferior products more recently. While Japanese com-
panies have gone on to become household names (think Sony, 
Canon, and Nintendo), Chinese companies have not, even though 
Chinese subsidiaries of Taiwanese companies manufacture many of 
the items Americans use in our daily lives, including the iPhones 
and iPads that Americans adore. Lenovo and Haier cannot yet claim 
a place next to Dell and Whirlpool in the American household’s 
lexicon. Whether India’s services companies will follow Japan’s path 
or China’s remains to be seen.
The Human Networks Behind Net- Work
The rise of India as the epicenter of services outsourcing poses a 
puzzle: Why did India, and not China, Russia, or eastern Europe—
all well- endowed with programmers and engineers—lead the world 
in supplying services electronically? While electronic networks made 
possible the new Silk Road in cyberspace, a kind of network as old 
as human migration has helped power this trade: diasporas.
Neither the revolution of information technology nor a particu-
lar millennial task nor even the imperatives of labor arbitrage explain 
adequately the evolution of the flow of trade in services. Helpful to 
the choice of India as a primary outsourcing destination was the 
ubiquity of Indian Americans in Silicon Valley, the heart of the 
information technology industry in the United States. An OECD 
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study concludes that “diaspora populations [are] proving important 
in [facilitating trade in] areas spanning traditional medicines to 
audiovisuals.”34 The economist Hal Varian declares, “It is almost 
impossible for an entrepreneur to put a foreign development team 
together without some strong connections on the ground.”35 This is 
not merely an academic notion: Varian currently serves as Google’s 
chief economist.
Also relevant are historical forces such as colonialism, which cre-
ated both the language linkages between India’s north and south 
and diaspora channels that facilitate trade in information services.36 
Personal relations remain important even in the global flows of net- 
work. Take, for example, the experience of a small San Francisco 
architectural firm that sought to outsource design work to Asia. The 
owner first attempted to outsource to firms in Southeast Asia 
that were “run by American ex- pats,” but this proved unsuccessful. 
When a “young Indian architect joined our firm after finishing 
his Master[’]s degree in the States,” the firm began outsourcing—
successfully—to the Indian company owned by that young archi-
tect’s parents.37
As I mentioned in chapter 1, economists such as Ronald Coase 
described two modes of organizing production: hierarchy (the top- 
down structure common in corporations and governments) and 
markets (the arm’s- length transactions entered into through freely 
negotiated contracts). More recently, economists have explored a 
third mode of organizing production—the network.38 The network 
allows a loose coordination of tasks toward an overlapping goal.
Networks do not replace hierarchy or markets but rather support 
both, reducing informational deficiencies in this new remote trade 
regime. Networks are likely to prove especially important when 
charting new terrain. Lack of familiarity with a country and its cit-
ies, workers, educational institutions, and enterprises will necessitate 
e
A
s
t
e
R
n
 e
n
t
R
e
P
Ô
t
72
a turn to alternative mechanisms to garner the information to engage 
in new transactions.
While ethnic networks might operate across continents to spur 
information flow, personal contacts arising out of geographic prox-
imity still matter. Indeed, the rise of information centers such as 
Bangalore and Hyderabad, Silicon Valley and Seattle, attests to the 
continuing relevance of geography. Outsourcing has not been dis-
tributed evenly across the regions of the world with broadband con-
nections. Scholars have suggested that geographic proximity might 
increase the “the availability of pools of specialized workers and 
the likelihood of knowledge spillovers from social and professional 
linkages among employees of competing firms facing similar 
problems.”39
While the success of Indian Americans in Silicon Valley has 
long been touted, the prejudice they faced has been less well explored. 
Indeed, the journey of Indian Americans in corporate America is 
reminiscent in some ways of the journey of Indian corporations 
in global commerce. Consider the story of Kanwal Rekhi, whom 
Fortune names the “godfather of Silicon Valley’s Indian mafia.” 
Rekhi earned his fortune when he sold his company, Excelan, 
to Novell in 1989 for $210 million. But when he had founded 
Excelan with two other Indian Americans, the entrepreneurs had 
found it difficult to raise capital. According to Fortune, “Indians 
were widely regarded as great techies but inadequate managers. 
So when three Indians who lacked a white guy went to raise 
money from VCs, they faced lots of slammed doors.”40 Even if 
a particular venture capitalist does not himself (and it is almost 
always himself ) share such views, the capitalist might worry about 
prejudices in the business world more generally. Accordingly, 
venture capitalists investing in “an Indian- founded company 
have brought in a non- Indian CEO, relegating the founder to a 
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technical role.”41 Indian- Americans were seen as appropriate for the 
back office but not the front office, and certainly not the corner 
office.
Faced with such barriers, Indian Americans set up their own 
formalized network to support one another—The Indus Entrepre-
neurs, or TiE. Through TiE, Indian Americans with entrepreneurial 
dreams could meet people like Rekhi whom they could consider 
their “guru.”42 They also relied on alumni networks associated with 
the Indian Institutes of Technology.
Boston Brahmins and Bangalore Doctors
India has not, however, been uniformly successful in its outsourcing 
projects. An example from the lucrative field of medical outsourcing 
shows that even Bangalore can be rebuffed, based on both legal and 
consumer concerns.
In hospitals around the world, yesterday’s photographic film is 
giving way to today’s digital imaging.43 Digitization of medical 
images facilitates review, reproduction, archiving, and error- checking 
while also enabling computer enhancement and speeding retrieval.44 
Digitization also permits radiology, once confined to review of 
films slapped atop lit boards in medical offices, to be conducted 
from a computer in the home or across the world—“anywhere 
with broadband access.”45 Crucial to this possibility is the standard-
ization of communications and semantic protocols, which enable 
digital images produced on one system to be accurately stored, com-
municated, and interpreted across different hardware platforms.46 
Indeed, manufacturers, professional societies, and other interested 
parties have developed the Digital Imaging and Communications 
in Medicine (DICOM) standard for radiological data. One radiolo-
gist, supplying his services to the United States from Bangalore, 
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reports: “ ‘You can’t reach over and slap [the radiologist] on the 
back, but every other aspect of the interaction is preserved.’ ”47
Hospitals now regularly outsource their nightshift radiology 
across the world “to be read by doctors in the light of day.”48 New 
firms have sprung up, responding to a “shortage of U.S. radiologists 
and an exploding demand for more sophisticated scans to diagnose 
scores of ailments.”49 One firm established in Idaho in 2001, Night-
Hawk Radiology Holdings, listed its stock on Nasdaq in 2006 before 
being purchased by Virtual Radiologic in 2010 for approximately 
$170 million. NightHawk Radiology sent images from US hospitals 
to be read by physicians often located in Sydney, Australia. Another 
leading provider, Teleradiology Solutions, transmits images from US 
hospitals to be read by physicians principally in Bangalore.
But can a patient trust a doctor who lives in a different hemi-
sphere? “Will a radiologist on another continent be as easily held 
liable?”50 Can private medical records be protected as they travel 
around the world? How can the patient be assured that the foreign 
radiologist is adequately trained? Providers of such services have 
sought to allay these concerns. They hire only radiologists certified 
by the American Board of Radiology and licensed to practice in the 
United States.51
It was precisely the absence of such qualifications that foiled the 
most technologically sophisticated version of cross- border teleradi-
ology, a service offered by Wipro. Wipro brought its considerable 
computing talents to the project, going far beyond the simple trans-
mission of images and the return transmission of a report entailed by 
most nightshift services. The Wipro service, tested in collaboration 
with Massachusetts General Hospital, permitted Wipro’s Bangalore 
radiologists not just to access the images of the patient taken that 
day or night52 but the ability to “download prior studies, reports, and 
patient history with as much ease as if they were working in an 
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[Massachusetts General Hospital] reading room in Boston.”53 A 
radiologist in Bangalore sat at a 3- D workstation reading images of 
a patient at Massachusetts General Hospital and reviewed the 
patient’s records before offering a diagnosis.54
The connections between India and the United States were coor-
dinated by an Indian American radiology professor then at Harvard 
Medical School, Dr. Sanjay Saini. Doctor Saini emigrated from 
India to the United States when he was in high school. In connect-
ing Boston to Bangalore, diasporic connections were clearly in play.
However, despite the technological feasibility of the enterprise, 
the project stumbled over three hurdles. First, Wipro failed to attract 
United States–licensed radiologists to Bangalore, and thus its radi-
ologists were not licensed to read patient images. Wipro accordingly 
restricted its experiment to collaboration between Indian and US 
radiologists. The Indian radiologists “provide interpretations to 
Wipro- employed licensed radiologists in the United States, who in 
turn consult with the client radiologist.”55 The addition of a second 
radiologist creates a potential redundancy but also carries the benefit 
of potentially allowing for a second opinion and, possibly, a con-
structive dialogue between radiologists.
Second, Congress has restricted Medicare reimbursements to 
US- based physicians.56 The regulations written under the statute go 
so far as to specifically bar subcontracting radiological services to 
India: “Payment may not be made for a medical service (or a portion 
of it) that was subcontracted to another provider or supplier located 
outside of the United States. For example, if a radiologist who prac-
tices in India analyzes imaging tests that were performed on a ben-
eficiary in the United States, Medicare would not pay the radiologist 
or the U.S. facility that performed the imaging test for any of the 
services that were performed by the radiologist in India.”57 
While the United States has committed under GATS to national 
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treatment for “hospital and other health care facilities” with respect 
to consumption abroad (what is called “mode 2” under GATS), it 
has not committed to national treatment for cross border health ser-
vices (“mode 1” under GATS). (I describe the distinction between 
GATS modes in chapter 6.) The United States indicated that mode 
1 offerings for “hospitals and other health care facilities” are “unbound 
due to lack of technical feasibility,” presumably because the idea of a 
hospital implies a physical building. In any case, GATS exempts 
government procurement of services from the MFN, market access, 
and national treatment obligations. This means that the United 
States is free (at least under GATS) to discriminate against foreign 
health services providers operating over the Internet. Because of 
restrictions on foreign reimbursement, radiology outsourcing com-
panies serving the United States from abroad thus typically rely 
on US- based radiologists to submit the claim and take responsibility 
for the reading, even if a radiologist based abroad provides an 
initial reading.
A third hurdle proved even more difficult to surmount. When 
the New York Times front page revealed the Indian radiologists 
assisting in reading patient images at Massachusetts General, there 
was a public outcry, and Wipro retreated.58 Even while Americans 
have long become accustomed to Indian American doctors, who 
make up more than 10 percent of American physicians, there was 
concern when a significant medical service might be performed in 
India itself.
Ensuring that only US- licensed radiologists review the images 
would not resolve concerns about fraud, privacy, and the enforce-
ability of agreements as private medical information crosses national 
borders. I return to these issues in chapters 6 and 7.
Even if part of the American public may currently be reluctant 
to have images read by doctors in Bangalore, other jurisdictions 
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appear more receptive because outsourcing might improve the qual-
ity of radiological services available and/or reduce the costs of such 
services. Consider two examples. The Dutch company Radiologie-
Uitslag.nl uses Indian and other radiologists to provide a second 
opinion to patients, in addition to the regular reading of the image. 
It allows individuals to receive the results of an MRI or X- ray in one 
day for 125 euros or in just six hours for 160 euros. The Singapore 
Ministry of Health has reviewed and accredited Bangalore- based 
Teleradiology Solutions to provide services to hospitals and diag-
nostic centers in Singapore. A national accreditation approach may 
offer a middle ground between rejecting crossborder teleradiology 
altogether and permitting hospitals to outsource at will.
Even though cross- border radiology has met roadblocks, a dif-
ferent type of cross- border trade in medical services is flourishing. 
Many individuals, and even corporations, are engaging in “medical 
tourism.” The rich of the developing world have long come to the 
United States seeking medical care, but now Americans find that 
they can receive medical procedures abroad for a fraction of the price 
at home.
Document Review in New Delhi
If it is complicated getting a foreign doctor on the other end of your 
X- ray machine or your iPhone in the United States, it may be a bit 
easier getting a foreign lawyer. While the outsourcing of medical 
services via the Internet has yet to flourish, the outsourcing of legal 
services via the Internet seems to be growing at Internet speed. 
David Wilkins, director of Harvard Law School’s program on the 
legal profession, characterizes the shift as a “historical movement.”59 
Foreign lawyers, especially in India, are assisting American lawyers 
in legal tasks such as document review, legal research and writing, 
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contracts management, and obtaining and enforcing patents and 
other intellectual property rights. Corporations especially may be 
driving legal process outsourcing (LPO), largely in search of cost 
savings.60
The practice of law is heavily regulated across the world and is 
generally restricted to those licensed by the local jurisdiction. Thus, 
outsourcing firms are careful to avoid performing work that might 
constitute the practice of law in a jurisdiction in which their lawyers 
are not duly licensed. Ethical obligations of the legal profession, too, 
might have posed an insurmountable hurdle to outsourcing of legal 
work. The model code of professional conduct used throughout the 
United States requires law firms to ensure that all lawyers conform 
to the rules of professional conduct and that all nonlawyer associates 
conduct themselves in ways compatible with professional conduct. 
Since an American Bar Association opinion interpreting the ethical 
obligations in 2008, local and state bar associations have generally 
agreed that outsourcing can be conducted in a manner consistent 
with professional rules, provided that the outsourcing lawyer remains 
ultimately responsible for the work and supervises it adequately.61
The San Diego County bar association considered a case 
in which a local firm employed an Indian firm to perform legal 
research, develop case strategy, prepare deposition outlines and 
draft correspondence, pleadings, and motions in a case. The ethics 
committee of the bar association concluded that “as long as the 
outsourcing lawyer is competent to evaluate the work performed 
by the outsourced contractor, retains control over the matter, exer-
cises independent professional judgment, and retains ultimate 
responsibility for the work, the assistance contracted for does not 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law, whether the work is out-
sourced out- of- state or out- of- the- country.”62 The committee also 
concluded that because of the extent of the outsourcing of the legal 
e
A
s
t
e
R
n
 e
n
t
R
e
P
Ô
t
79
representation in this case, the law firm had a duty to inform the 
client of the outsourcing relationship.63
The success of legal process outsourcing (LPO) depends on a 
careful assessment of the professional regulations in multiple juris-
dictions. One leading firm in the industry, the Clutch Group, 
describes itself as providing “fact development and process manage-
ment services” and not “legal advice.”64 Given the constraints on 
who can practice law, the opinions of the American bar associations 
have helped provide some assurance for firms in this area. Such a 
legal foundation for the trade may have helped bring the major 
US- based data provider Thomson Reuters into the industry through 
its purchase of the leading LPO provider Pangea3 in 2011.
Through legal services, one can begin to imagine a world in 
which service providers really are free to provide services across the 
world. Even if each jurisdiction requires one to demonstrate compe-
tence in its law and to be bound by its ethical rules, many lawyers 
around the world will be able to satisfy these conditions. To offer 
services in the United States, some could take the step of attending 
law schools accredited by the American Bar Association and then sit 
for the bar in the state or states whose law they wish to practice. This 
would most likely involve travel to the United States because thus 
far the ABA has approved only law schools in the United States, 
though the Peking University School of Law in Shenzhen, China, 
has applied for ABA accreditation. If these lawyers return home, 
either by choice or by lack of a visa to remain in the United States, 
they will still be able to offer legal services wherever they are mem-
bers of the bar. Constraints on the practice of law generally do not 
require one to be physically present in the relevant jurisdiction, at 
least as long as the remote lawyer can gain the information he or she 
needs for competent representation. The most significant challenge 
for such lawyers may not be the law but rather attracting sufficient 
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clients willing to trust foreign lawyers with local bar admissions. 
Perhaps the promise of lower fees or contingency fee arrangements 
might entice clients, but this suggests the increased competition 
faced by lawyers resident in the United States arising from net- work. 
Indeed, the United States has been at the forefront of seeking 
to open up free trade in legal services around the world, confident 
that American law firms are best prepared to meet global competi-
tion and take advantage of global advantage. As an American- 
educated lawyer who once worked in Hong Kong doing deals 
involving China and in New York conducting deals involving Latin 
America, I have experienced firsthand the high quality of American 
firms.
Keeping Filipinos Home and on the Phone
The Philippines has long sent its young men and women abroad for 
economic opportunities, generating $23 billion in remittances home 
in 2010.65 Now it has emerged as a leading outsourcing provider, its 
young men and women prized for their “American style” English. In 
2010, it became the leading call center destination in the world. The 
BPO industry now accounts for 4 to 5 percent of GDP, generating 
half the amount sent home by the estimated nine million overseas 
Filipinos. The BPO industry “keeps Filipino families together,” 
observes Martin Crisostomo of the Business Processing Association 
of the Philippines.66
In developing this industry, the Southeast Asian country was 
“helped by an affinity for the language, culture and work ethics of 
the United States, its former colonial master.”67 Many of the call 
center workers are employed by captive subsidiaries of Western 
enterprises or local subsidiaries of global outsourcing enterprises like 
IBM, Accenture, Convergys, Infosys, and Tech Mahindra. For 
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example, Aegis Global, an outsourcing firm based in Mumbai, 
employs nearly thirteen thousand Filipinos.68
Happy hour in Eastwood City, outside Manila, begins at 
6:00 a.m. for call center workers seeking a drink after their shift.
Economic Development and the Electronic Silk Road
The nations of the ancient Silk Road as well as nations newer to the 
world stage are racing to supply trade through the new thorough-
fares in cyberspace. In an article colorfully titled “Soccer, Samba and 
Outsourcing?” the Wall Street Journal announced that “Brazil appears 
poised to be Latin America’s big winner in the global outsourcing 
boom.”69 Cities “from Buffalo to Belfast, from Beijing to Buenos 
Aires” vie to be outsourcing hotspots. Why are governments across 
the world so keen on becoming the next Bangalore?
The development of the outsourcing services industry has 
proved attractive for India. Indian net- work providers assist India’s 
economic development in a number of ways. Let me identify five: 
(1) aiding employment and economic growth; (2) spurring educa-
tion; (3) improving domestic processes; (4) promoting an entrepre-
neurial spirit and increasing opportunity; and (5) lifting Indian 
self- confidence.
Aiding Employment and Growth. Outsourcing is labor intensive, 
therefore employing many workers, most of whom are professionals. 
The Indian trade body Nasscom estimates that the domestic 
IT- BPO industry employs 2.8 million people. Nasscom further esti-
mates revenues for Indian IT and BPO services to exceed $87 billion 
in fiscal year 2012, with the IT software and services sector (exclud-
ing hardware) accounting for $87 billion. Nasscom believes that this 
industry constitutes some 7.5 percent of the nation’s GDP. Nasscom 
estimates Indian IT- BPO exports to reach $69 billion in fiscal year 
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2012, a quarter of India’s total exports.70 (Of course, a trade associa-
tion’s estimates of that industry’s contribution to the national econ-
omy are by their nature self- interested.) Three of India’s twelve 
largest publicly traded corporations (by market value) are TCS, 
Infosys, and Wipro, each a net- work enterprise.71 Each of the big 
three employs more than 100,000 people, the bulk of them in India.72
The leaders of each of these three powerhouses all see their role 
as promoters of Indian economic and social development. Under 
Ratan Tata, Narayana Murthy, and Azim Premji, respectively of 
TCS, Infosys, and Wipro—these companies and their leaders con-
tributed significantly to charitable enterprises. Philanthropic trusts 
established by the Tatas together own some two- thirds of the con-
glomerate.73 Through the Infosys Foundation, Infosys contributes to 
healthcare, education, and rural development. Narayana Murthy 
titled his autobiography not with a statement about himself but 
rather with a noble ambition, A Better India, a Better World. Murthy 
cites three authors as his inspiration—India’s Mahatma Gandhi, 
Germany’s Max Weber, and, most surprising, Africa’s Frantz Fanon. 
Citing Gandhi’s dream of “wiping the tears from the eyes of every 
poor child,” Murthy’s declares his own “experiment”—“My experi-
ment in using entrepreneurship as an instrument to create jobs and 
address the problem of poverty in India.”74 Azim Premji, who retains 
a substantial shareholding in Wipro, has established a foundation to 
aid primary education and has announced plans to give away the 
bulk of his wealth to charity.75
Spurring Education. The possibility of employment in the net- 
work sector leads individuals to make a personal investment in 
themselves—what economists call “human capital.” They invest in 
the skills that allow them to enter these attractive service profes-
sions. Education in order to develop skills for international trade 
has long roots. The seventh- century Chinese Buddhist pilgrim 
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Xuanzang observed that “little boys in Samarkand were taught to 
read and write at the age of five, even if it was in the service of their 
commercial skills.”76 But unlike the trading depot of Samarkand, 
where girls might not be expected to become merchants, today both 
boys and girls can grow up to work in the net- work trade. Women 
represent some 30 percent of Indian IT- BPO employees.77 How-
ever, women are poorly represented in the top management at lead-
ing Indian IT companies, as a glance at the photos of the officers 
and directors of these companies will show. TCS has but one woman 
among its twelve officers and directors; Infosys, two of twenty- nine; 
and Wipro, two of thirty- eight. American IT powerhouses are 
not much better—Apple counts but one woman of its eighteen top 
officers and directors. Google has three women among its thirteen 
directors and top officers; Microsoft has three women of seventeen; 
Facebook has only one of nine.
Even while it boasts many world- class research universities, 
especially in the sciences and in management, India lags in primary 
education. India ranks 107th among the countries examined in 
UNESCO’s Education for All Development Index, precariously 
close to Niger’s bottom ranking of 127.78 By failing to provide suf-
ficient education to boys and girls, India handicaps itself in its desire 
to be the back office to the world.
Improving Local Productivity. As in many developing countries, 
productivity in India is generally low. Productivity can be increased 
by better tools, techniques and education. The skills that outsourcing 
firms developed to supply the world can be increasingly applied 
within India itself. These enterprises have recognized that India, too, 
needs their services and, in a helpful bit of diversification, offers a 
rapidly growing market. Historically a promoter of the civil service, 
the Indian government for its part has been increasingly willing 
to outsource functions, for example, hiring an American firm run 
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by a Czech immigrant to process visa applications of Americans 
traveling to India.79
Indian outsourcing enterprises have developed an obsession 
with performance metrics and process reviews. They are eager to 
demonstrate to potential clients that they meet international stan-
dards such as those set by ISO, the international standards- setting 
body. Many Indian firms have adopted the Six Sigma strategy for 
quality improvement, a program developed by Motorola and then 
embraced by General Electric’s Jack Welch.80 Bringing process 
review and optimization techniques such as Six Sigma to domestic 
industries previously protected from foreign competition promises 
to improve productivity. Moreover, Indian enterprises, which have 
often relied more on labor than technology, can benefit from the IT 
services offered by these enterprises.
Instilling Entrepreneurship and Increasing Opportunity. In the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century, commentators would condescend-
ingly explain India’s unremarkable economic growth rate of less than 
4 percent annually as the “Hindu rate of growth.”81 India’s millennia- 
old culture, with its entrenched hierarchies, could never grow at the 
pace of its neighboring tiger economies. Surprising many, however, 
economic liberalization beginning in 1991 doubled the rate of 
growth. The socialist economy was replaced by a more capitalist 
one. Where bright Indian students once hoped to join the vaunted 
Indian civil service, they now dream of joining a business or even 
creating one. Computer engineer Ashwin Hegde of Infosys observes 
this of his compatriots in Bangalore: “The bug is biting in Bangalore. 
. . . That’s what everybody is thinking about all the time, starting 
your own company.”82 The emergence of a start- up culture demon-
strated that popular accounts of Indian passivity and capitulation to 
karma were overblown. Because many kinds of IT- enabled services 
require less start- up capital than manufacturing, the opportunity to 
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become a global trader has led many to build new businesses using 
India as a launching pad to the world.
It has also kept many Indians at home. There was a time when 
the majority of the graduates of India’s prestigious Indian Institutes 
of Technology left for foreign shores in search of opportunity.83 
India’s brightest and most entrepreneurial often left for better 
opportunities elsewhere. Few would return. Both Vinod Khosla, 
cofounder of Sun Microsystems, and Sameer Bhatia, who founded 
the web- based email service Hotmail, were immigrants from India. 
Because of information technology, the brain drain of the past is 
giving way to opportunity in India. The Internet- speed success of 
the Indian services companies has demonstrated to Indians “that 
you can create substantial wealth in one generation,” says Nandan 
Nilekani, managing director of Infosys. “For the first time, there is 
an option for Indian youngsters which does not mean going to 
the U.S.”84
“Export Quality.” Indian companies, like many companies in the 
developing world, have long labeled their higher- quality products 
“export quality,” a term most American consumers are unfamiliar 
with. It denotes a product that meets world standards, and by impli-
cation, not the lesser standards prevailing at home. “Export quality” 
marked the few Indian products that would be good enough for 
Americans. With few exceptions (such as textiles), Indians were 
unaccustomed to matching American production quality.
The rise of net- work has led Indians to rethink their place in the 
world order. Since independence, India had protected local produc-
ers with tariffs designed to nurture infant industries. Its corporations 
accordingly lacked global ambitions, content to serve a huge domes-
tic market. The panic in the West stemming from Indian competi-
tion in services shattered myths of Indian inferiority, long internalized 
within India. Indians’ confidence in their own capacity to supply 
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world- class services grew in the face of the realization that others 
now feared them. In the wake of the financial crisis precipitated by 
an inadequate US legal regime, even the American legal model’s 
claim for superiority was battered.
Coupled with the rise of the Indian multinational is the rise of 
the Indian services professional. The idea that such an individual 
could compete globally for work with Americans and Europeans 
might have seem far- fetched just two decades back. Today, there 
may be few, if any, Fortune 500 companies that do not routinely 
outsource parts of their operations to Indians.
87
4
PIRATES OF CYBERSPACE
Can you stop the Internet? Is it possible to banish information from 
cyberspace? Or at least your part of cyberspace?
What if the information is on a computer on the other side of the 
earth but connected to the World Wide Web? The rise of the World 
Wide Web has made this a persistent problem for all the countries of 
the world. Indeed, we have already encountered one noted effort to ban 
cyberinformation—French efforts to stop Yahoo! from auctioning 
Nazi materials through its services. In that case, we saw a company 
voluntarily withdrawing most Nazi materials from its sites worldwide.
But what of companies that offer services from offshore loca-
tions precisely because such services are banned in the jurisdictions 
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where consumers want them? These companies are more akin to 
pirates than to traditional Silk Road traders. History’s safe harbors 
were not, as we might imagine, harbors safe from pirates but rather 
harbors safe for pirates. Such ports welcomed brigands, happy to sell 
them provisions, repair their ships, and gain their patronage. Can 
web entrepreneurs now find new safe harbors for their offerings, 
insulating them from the reach of the authorities of strict jurisdic-
tions, yet still offering their service across the world?
The meme that information wants to be free has a potential 
corollary: the pirates of cyberspace cannot be controlled. Legal 
scholars David Johnson and David Post famously argued more than 
a decade ago that “efforts to control the flow of electronic informa-
tion across physical borders—to map local regulation and physical 
boundaries onto Cyberspace—are likely to prove futile.”1 In this 
chapter we see that governments have sought to control information 
coming into their country with occasional success. Information may 
want to be free, but it can sometimes be chained.
Thus far in this book, we have met some of the world’s 
best- respected net- work companies, from Apple to Wipro. In chap-
ter 2, we met Silicon Valley enterprises, which leverage efficiencies 
of mass production, network effects, and first- mover advantage to 
become global traders. In chapter 3, we encountered Bangalore 
enterprises, which leverage efficiencies of mass production and labor 
arbitrage to become leading traders on the Electronic Silk Road. In 
this chapter we’ll consider net- work enterprises that other countries 
deplore, whether fairly or unfairly. Here we meet companies from 
the Caribbean to Russia that leverage local regulatory laxity to 
become global traders.
I use the term pirate without any wish to tar all such enterprises 
as morally reprehensible. There is strong reason to think that many 
of these enterprises provide a socially useful function. Even Silicon 
P
IR
A
t
e
s
 o
F c
Y
B
e
R
s
PA
c
e
89
Valley enterprises might be seen as pirates in some cases, providing 
outlawed information to the people of repressive regimes. YouTube, 
Facebook, and Twitter transmitted information that the Hosni 
Mubarak dictatorship would have denied to the Egyptian people. 
Indeed, as we will see, in its desperation, Egypt’s government turned 
off the Internet for the entire country.
In this chapter I describe five enterprises that have engaged in a 
kind of regulatory arbitrage: (1) the gambling enterprises of the tiny 
Caribbean island nation of Antigua and Barbuda, which hopes to 
become the Las Vegas of cyberspace; (2) Kazaa, a peer- to- peer file 
trading service; (3) The Pirate Bay, another peer- to- peer file trading 
service; (4) Russia’s AllofMP3.com, which offered entire record 
albums for the price of one iTune; and (5) WikiLeaks, a site that 
seeks to reveal the world’s deepest, darkest secrets. Each of these 
services asserts its legitimacy under the laws of its home country, but 
each is denounced as a pirate by authorities elsewhere. Like the 
pirates of yesteryear, these companies fly flags of convenience, claim-
ing jurisdictional advantage and legal immunity by their choice of 
their home base.
Ultimately, however, their stories reveal that such enterprises are 
not entirely immune to legal process, at least where those they 
antagonize have the resources and perseverance to hound them, like 
Ahab, across the seas.
Gambling in Antigua
There was a time when American adventurers booked passage to 
Havana to place a bet. Restrictive laws across most of the United 
States necessitated travel to more permissive jurisdictions for those 
who wished to gamble. Today the Internet permits Americans to 
gamble on “foreign” card tables without leaving home. Recognizing 
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this possibility, Antigua set out a decade ago to “become the Las 
Vegas and Atlantic City of online gambling.”2 It licensed online 
casinos and sports booking, charging $100,000 and $75,000, respec-
tively, for each license.3 Quickly this island of seven working stop-
lights became the principal haven for Internet enterprises offering 
gambling to Americans.4
Other jurisdictions followed suit. Spurred by an American entre-
preneur, a Mohawk Indian community in Quebec set up computer 
servers on the banks of the Saint Lawrence River—near the 
American market and helpfully atop a “major fibre optic corridor.”5 
Its principal client was the online gambling provider Party Gaming, 
established by an American lawyer and an Indian expatriate pro-
grammer, incorporated in the British overseas territory of Gibraltar, 
with a workforce in Hyderabad.6 PartyGaming grew into a multina-
tional corporation listed on the London Stock Exchange. At 
its height, it was worth more than $10 billion.7 In 2005, almost 
90 percent of PartyGaming’s customers were in the United States, a 
country whose authorities believed that such gambling was illegal.
These money- making paradises would not remain undisturbed 
for long. American prosecutors, relying on a law enacted in 1961 to 
dismantle gambling operations run by organized crime, issued arrest 
warrants for online gambling operators. Attorney General Janet 
Reno warned, “You can’t go offshore and hide. You can’t go online 
and hide.”8 Confident that “no judge is going to let [an arrest war-
rant against him] stand” because he ran his business from Antigua, 
where online gambling was legal, online gambling proprietor Jay 
Cohen returned to the mainland to defend himself.9 Cohen would 
spend a year and a half in prison, perhaps ruing his bad bet.10 Fearing 
that a similar fate would befall her son should he return to the 
United States, the mother of Cohen’s business partner did not tell 
her son of his father’s death.11 Cohen’s lawyer saw the conviction as 
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an affront to Antiguan sovereignty: “What they’re doing is they’re 
telling Antigua, which is a sovereign nation, ‘You can’t do this.’ ”12 
For its part, PartyGaming would lose billions of dollars in value 
when the United States enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in 2006. In 2011, it merged into another 
gambling enterprise, Bwin, based in Gibraltar.
Given the US authorities’ commitment to enforcement, coming 
to the United States, even simply to change planes for another inter-
national destination, became a dangerous activity for overseas gam-
bling executives. British gambling CEO David Carruthers might 
have regretted his 2006 layover in Dallas–Fort Worth International 
Airport, where he was arrested on his way from Britain to Costa 
Rica, where he ran an Internet gambling business. Like Party-
Gaming, Carruthers’s firm was listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Two months later, the chairman of London- based Sportingbet PLC 
was taken into custody when he arrived at JFK International Airport 
for a visit to the United States. As recently as 2012, the CEO of 
Irish gaming company Full Tilt Poker was arrested flying into JFK, 
charged not only with illegal gambling but also with running a Ponzi 
scheme in which he promised customers that their deposited funds 
were secure when they were not.
In passing the UIGEA, Congress recognized the limits of rely-
ing on gambling scofflaws (viewed from the American perspective) 
to retain legally unsophisticated travel agents. So Congress tried a 
different tactic: to go after the money flow to these foreign compa-
nies. The UIGEA required payment systems to identify and block 
funding of gambling transactions. Under pressure from New York 
attorney general Eliot Spitzer, Paypal had already desisted from 
serving Internet gambling customers in 2002. In response to the 
UIGEA, Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and American Express also 
identified and blocked Internet gambling payments.
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Faced with these American threats to its thriving new industry, 
Antigua responded like any country that found its exports hampered 
by legal restrictions elsewhere: it filed a claim against the United 
States before the World Trade Organization. Antigua’s claim was 
novel in at least two dimensions. It was the first in history 
brought squarely under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services. Antigua’s dispute was also the first to challenge interna-
tional barriers to trade via the Internet. Antigua argued that the 
requirement of physical establishment in certain specified zones in 
the United States ran afoul of the national treatment obligation 
by disadvantaging foreign providers. Antigua further argued that 
the United States violated its commitment to provide market 
access to trade in “other recreational services.” I discuss this dispute 
more fully in chapter 6, but for the moment it is sufficient to 
note that the WTO largely ruled in favor of the United States, 
accepting the American argument that online gambling might 
promote underage and problem gambling, as well as abet fraud and 
money laundering.
There was one hiccup in the American victory. The United States 
had failed to explain why it banned online gambling but yet permit-
ted online horse racing gambling provided by US enterprises. 
This was inconsistent, at least on its face, with the American 
argument that online services were especially prone to undesirable 
activity. Despite the obvious inconsistency, the United States refused 
to budge, maintaining its horse- racing exception in the face of the 
WTO ruling. Antigua thus applied to the WTO to apply trade 
sanctions on the United States. But the United States is unlikely to 
worry about higher tariffs on exports to Antigua, the traditional 
trade remedy available under the WTO system. The loss of exports 
to Antigua would be but a pinprick to a giant. Antigua sought 
a slightly more painful remedy—the ability to violate American 
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intellectual property rights in an amount roughly equal to the losses 
from the American trade law violation.
The WTO granted Antigua the right to retaliate by suspending 
Antigua’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) obligation to respect US intellectual 
property rights in an amount corresponding to the estimated 
lost revenues from online horse racing.13 Antigua is thus officially 
free to copy Hollywood movies and the latest music—at least up to 
$21 million in value each year. Antigua is thus now truly a pirate of 
the Caribbean.
Next Stop, Kazaakhstan?
Kazaa, a peer- to- peer file trading system, was founded in the 
Netherlands by a Swede and a Dane but programmed from Estonia 
and eventually run from Australia and incorporated in the South 
Pacific island nation of Vanuatu.14 Launched in 2001 by the Dutch 
company Consumer Empowerment, Kazaa soon faced a copyright 
infringement suit from the Dutch music publishing body Buma/
Stemra. After an adverse November 2001 trial court ruling, 
Consumer Empowerment passed the hot potato along, selling Kazaa 
to newly incorporated Sharman Networks, headquartered in 
Australia and incorporated in Vanuatu. Kazaa’s founders might have 
made a hasty decision. In 2002, a Dutch appeals court reversed the 
earlier ruling, holding that Kazaa provided a number of worthy uses 
and could not be held responsible for the members who used the 
service for copyright infringement.15 The Dutch supreme court 
affirmed the appellate ruling the following year.16 But the rulings 
came too late; the software’s new owner, Sharman Networks, faced 
suits in both Australia and the United States. Even Kazaa’s location 
on the other side of the world did not guarantee immunity from 
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process in the United States. A federal district court in California 
ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over Sharman on either one of 
two separate grounds: (1) the large number of California users of its 
service, and (2) the fact that Sharman “is and has been well aware of 
the charge that its users are infringing copyrights, and reasonably 
should be aware that many, if not most, music and video copyrights 
are owned by California- based companies.”17 In 2006, Sharman 
reached a global settlement with the plaintiffs, agreeing to pay music 
studios $100 million and another undisclosed sum to movie stu-
dios.18 It also promised to restructure its service to bar most 
copyright- infringing works.
Why did Sharman settle? Couldn’t it have simply retreated 
to yet another jurisdiction? We can offer a conjecture: both the 
American and Australian lawsuits threatened Sharman’s ability to 
raise revenues through advertising and other services. If it hoped to 
avoid a never- ending cat- and- mouse game that would undermine 
its ability to make money, Sharman needed to eliminate the legal 
threat hanging over it.
Of course, the same will not be true of all such services. So- 
called darknets, for example, promise to allow individuals to 
share information but mask the identity of all the parties involved. 
Such systems allow sharing among a small group of users who 
gain trust by sharing large quantities of high- quality, often illegal 
material.19 Some have suggested that darknets make copyright law 
or censorship futile. But darknets require a significant degree of 
sophistication from users, thus reducing their potential market. 
To find the illicit online drug market Silk Road, for example, one 
needs to first install and configure the anonymizer Tor on one’s com-
puter.20 Furthermore, while Silk Road has established Amazonlike 
reputation systems, suspicions may still hamper transactions in 
such a system. One does not know whether the anonymous person 
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on the other end is a patient police officer pretending to be a 
longtime outlaw. Still, the prospect of open- source, not- for- profit 
peer- to- peer systems suggests that unauthorized distribution chan-
nels such as darknets will long remain a thorn in the side of law 
enforcement.
Kazaa’s story has a happy ending, at least for its founders. Janus 
Friis and Niklas Zennström followed the Kazaa model to create the 
video and voice- over Internet Protocol service Skype, incorporating 
their London- operated company in Luxembourg and relying on 
Estonians for programming. In 2005, they sold Skype to eBay for 
$2.6 billion.21
From Russia with Love: An Entire Album for $0.99
Imagine that you are an executive of a Hollywood music studio. 
Consider your reaction to a Russian website that allows individuals 
around the world to download every song your studio owns for pen-
nies on the dollar, all the while relying on Russian law to claim that 
it was entirely legal. This was in fact the reality for a number of years: 
“Sold by the megabyte instead of by the song, an album of 10 songs 
or so on AllofMP3 can cost the equivalent of less than $1, compared 
with 99 cents per song on iTunes.”22 For users, it seemed too good to 
be true: “From a consumer standpoint, AllofMP3.com was pretty 
close to the perfect music service—dirt cheap, easy to use. . . . Oh, 
and no DRM [digital rights management].”23 The fact that AllofMP3 
did not bother to license its content from your studio or any studio 
also meant that it could offer up a music catalog that covered music 
unavailable on licensed services; for example, it offered the entire 
Beatles catalog long before any part of that catalog appeared on 
iTunes. The end result: a bigger catalog than iTunes, for a fraction of 
the cost.
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What made AllofMP3 especially troublesome for record com-
panies was the possibility that it was legal under Russian law. 
According to its website: “The availability over the Internet of 
the ALLOFMP3.com materials is authorized by the license # 
LS–3M–05–03 of the Russian Multimedia and Internet Society 
(ROMS) and license # 006/3M–05 of the Rightholders Federation 
for Collective Copyright Management of Works Used Interactively 
(FAIR).”24 This was not just the usual bluster of a shady business. 
The Russian license from the Russian collecting society arguably 
permits the online sale of music upon the payment of a 15 percent 
royalty to the Russian collecting society (the Russian Multimedia 
and Internet Society, known as ROMS), without requiring individ-
ual negotiation with copyright holders.25 ROMS licensed the site 
and even backed it up, describing it as “quite legitimate.”26 ROMS 
collected royalty payments on behalf of record companies and 
artists, but it “had few takers” for the royalties obtained for AllofMP3 
downloads.27
By 2006, the website, which claimed five million subscribers, had 
become one of the thousand most popular websites in the world.28 
AllofMP3 eschewed any responsibility “for the actions of foreign 
users” and advised them to consult local counsel while at the same 
time suggesting that downloading was in fact legal in the United 
States.29 The website’s backers themselves were not confident of the 
legality of the offering, refusing to publicize any physical address. 
The New York Times tracked down a responsible party to a Moscow 
address only by examining the site’s domain name registration.30
Even a Moscow address may not prove an insurmountable 
obstacle for enforcement efforts within the United States. When 
the recording industry filed a copyright infringement suit against 
the site in 2006 in New York federal court, it sought statutory dam-
ages in the amount of $150,000 for each instance of copyright 
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infringement, totaling $1.65 trillion (an amount that exceeded 
Russia’s 2005 GDP).31 It also sought the company’s domain name. 
While the recording industry might have found it difficult to collect 
the monetary award, they might have had better luck against the 
company’s “.com” domain name. This is because the company that 
operates the “.com” domain name registry, Verisign, is headquartered 
in Virginia. Verisign is likely to listen to a federal court order to 
remove or transfer a domain name.
The recording industry pursued yet another approach: blocking 
by the Internet service provider on the user side of the download. A 
Copenhagen court ordered Danish Internet service provider Tele2 
to block access to the site on the theory that Tele2 would be liable 
for infringement if its customers used AllofMP3 to download 
music.32
The international music industry asked Visa and MasterCard to 
refuse to process payments to the site. When these companies com-
plied, AllofMP3’s owners sued the Russian financial agents for Visa. 
In 2007, a Moscow arbitral tribunal ruled that Visa could not refuse 
to process transactions for AllofMP3’s successor site, AllTunes.com, 
because that site was legal.33
If the music studios could not stop the money, they could still put 
pressure on the site in other ways. In 2007, Russia happened to be 
negotiating entry into the World Trade Organization. WTO entry 
would mean that its exporters would face fewer tariffs and other 
trade barriers, but the United States could effectively block entry. US 
Trade Representative Susan Schwab explicitly linked WTO entry 
with protecting intellectual property rights: “I have a hard time 
imagining Russia becoming a member of the WTO and having a 
Web site like that up and running that is so clearly a violation of 
everyone’s intellectual property rights.”34 Schwab’s chief spokes-
woman, Neena Moorjani, had even sharper words: “AllofMP3.com 
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is the world’s largest server- based pirate website,” she declared.35 
Russian prosecutors charged Denis Kvasov, a former owner of 
AllofMP3, with copyright infringement. Kvasov faced a jail term of 
up to three years and a penalty of $500,000, payable to American 
music companies EMI, Warner, and Universal.36 In 2007, however, a 
Moscow court acquitted Kvasov, ruling that AllofMP3 acted within 
Russian law.
Nonetheless, in July 2007, AllofMP3 was shuttered. Using a 
court order, Russian authorities severed the connection between 
the company, Media Services, and its Internet service provider, 
Master Host.37 Tellingly, the action was reported to the media by the 
United States trade representative. By 2008, the recording industry 
had dropped its lawsuit, declaring the site defunct. Russia gained 
admission to the WTO in 2012.
Viking Pirates of the Twenty- First Century
The Pirate Bay is so accustomed to complaints from copyright hold-
ers that its home page includes a link titled “Legal Threats.” The site’s 
proprietors confidently assert that their actions are legal under 
Swedish law and that foreign laws do not apply to their Stockholm- 
based service, posting retorts on their website. When Hollywood 
studio DreamWorks complained that the site facilitated copyright 
infringement of its movie Shrek 2, The Pirate Bay’s Gottfrid 
Svartholm responded with derision:
As you may or may not be aware, Sweden is not a state in the 
United States of America. Sweden is a country in northern 
Europe. Unless you figured it out by now, US law does not 
apply here. For your information, no Swedish law is being 
violated.
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. . . It is the opinion of us and our lawyers that you are . . . 
morons.
Svartholm explains that The Pirate Bay supports freedom and that 
its services help disseminate important material that many people 
wish to censor or that traditional mass media do not show. 
Copyright holders argue that The Pirate Bay willfully abets copy-
right infringement. The site earns money from advertising. A visit to 
the site from a university computer in New Haven, Connecticut, in 
2008 resulted in an advertisement for dates in that city.
In 2006, Swedish authorities raided the site’s offices, seizing its 
servers. Despite the turmoil, The Pirate Bay restored service just 
three days later, unveiling a new logo (see fig. 1). The police eventu-
ally returned the servers, one of which the website donated to a 
Swedish museum. In 2009, the site’s founders were convicted of 
violating Swedish copyright law and sentenced to terms of up to 
one year. In 2012, the site switched from a “.org” address to a Swed-
ish “.se” address in order to lessen the risk of the seizure of the 
domain name by US authorities.
Figure 1. The Pirate Bay’s defiant logo upon restoring service after a 
police seizure. Courtesy of The Pirate Bay.
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Some copyright holders seem also to have employed “self- help” 
measures outside the law to attack The Pirate Bay. Such measures 
include seeding the site with corrupt files and launching denial- of- 
service attacks that make it difficult for users to access the site. There 
is risk in such an approach. Both denial- of- service attacks and 
uploading a site with corrupt files would likely run afoul of many 
national laws.
Copyright holders across the world have acted against the site 
through administrative and judicial processes in their home jurisdic-
tions. They have targeted local Internet service providers, obtaining 
orders enjoining the ISPs from providing users with access to the 
site. According to Wikipedia, authorities in the following countries 
have, at times, ordered local ISPs to deny access to the site: Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, the People’s Republic of China, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. The blocks, however, are imperfect; a determined 
web user simply needs to point the browser to a new “proxy” address 
established by The Pirate Bay that has not yet been blocked.38 A 
helpful list of proxy servers can be found at a site titled The Hydra 
Bay, recalling the Greek monster that grew two new heads for every 
head that was cut off.
Trying to Censor an Uncensorable Site
Imagine a way for anyone around the world who is privy to state or 
corporate secrets to share those secrets anonymously with the world. 
Governments and corporations might shudder to imagine their 
darkest secrets revealed for the world to see. Authorities, whether 
public or private, have little incentive to reveal their mistakes or their 
unethical or illegal conduct. Silencing the people who betray such 
secrets has provided the motive for countless murder mysteries. 
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When they founded WikiLeaks in 2006, the site’s promoters knew 
that they were engaged in an activity that many governments would 
seek to suppress. Accordingly, Australian Julian Assange and a 
stealth group of other activists established a means for anyone 
across the world to pass secrets to them anonymously.39 Assange 
stepped out in 2008 only as a spokesperson for the group. Wikipedia 
now recognizes Assange as the editor- in- chief of WikiLeaks. 
The network lacked any formal corporate organization. On their 
site, the nameless activists simply declared, “We help you safely get 
the truth out.”40
The founders saw themselves as offering “a universal way for the 
revealing of suppressed and censored injustices.”41 In a sense, 
WikiLeaks represents the natural evolution of newspapers in an era 
of globalization and digitization. Newspapers have long prided 
themselves on scoops—being the first to divulge information that a 
few people have known, often much to the chagrin of the subjects of 
the story. But traditional newspapers have always been subject 
to state suppression. The breaking of printing presses and the 
shuttering of newspapers have been widespread since the dawn 
of the press. Even the US government famously sought to 
suppress the release by the New York Times of the history of 
American intervention in Vietnam, which revealed among other 
things the deliberate bombing of Cambodia and Laos. In the famous 
Pentagon Papers case decided in 1971, the Supreme Court rejected 
the effort to suppress the leak as inimical to the Constitution’s 
free speech guarantee. Of course, there is probably no country in the 
world that can match American speech rights. And even US 
courts faced with efforts to reveal information about the War on 
Terror have been willing to abet suppression of “state secrets.” But a 
global digital network of largely invisible persons could perhaps 
avoid the retaliation that might follow a shocking disclosure. 
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By establishing a network across nations, a website can pass a hot 
potato rapidly across countries. By relying on a digital network, the 
site can keep newsgathering and publishing costs relatively low 
while reaching people across the globe both as informants and as 
consumers.
In its earliest years, WikiLeaks annoyed a few governments and 
private corporations by divulging secret information. WikiLeaks 
exposed documents that suggested that former Kenyan president 
Daniel Arap Moi had laundered $4.5 billion. It leaked a Pentagon 
handbook that showed that psychological techniques that many 
described as torture were used against prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. 
It disclosed internal documents of the Church of Scientology.
In 2008, when the site revealed bank account records of Cayman 
Islands transactions involving a Swiss private bank, the bank sued. 
But where would it choose to sue a nameless, global network? The 
Swiss bank decided on the federal court in the Northern District of 
California. There the Swiss institution, Bank Julius Baer & Co., 
sought an order requiring WikiLeaks to desist in publishing the 
private banking details of clients. The federal judge, worried about 
the privacy of bank accounts, granted the request. The most surpris-
ing aspect of his preliminary decision was to accede to the bank’s 
demand that the WikiLeaks.org domain be shut down. But how can 
one shut down a nameless, faceless website? It turns out that 
WikiLeaks’ domain name provider, Dynadot, was based in San 
Mateo, California—within the Northern District of California. 
It may have been the connection with Dynadot that the Swiss 
bank was after in choosing to bring the suit in California. The 
district court granted the bank’s request, ordering Dynadot to dis-
able WikiLeaks.org temporarily while it considered the matter. 
WikiLeaks immediately found mirror sites around the world from 
which to post information, including WikiLeaks.be (Belgium), 
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WikiLeaks.in (India), and The Pirate Bay. Most interestingly, when 
the court ordered the domain name registrar to refuse to point 
WikiLeaks.org to the WikiLeaks’ server, the New York Times and 
other news venues published the IP address of the WikiLeaks’ 
Swedish web server, 88.80.13.160.42 Equally notably, the Swedish 
servers that host the site were run by the founders of The Pirate 
Bay.43 With more briefing on the case, the federal judge reconsid-
ered his decision and quickly rescinded his order.44
The attack by Julius Baer foreshadowed the far wider and more 
vociferous response WikiLeaks would draw in 2010 when it began 
disclosing material related to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, fol-
lowed by US diplomatic cables. In releasing the Afghan documents, 
WikiLeaks partnered with mainstream print media to edit and inter-
pret the material. It found willing partners in some of the world’s 
leading names in journalism: the New York Times, the British news-
paper the Guardian, and the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel.
Although WikiLeaks is not a commercial site and thus not in 
that sense a global trader, the response to it shows both the power 
and the limits of governments against a diffuse digital network. The 
attacks against WikiLeaks have come from various quarters, from 
private companies to sovereign governments. At the same time, 
WikiLeaks’ principals and supporters, cyberexperts that they are, 
have proven both resourceful and clever in seeking to evade the 
sanctions imposed.
WikiLeaks’ domain name registrar cut off its domain name on 
December 2, 2010. Perhaps surprisingly, WikiLeaks had again relied 
on an American registrar, though a different one. The domain 
name management service EveryDNS cut off WikiLeaks without a 
court order, instead citing denial- of- service attacks on WikiLeaks, 
which EveryDNS said were threatening the other half a million 
sites it served.45 As before, WikiLeaks’ principals simply promoted 
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an alternative domain name—WikiLeaks.ch—linked to the IP 
address of their computer server. The choice of a dot.ch was likely 
neither entirely accidental nor based on convenience: Switzerland 
controls the .ch domain. Perhaps WikiLeaks hoped to benefit from 
the famous neutrality of their hosts.
That same day, Amazon stopped providing hosting services to 
WikiLeaks. Amazon reported that it, too, had experienced “large- 
scale DDoS [distributed denial- of- service] attacks,” but stated 
that these attacks “were successfully defended against.” It also cited 
violations of its terms of service, suggesting that WikiLeaks did not 
“own or otherwise control all of the rights to the content” that it was 
posting on Amazon’s servers.46
The following day, PayPal, an American payment processor 
owned by eBay, stopped processing donations for the Wau Holland 
Foundation, which had been collecting monies for WikiLeaks. 
PayPal asserted that processing donations ultimately for WikiLeaks 
violated its “Acceptable Use Policy” because it was used for “activities 
that encourage, promote, facilitate or instruct others to engage in 
illegal activity.” The vice president of PayPal later stated that 
they stopped accepting payments after the “State Department 
told us these were illegal activities. It was straightforward.” Later 
the same day, he retracted that statement, saying that PayPal’s 
decision was in fact based on a letter from the State Department 
to WikiLeaks.47
WikiLeaks’ supporters responded by targeting the corporations 
that had denied service to WikiLeaks. Operation Payback involved a 
DDoS attack on these corporations. DDos attacks are typically 
launched through a “botnet”—a network of online “robots” (in this 
case, software programs) dispersed across thousands of computers. 
Typically, one creates such a botnet through a virus—indeed, this 
is the typical reason to create a virus—so that it will give one a 
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sleeping botnet, to be activated when needed. The innovation of the 
WikiLeaks activists was that they created a voluntary botnet—in 
which individuals voluntarily downloaded the software program that 
created the botnet. But how does one get thousands of people to 
download software that makes their computer participate in a 
botnet? Via Twitter and Facebook, of course. Calling themselves 
“Anonymous,” the loosely knit activists used social media to circulate 
information about the distributed denial- of- service response, includ-
ing how to download the software. In one video, an announcer 
declares,  “Corrupt governments of the world, we are Anonymous.”48
In turn, evincing the never- ending cat- and- mouse game of 
Internet attack and counterattack, Twitter and Facebook shut 
down the accounts of Anonymous. And in the inevitable response, 
Anonymous shifted accounts.
There is reason to worry about corporations removing content 
they find undesirable on their own accord. Corporations will have 
the tendency to remove information their management disfavors, 
but worse, they may well seek to remove controversial material 
more generally. WikiLeaks’ Assange has described the American 
corporate actions as the “privatisation of state censorship.”49
WikiLeaks thus represents the cutting edge both of efforts to 
thwart undesired cyberactivity and to sidestep those blocks. Thus far, 
at least, WikiLeaks seems to be winning. The forbidden information 
remains widely and readily available. And it continues, in fits and 
spurts, to gather and release more underground information.
Controlling Cyberspace
Holding Internet service providers (ISPs) liable for the ephemeral 
copying that takes place when a music file is downloaded is certainly 
a broad strategy. The worry is that such an approach will cause ISPs 
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to aggressively police what flows through their wires—barring 
otherwise inoffensive material in the process.50 In the United States, 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act offers immunity from civil 
liability for claims of copyright infringement against ISPs, as long as 
they meet the terms of a safe harbor. The DMCA’s Section 512(a) 
immunizes ISPs for “routing . . . material . . . if . . . the transmission 
of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other 
than the service provider . . . [and] the service provider does not 
select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response 
to the request of another person.”
But ISPs are hardly the only points of control. Other points of 
control include search engines, website hosts, and Internet routers, 
not to mention web users and website providers. Federal and state 
governments in the United States have targeted such points of 
control to reach illicit activity, including a federal government agree-
ment with credit card companies to prevent illegal online purchases 
of cigarettes via credit cards; a congressional initiative to block 
illegal online prescription sales; and a Pennsylvania statute, later 
held unconstitutional, which would require ISPs to block child 
pornography sites.51 Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley suggest that 
focusing on intermediaries (by placing liability on them) should 
only be pursued where cost effective: “The key question for deter-
mining the propriety of intermediary liability is the plausibility 
that the intermediary could detect the misconduct and prevent it 
[economically].” They explain: “When intermediaries have the 
technological capability to prevent harmful transactions and when 
the costs of doing so are reasonable in relation to the harm pre-
vented, they should be encouraged to do so, with the threat of 
formal legal sanction if necessary.”52 However, just calculating 
relative costs of enforcement—the costs of intermediaries 
enforcing copyright versus the costs of copyright holders enforcing 
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copyrights—neglects the price paid by such enforcement on values 
such as free speech.
Many countries have sought to employ various points of control 
to achieve their regulatory objectives. YouTube, for example, has 
attracted the attention of numerous governments. Thailand has 
objected to various videos posted to YouTube critical of the monar-
chy.53 Even the United States has barred its military from posting 
videos to the site, citing bandwidth concerns.54
The emergence of a community titled “We Hate India” on 
Google’s Orkut social networking service led to numerous efforts to 
respond, including attempts to block access to that community. The 
website includes a “picture burning the national tricolor [flag], bear-
ing an anti- India message.”55 As if taking a cue from Justice Louis 
Brandeis, who promoted more speech as a response to false speech, 
a few Orkut members established new communities titled “I Hate 
Hatred” and “We hate those who hate India.”56 Others, however, 
sought to ban the anti- Indian community outright. A student group 
associated with a right- wing Hindu political party, the Shiv Sena, 
asked Indian cybercafés to block access to the anti- India commu-
nity, going so far as to vandalize those that did not. The president of 
Bharatiya Vidyarthi Sena, one such student group, condemns Orkut, 
saying that it is “used by many destructive elements to spread canards 
about India, Hindus, our gods and cultural heritage.” The complaint 
was even heard by a Mumbai court, though it does not appear that 
the complaint resulted in definitive action.57 Orkut was briefly 
banned by Pune police in India after a series of violent events fol-
lowing the filing of a complaint by the Shiv Sena and related groups 
alleging that Orkut had allowed the posting of “slang, rude and vul-
gar language” about the Maratha warrior- king Chhatrapati Shivaji 
Maharaj.58 The complaint centered on a mere 160- word posting 
on one of Orkut’s multitudinous community web pages.59 Indian 
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authorities have also targeted ISPs in order to impede access to sites 
allegedly promoting hate or armed rebellion.60 Unfortunately, the 
effort to block a dozen or so blogs has often led risk- averse ISPs to 
block access to all blogs hosted on various popular services, such as 
Blogger and Typepad. After complaints, ISPs have restored access 
to these services in favor of narrower censorship by blocking at the 
subdomain level. The OpenNet Initiative found that even the more 
refined attempts to block access to certain blogs were not entirely 
successful because the content migrated elsewhere.61 OpenNet 
reports that Indian authorities sought to block an anti- Islamic web-
site, but that again proved only partially successful, since one ISP 
refused to abide by the order. When the Mumbai police ordered the 
blocking of www.hinduunity.org for posting anti- Islamic material, 
they claimed to be exercising emergency powers to block material 
constituting a nuisance or threat to public safety. Most ISPs com-
plied, but the largest one refused, arguing that the police lacked the 
power to issue blocking orders. As of March 2012, the website 
remains available in the United States but does not resolve to an 
accessible address in India, as tested on one Indian ISP. The domain 
name Hinduunity.org is registered to a person with a Post Office box 
in East Norwich, New York.62
Efforts to employ various control points to regulate information 
flow across the world will not prove uniformly successful. Determined 
web surfers may find ways to access forbidden information. There are 
numerous methods for bypassing government blocks of websites such 
as Orkut. The most popular requires the web surfer to access a website 
such as www.kproxy.com to reach an anonymizing proxy server, “a 
proxy server that removes identifying information from the client’s 
requests for the purpose of anonymity.”63 Kproxy.com itself states that 
its site cannot be used “to transmit any unlawful, harassing, libelous, 
abusive, threatening, harmful, or hateful material of any kind or 
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nature” or “for any illegal purpose including but not limited to the 
transmission or receipt of illegal material.”64 It will be difficult to 
stamp out entirely runaway information in cyberspace if there are 
determined disseminators and web surfers eager for the information 
sitting at computers around the world. In a dispiriting lesson for 
copyright owners, Hollywood brought a successful suit against one 
website to ban its linking to the DeCSS code that allows individuals 
to copy DVDs, but that code remains widely available.65
But yet another point is clear. The capacities of each state to 
regulate offerings from abroad will vary widely. Few countries will be 
able to hold accession to the WTO or some other international 
regime hostage to compliance with that country’s legal regime. Very 
few will rival the United States’ capacity in this regard. Countries 
such as China and Saudi Arabia might find success through control 
over routers and the Internet backbone or through employing large 
armies of censors. One common strategy will be to target Internet 
service providers as the locus for regulation, a strategy that will likely 
lead to the suppression of even some speech permitted in those 
restrictive jurisdictions. Another common strategy will be to target 
domain names.
The Domain Name System as Chokepoint
Complicating governmental efforts to enforce their rules in cyber-
space is the “end- to- end” nature of the Internet. The end- to- end 
principle “holds that the intelligence in the network lies principally at 
its endpoints.”66 Rather than relying on a central, top- down hierar-
chy for disseminating information, like television, the Internet allows 
individuals worldwide to communicate directly with one another. 
The absence of a central authority to mediate information flows 
hampers regulatory efforts. Yet as the WikiLeaks case demonstrates, 
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there is one crucial chokepoint for the Internet: the domain name 
system (DNS).
Information on the web is most readily accessible if it has a sin-
gle, static address in cyberspace. The domain name system provides 
such a function. Just as in any property registry, the need for each 
web address to have a unique translation to a particular computer 
requires a single authority to manage that translation.67 Currently 
that authority is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), a California not- for- profit corporation, which 
received its original authority through a 1998 US Department of 
Commerce contract. ICANN retains the power to set the rules for 
global domain name spaces such as “.com,” “.net,” and “.info” but 
does not claim authority over country domain name spaces. By 
convention, that authority is reserved for the governments of the 
countries themselves. Of course, there can be questions as to who 
the legitimate government might be. As an example, consider the 
awarding of the .ps domain name for the Palestinian Territories to 
the management of the Palestinian Authority.
Thus far, ICANN has chosen to apply its authority as a choke-
point only on behalf of trademark holders. ICANN has presided 
over an extensive dispute resolution system largely created and man-
aged by the United Nations agency the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Under this system, in order for any person 
to register a domain name, that person must agree to arbitrate any 
claims that that domain name impermissibly infringes on a trade-
mark holder’s mark. This system extends ICANN’s regulatory 
authority over all domain name registrants. ICANN’s recent deci-
sion to allow new top- level domains (TLDs) promises to extend 
that authority in even more controversial ways.
An even more concentrated—and popular—point of control 
turns out to be the “root server”—the computer database that serves 
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as the registry of domain names. For “.com” and “.net” domains, the 
root server has long been maintained by VeriSign in northern 
Virginia—in comfortable (or uncomfortable, depending on one’s 
perspective) proximity to Washington, DC. More recently, the root 
server has been distributed across multiple jurisdictions, so it is 
harder to locate (or attack). The local Virginia federal court has 
attracted a large number of domain name disputes—especially 
those where the claims are brought in rem against a domain name 
held by a foreign party. Thus, the ultimate power over the “.com” and 
“.net” domains seems to rest, for US law purposes, with the federal 
district court for the Eastern District of Virginia, appeals from 
which are heard by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and ulti-
mately (though it has never taken a domain name case) the Supreme 
Court. The Pennsylvania- based Public Interest Registry manages “.
org.” In 2012, as noted, The Pirate Bay moved from an “.org” address 
to a Swedish “.se” TLD, hoping thereby to limit the reach of US 
authorities.
States and private parties can defect from the current domain 
name system: “If any country becomes disaffected with ICANN’s 
management, it could opt out of it in favor of a parallel Internet 
system.”68 But because of network effects, opting out would reduce 
the value of cyberspace for all. Furthermore, it is difficult to persuade 
countless web users to modify their computers to point to the alter-
native DNS rather than the ICANN- managed DNS. One might 
imagine the European Union or China mustering the will and com-
mand authority to offer an alternative system, but the challenges 
would be enormous. A world with multiple domain name systems 
would make it difficult for Americans to talk to Europeans or 
Chinese to talk to Brazilians, and vice versa.
One final method of control might be mentioned. In 2011, 
facing rebellion, the dictator of Egypt, flailing for a means to shut off 
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information flow in the country, found the Internet “kill switch.” The 
government ordered the five major Internet service providers to shut 
off their service entirely. Traffic to the Google search site from Egypt 
vanished for the six days that the Internet was shut (see fig. 2).
Governments can ultimately control the Internet, at least 
through this blunt instrument. But turning off the Internet is the 
desperate measure of a government that is willing to wreak enor-
mous economic damage. When the Mubarak regime was under 
siege, the Egyptian government initially spared the Internet access 
provider to the country’s stock exchange, until it realized that dissi-
dents were turning to this provider. Turning off the Internet can only 
be sustained in a largely undeveloped country whose government is 
willing to sacrifice the economic progress and knowledge advances 
that the Internet offers. North Korea, for one, bans its civilian 
population from accessing the Internet.
Figure 2. The Internet kill switch as evidenced by traffic to Google: 
Egyptian dictator Mubarak shuts off the Internet for his country  
to stall revolt. Courtesy of Cornell Law Review.
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FACEBOOKISTAN
Who rules Facebookistan? The United States? France? Egypt? Mark 
Zuckerberg? Social networks by necessity span borders, following 
the transnational webs of human relationships. Who makes the rules 
that govern the ways that Facebook connects a seventh of humanity?
Facebook has become so powerful and omnipresent that some 
have begun to employ the language of nationhood to describe it. It 
boasts a community of a billion people. It circulates a currency that 
can be purchased in some forty- nine national currencies, from the 
Argentine peso to the Vietnamese dong. It dispatches a team of 
“diplomats” to reach governments around the world.1 Its head 
of global communications previously served as press secretary for 
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President Bill Clinton. The New York Times reports a “Zuckerberg 
Law,” where each year, people “share twice as much information as 
they shared . . . the year before.” Facebook can boast of an “economy” 
consisting of the various third- party developers who engage in com-
merce using the Facebook platform. Facebook even holds a kind of 
a taxing power through its share of the revenues garnered via com-
merce on its site. Rebecca MacKinnon suggests that “Facebookistan 
. . . is run by a sovereign, who believes himself to be benevolent.”2
For the growing numbers of people trusting their lifetime of 
intimate communications with friends and family to this service, the 
question of who controls Facebook is quite substantial. Facebook 
increasingly records our lives, mediates our interactions, and 
serves as a platform for businesses, media, organizations, and even 
governments to engage the world.
Facebook’s global nature results in a dazzling array of possible 
regulators—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. More than 80 percent 
of Facebook users lie outside the United States, Facebook’s home 
country. Will the array of possible regulators ultimately prove pow-
erless, ineffective against this global service run (for most of its users) 
from afar?
The inquiry into Facebook’s relationship with sovereign states 
allows us to interrogate some foundational issues of cyberlaw. By 
reviewing the interaction between one of the world’s most important 
web enterprises and a number of nation- states, we can test the validity 
of early claims about the web. Is East Coast Code more powerful than 
West Coast Code, or vice versa?3 Are national efforts to regulate futile 
against a company that operates offshore?4 Will governmental efforts 
to regulate cyberspace be contested as illegitimate? Does cyberspace 
create separate fiefdoms, largely immune to sovereign- bound legal 
process?5 Does voting “with one’s feet”—or with one’s clicks or taps—
prove an effective disciplinary mechanism for wayward web masters?
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At the same time, this inquiry furthers understanding about the 
globalization of contemporary corporations. Facebook represents a 
type of multinational corporation new to the world stage—one that 
raises issues different from those raised by earlier generations of 
multinational corporations. Earlier eras of corporate globalization 
saw companies turning to the world as markets for goods. Witness 
General Motors’ cars and General Electric’s turbines. These compa-
nies quickly globalized production of goods as well, establishing 
manufacturing subsidiaries or outsourcing manufacturing around 
the world. Hollywood studios, too, represent an important breed of 
multinational corporation, distributing their products around the 
world and occasionally outsourcing production as well. The multina-
tional enterprises that make up Web 2.0 offer something different—
not goods to be manufactured and distributed but rather a platform 
on which others can create and share.
This intertwines Facebook with issues of culture, religion, 
and politics around the world. Facebook founder and CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg acknowledges the firm’s peculiar role: “We exist at the 
intersection of technology and social issues,” he observes.6
Facebook is not the only Web 2.0 enterprise existing at the 
intersection of technology and social issues. Google, Yahoo!, and 
Microsoft are among the Internet companies with the breadth, cap-
ital, and power to challenge governments as alternative authorities. 
A focus on Facebook alone allows us to probe the position of major 
Internet enterprises in the international order.
Facebook, C’est Moi
Facebook now employs an “envoy to India” and an “emissary to Italy.” 
Slate advises, “Now foreign countries should send diplomats to 
Facebook.” One scholar observes, “When David Cameron became 
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Britain’s prime minister, he made an appointment to talk to another 
head of state—Mark Zuckerberg.”7
Facebook is hardly the only corporation with substantial power 
over people’s lives. Since their original formulation as entities 
chartered by the king or queen, corporations have long enjoyed priv-
ileges and responsibilities associated with sovereigns. Corporations 
built bridges (and charged tolls), ran railways across cities and states, 
and managed universities. Granted an official monopoly on trade 
with India, the East India Company grew into history’s most pow-
erful corporation, becoming the de facto government for millions of 
people. The great chronicler of the twentieth- century corporation, 
Alfred Chandler, has called multinationals “leviathans,” borrowing 
Thomas Hobbes’s characterization of the omnipotent state.
Still, Facebook is different from the multinational corporations 
that have come before. A number of features make it different. First, 
its database of information about individuals is nearly unparalleled 
in human history. Second, it enjoys an enormous user base of indi-
viduals who can interact directly with each other. These direct rela-
tionships with a significant percentage of humanity and the power 
they give to Facebook have led many to employ the language associ-
ated with sovereigns to this company.
The close relationship between state and corporation is to some 
extent understandable. Each provides a good or service that indi-
vidual persons would lack the capital to supply by themselves, with 
the state largely supplying public goods and the corporation largely 
supplying private goods. Each must deal with the possible abuse of 
minority stakeholders by those in power.
It is not the size of Facebook as a corporation alone that makes 
some deploy the language of nationhood to describe it. What makes 
Facebook different from so many other corporations, and more like 
a government, is how it is involved with so many aspects of our 
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lives—including our business relationships, our friendships, and our 
families. Australian writer Julian Lee cautions: “If Facebook [were] 
a government agency, its power would be as undisputed as it would 
be frightening. For a single organisation to know as much as it does 
about the habits, interests and behaviour of 10 million Australians is 
unsettling.”8
In some ways, Facebook is more involved with intimate aspects 
of our lives than governments of liberal states. In the United States, 
the constitutional right to privacy established in Griswold v. Con-
necticut and reaffirmed in Lawrence v. Texas removed the state gov-
ernment’s right to interfere with certain relations in the bedroom. 
Liberal states generally maintain realms of private behavior—in 
which they may neither interfere nor monitor. Facebook limits itself 
somewhat—by banning some sexual material—but generally 
encompasses the breadth of our lives, even more explicitly so through 
its “Timeline” view of one’s life.
Facebook has embraced the concept of the social graph and 
seeks to implement it across the world. The social graph refers 
to “the global mapping of everybody and how they’re related.”9 
Websites linked through this social graph can share information 
with each other, enhancing the user’s experience by using informa-
tion supplied by an individual’s personal social network. At the same 
time, this means that an extraordinary amount of linked data and 
information passes through Facebook.
Facebook itself makes and enforces rules for the use of its plat-
form. Enforcement consists in removing and/or banning individuals 
or groups for violating Facebook’s terms (as determined by Facebook), 
deleting certain information, or sharing certain information with 
government authorities. To take one example, Facebook enforces 
a policy against nudity.10 When individuals sought to post photos 
of breastfeeding mothers, Facebook initially deleted them. Its 
FA
c
e
B
o
o
K
Is
t
A
n
118
spokesperson explained, “I recognize breastfeeding is a natural thing 
to do, but many users want to foster diverse respect so we have come 
up with a set of community standards.”11 It reconsidered its decision 
to delete one breastfeeding photo after a reporter asked Facebook to 
explain the deletion. Like governments, Facebook is at times suscep-
tible to public protest, as when it reinstated a photo of two men 
kissing after first removing it as a violation of the terms of use.
Facebook even briefly introduced a “governance” mechanism 
whereby users can comment on changes to Facebook’s terms of use. 
Facebook promised that “if more than 7,000 users comment on the 
proposed change, we will also give you the opportunity to participate 
in a vote in which you will be provided alternatives.” Facebook’s 
management reserved the right to overrule the votes, however, unless 
“more than 30% of all active registered users voted”—a high hurdle, 
considering that its current user base is a billion people across the 
world. Still, the opportunity to participate in Facebook’s governance 
was meaningful and could yet become more so over time.12 By late 
2012, Facebook had ended its experiment in governance.
Nation- states are likely not to leave Facebook entirely to self- 
regulation. Rather, they often seek to regulate Facebook because of 
four principal concerns.
•	 Facebook’s	 practices	 implicate	 privacy—the sharing and 
processing of information about individuals. As James 
Grimmelmann writes, “By the time you’re done [filling out 
your Facebook profile], Facebook has a reasonably com-
prehensive snapshot both of who you are and of whom you 
know.”13 Since Facebook users often post information 
about others (a natural human activity for everyone but the 
most solipsistic), Facebook holds information that people 
have not disclosed about themselves.
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•	 Facebook	might	permit	or	censor	speech in ways that raise 
regulatory concerns. Speech that involves religious, politi-
cal, trade union, health, or sexual matters might be subject 
to diverse regulation across the world. Many countries, for 
example, regulate the health claims of drug manufacturers. 
Rules for defamation and hate speech will be implicated  
as well.
•	 States	may	wish	to	regulate	the	kinds	of	associations	per-
mitted by Facebook. Facebook grants individuals and 
enterprises the ability to form associations without official 
sanction or intermediation.
•	 States	may	wish	to	regulate	the	economic	impacts	of	Face-
book. Facebook is increasingly becoming a global bazaar. 
Rather than relying on advertising alone (which itself  
has economic impact), Facebook gains revenue from tax-
ing the transactions occurring through its platform, taking 
30 percent.
Each of these areas of law—privacy, speech, association, and eco-
nomic regulation—vary dramatically across nation- states, increasing 
the risk of legal conflicts.
Some will suggest that nation- states should not seek to regulate 
Facebook because engagement with Facebook is entirely voluntary, 
in that one does not need to sign up at all if one does not like 
its terms. Indeed, there are many who have rejected Facebook and 
other social networks. Increasingly, however, one needs to open a 
Facebook account in order to receive information about an institu-
tion, a company, a store, to participate in a conference, or to receive 
information about activities nearby. Even if one forgoes all these 
opportunities, other people can still put up information about one 
on Facebook.
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Faceoff: Facebook v. Nation
As Facebook goes global, have states melted against Facebook’s jug-
gernaut, or is Hobbes’s Leviathan still potent? Writing of a faceoff 
between the German minister of consumer protection Ilse Aigner 
and Facebook’s then- twenty- five- year- old founder Mark Zucker-
berg, the Economist offers this acute observation: “It is hard to say 
who is the David,” and who the Goliath.14 I survey below efforts to 
use municipal law to influence Facebook.
United States. In its home jurisdiction, Facebook has been the 
subject of a number of federal and state regulatory efforts, as well as 
the defendant in a number of lawsuits. It seems sensible that the 
United States would be the jurisdiction with the most extensive 
efforts to regulate Facebook thus far. As the home of Facebook’s 
principals, its key assets, its headquarters, and the site of its incorpo-
ration, the United States can be Facebook’s most effective regulator, 
if it so chooses.
The most significant effort to modify Facebook’s policies by the 
US government occurred in December 2011, when the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) sought to resolve a complaint against 
Facebook for its privacy practices. The FTC alleged that Facebook 
had failed to live up to its privacy promises, thereby engaging in 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . in violation of Section 5(a) 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” The FTC alleged, for exam-
ple, that Facebook had shared users’ information in violation of its 
own privacy policies by doing such things as giving third- party 
applications access to information about a user’s friends, even if 
those friends had not authorized such access. It also charged that 
Facebook would publish the list of one’s friends, even when one 
selected a privacy setting to keep that information private. The FTC 
did not publish its complaint until December 2011, when it 
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announced the proposed settlement. Under that settlement, Face-
book agreed to not misrepresent the privacy or security of personal 
information about individual consumers and to obtain the user’s 
“affirmative express consent” before materially modifying its privacy 
settings. Violations of the terms would result in fines of up to 
$16,000 per violation, per day. Some commentators characterized 
the FTC’s proposed settlement terms as a “wrist slap.”15 But the 
settlement order included a crucial provision: an independent audit 
of Facebook’s privacy and security practices conducted biennially for 
twenty years. The FTC had set a precedent for such audits in its 
earlier settlement with Google following the Buzz fiasco, when 
Google indirectly revealed to the world whom one emailed most 
often when it automatically enrolled these people in a social network 
together.
A smaller regulatory initiative, taken by a single state, shows 
both the possible multitude of regulators even within a single coun-
try and the extent of Facebook’s reach into our relationships. This 
statute targeted Facebook users, as the focus of regulation, rather 
than Facebook itself. In 2011, Missouri passed the Amy Hestir 
Student Protection Act, a statute that included a section that quickly 
became known as the “Facebook Law.” The law barred teachers 
from using “a nonwork- related website that allows exclusive access 
with a current or former student.” In effect, this law outlawed teach-
ers from using Facebook or other social media to communicate with 
students. This section was motivated by reports of teachers using 
online services to engage in misconduct with students such as 
explicit online messages. It responded to concerns that social media 
allowed teachers to reach students outside the classroom and with-
out parental supervision. A storm of criticism was followed shortly 
by a lawsuit. The Missouri State Teachers Association sought to 
enjoin the contested portions of the statute as a violation of teachers’ 
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First Amendment rights. The Missouri court granted a preliminary 
injunction based on the statute’s “chilling effect on speech.”16 In 
October 2011, the Missouri legislature repealed the contested sec-
tion of the law, replacing it with a requirement that each school 
board develop a social media policy “to prevent improper communi-
cations between staff members and students.”17
Germany. Within Europe, Facebook has met its sharpest critics 
in Germany, a country with a deep commitment to privacy.
Facebook’s “Social Graph” architecture allows any site to share 
information between the site and the Facebook platform, permitting 
readers of the German newsmagazine Spiegel Online, for example, 
to see what stories their Facebook “friends” like. Websites such as 
Spiegel Online often use a “Like” button to connect their visitors to 
Facebook, permitting users to promote a particular item with a sin-
gle click. Many users might assume that no information would be 
passed to Facebook unless they pressed the Like button—but they 
would be wrong. An executive at a privacy software company offers 
a startling comparison: “What people don’t realize is that every one 
of these buttons is like one of those dark video cameras. If you see 
them, they see you.”18
Facebook admits that the company can see “information such as 
the IP address” of users who visit a site with a “Like” button.19 But it 
asserts that it simply collects aggregate data: “According to Face-
book, it simply counts the number of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
that visit sites with Like buttons.”20 The Facebook privacy policy, 
however, suggests that Facebook receives an array of data when a 
user visits a website that connects to the Facebook platform through 
such links as the Like button:
We receive data whenever you visit a game, application, or 
website that uses Facebook Platform or visit a site with a 
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Facebook feature (such as a social plugin), sometimes 
through cookies. This may include the date and time you 
visit the site; the web address, or URL, you’re on; technical 
information about the IP address, browser and the operating 
system you use; and, if you are logged in to Facebook, your 
User ID.21
In August 2011, the data protection minister for the northern 
German state of Schleswig- Holstein, Thilo Weichert, declared that 
the Like button and other Facebook actions violated both German 
and European law. The state data protection authority led by 
Weichert, the Independent Center for Data Protection for 
Schleswig- Holstein (ULD), explained: “Whoever visits facebook 
.com or uses a plug- in must expect that he or she will be tracked 
by the company for two years. Facebook builds a broad profile for 
members and even a personalized profile. Such profiling infringes 
German and European data protection law.”22 The ULD thus 
directed websites based in the state to desist from connecting their 
site to Facebook through the Like button—subject to a penalty of 
up to 50,000 euros. The ULD also directed government agencies to 
shutter their own Facebook pages. The Schleswig- Holstein Tourism 
Agency was one of the entities that complied with the ruling, pulling 
its Facebook page. While noting that the tourism agency takes pri-
vacy very seriously, a spokeswoman for the agency also “bemoaned 
the loss of the tools provided by the social media platform, saying 
they had been useful for business.”23
In response to these complaints, Facebook announced in 
September 2011 that it would abide by a voluntary code of conduct 
in Germany to protect user data, which, according to reports, was 
“the first time the site has agreed to such measures.”24 A possible 
approach is to adopt or adapt a voluntary code developed by 
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German media intermediaries under the auspices of the Federführung 
der Freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle Multimedia- Diensteanbieter (FSM).
Facebook has not smoothed its relations with all German 
authorities, however. In November 2011, the data protection author-
ity of the German state of Hamburg said that it planned to initiate 
legal action against Facebook for a new feature that automatically 
recognizes faces in photos posted to the site. The Hamburg author-
ity complained that Facebook had introduced this feature without 
seeking user consent. Indeed, in the United States, at least, the fea-
ture is activated by default, though an individual can disable it if he 
or she chooses. In 2012, Facebook suspended its automatic face rec-
ognition feature in Europe. By year-end, however, Facebook and 
German authorities were engaged in a new dispute: whether Face-
book would permit pseudonymous speech.
Austria and Ireland. In July 2011, twenty- four- year- old Austrian 
law student Max Schrems, exercising his right under European data 
protection law, asked Facebook what information they had collected 
about him.25 He received a CD with 1,222 pages of information. On 
these pages he found “everyone he had ever friended and de- friended, 
every event he had ever been invited to (and how he responded), a 
history of every ‘poke’ he had ever received, a record of who else 
signed onto Facebook on the same computers as him, email addresses 
that he hadn’t provided for himself (but that must have been culled 
from his friends’ contact lists) and all of his past messages and chats, 
including some with the notation ‘deleted.’ ”26 With this and other 
dossiers in hand, the group of activists calling themselves Europe vs. 
Facebook filed a complaint with Facebook’s European regulator, 
the Office of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner. The group 
complained that Facebook was violating Irish and European privacy 
law by, for example, saving supposedly deleted data.
In December 2011, the Office of the Irish Data Commissioner 
announced both its findings and its resolution of the claims. The 
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report did not focus on whether Facebook had broken European or 
Irish data protection law but considered whether Facebook had 
adopted what the commissioner believed to be the best practice for 
the social network in its European operations. Indeed, despite sug-
gesting various changes to Facebook’s policies, the report indicated 
that its recommendations “do not carry an implication that FB- I’s 
[Facebook Ireland] current practices are not in compliance with 
Irish data protection law.”27 After cooperating with an extensive 
audit of its privacy practices, Facebook agreed to modify its policies 
in a number of ways, including anonymizing or deleting information 
gained through third- party websites connected to the Facebook 
platform, increasing the privacy controls available to users, and 
deleting information about advertisements clicked on by users after 
two years.
Facebook, Inc., itself was not the subject of the audit. Rather 
Facebook Ireland, Ltd., was the subject of the audit and the entity 
taking on obligations for changes. But despite the focus on the 
Irish entity, the Irish enforcement action has implications beyond 
Ireland and even beyond Europe. While the audit was focused on 
Facebook’s Irish data- processing facility, the Irish data protection 
commissioner did visit Facebook’s Palo Alto headquarters and meet 
with Mark Zuckerberg. Furthermore, because Facebook places 
responsibility for data about persons outside the United States and 
Canada with Facebook Ireland, Ltd., the home regulator of Face-
book Ireland becomes, de facto, the regulator of Facebook across the 
world (outside the United States and Canada). Of course, this does 
not mean that other nations cannot regulate simultaneously. Indeed, 
even the Office of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner does not 
claim exclusive regulatory authority over Facebook even within 
Europe.28 From the perspective of those concerned about protecting 
privacy, there are some advantages to this arrangement for those 
outside Europe. European data protection laws are stricter than US 
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laws—and thus offer a stricter home regulator than the American 
alternative.
France. In Hervé G. v. Facebook France, the Paris Court of First 
Instance considered a claim brought by a French bishop against 
Facebook.29 Bishop Hervé Giraud of Soissons claimed that a Face-
book page titled “Courir nu dans une église en poursuivant l’évêque” 
(running naked in a church after the bishop) incited hate and vio-
lence against Catholics and thus violated the French hate speech 
codes. He also claimed that a photograph of him was used without 
his permission. The French court ruled in the bishop’s favor on both 
grounds.30 The photograph at issue was not at all scandalous but 
rather simply a portrait of the bishop.31 The court ordered Facebook 
to remove the page and to pay 2,000 euros in damages, with a pen-
alty of 500 euros for every day the page remained up. In addition, 
Facebook was ordered to identify the person who posted the page.
Facebook failed to appear before the court. Indeed, Facebook’s 
French entity seems to have insisted that the complaint should be 
lodged with the Facebook parent entity rather than Facebook France. 
The bishop’s attorney told the BNA news service that (in the news 
service’s words) “Facebook France indicated to him that it had 
no connection to the litigious page and that the bishop would have 
to pursue Facebook.com in the United States.”32 Facebook did, 
however, take the page down.
Canada. One of the most thorough official examinations of 
Facebook’s privacy practices to date was conducted by Canadian 
authorities. Faced with a complaint about Facebook’s privacy 
policies, in 2009 the Canadian privacy commissioner undertook 
an investigation into those practices.33 Assistant Commissioner 
Elizabeth Denham made a number of findings about the allegations, 
concluding that some allegations were well founded while 
others were not. With respect to the latter group, Denham made 
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recommendations in a preliminary report, and in response, Facebook 
implemented a number of changes. It appears that Facebook also 
applied these changes to its American offering. In a sense, then, 
Denham became a privacy commissioner for Americans, too, since 
her recommendations were implemented in a manner that affects 
Facebook’s operations for Americans as well as Canadians.
Facebook did not agree to all the recommendations, however. 
Facebook was asked “to implement technological measures to limit 
application developers’ access to user information that is not required 
to run a specific application.”34 It refused to do so, instead proposing 
to give users specific consent for each category of information shared 
with third- party applications.
In St- Arnaud v. Facebook, Inc., the Montreal Superior Court 
considered a privacy- based challenge against Facebook. The peti-
tioner, Patrice St- Arnaud, sought to have the court certify a class 
action brought by Quebec residents who claimed they were harmed 
by Facebook’s privacy practices. Facebook argued that Quebec users 
of its service had agreed to resolve disputes exclusively in its home 
jurisdiction in Santa Clara County. The submission to jurisdiction 
clause in the terms of use read as follows: “You will resolve any claim, 
cause of Action or dispute (‘claim’) you have with us arising out of or 
relating to this Statement or Facebook exclusively in a state or fed-
eral court located in Santa Clara County.” St- Arnaud argued that 
the clause was part of an abusive adhesion contract and should 
therefore be unenforceable.35
Relying on the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dell 
Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, in which the Canadian 
Supreme Court had held that hyperlinked terms of use were prop-
erly notified to the user and therefore enforceable, the Montreal 
Superior Court held that St- Arnaud was bound by the Facebook 
terms.36
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St- Arnaud offered an alternative, and seemingly promising, 
argument. The Civil Code of Quebec declared that waivers of the 
jurisdiction of local courts were not valid in consumer contracts. The 
Montreal Superior Court ruled, however, that “Facebook does not 
have a consumer relationship with its Users,” because “access to 
the Facebook website is completely free.” A consumer contract is 
“premised on payment and consideration,” and must be “onerous.”37 
Thus, St- Arnaud could not take advantage of the mandatory 
Quebec law to maintain an action in Montreal, despite Facebook’s 
terms of use. There is no guarantee that the court would reach the 
same conclusion if Facebook began charging consumers for its pop-
ular services.
Although Quebec consumer protection law might not be appli-
cable to Facebook, Facebook itself may have had an impact on 
Canadian law. The pressure of Twitter and Facebook and other social 
media services based outside Canada seems to have resulted in the 
Canadian government rescinding its ban on election night release of 
early election results.38 In place since 1938, the law was designed to 
prevent what was seen as improper influence on voting in western 
provinces by the results of voting in eastern provinces. The Canadian 
supreme court had upheld the restriction in 2007 as a speech con-
straint that was within parliamentary power.39 In January 2012, the 
Canadian government announced its reversal of the 1930s law via a 
twenty- first- century medium, Twitter.
China, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt. Although many governments 
in liberal states have found Facebook an irritant, a few governments 
see it as a mortal threat. In July 2010, a newspaper associated with 
the Chinese Communist Party carried the front- page headline: 
“Facebook Could Be a Spy Tool.” A report by the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) concluded, “Facebook and certain other 
social networking sites may be exploited by Western intelligence 
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services and used for subversive purposes. . . . Its special political 
function can be a threat.” The report went on: “In the name of free-
dom, some organisations or people are encouraging revolt.”40
China blocked Facebook in July 2009 across the country after 
unrest in the northwest province of Xinjiang. The site remains 
blocked as of this writing. According to a report by Sohu.com, Mark 
Zuckerberg held several meetings with Baidu CEO Robin Li to 
discuss a possible linkup to develop a Chinese offering for Facebook. 
Thus far at least, these discussions do not appear to have borne fruit.
In 2009, Syria blocked access to Facebook after Facebook per-
mitted residents of the Golan Heights to claim Israel as their coun-
try of abode.41 Facebook had responded to earlier protests of its 
policy of requiring residents of that area to specify Syria as their 
country of residence. Critics suggested that “the Syrian government 
was simply looking for a pretext to block Facebook because it fears 
the influence of the social networking site.”42 Syria restored access, 
only to deny it again in early June 2011 in response to widespread 
protests. Again, Syria restored the Internet, though the civil strife 
continues as of this writing.
In Tunisia, weeks before the Ben Ali dictatorship fell, it was 
reported that the government was trying to “steal an entire country’s 
worth of passwords.”43 Dissidents “found their Facebook pages taken 
over without their knowledge.”44 Back in California, Facebook 
treated the hacking as “a black and white security issue and less of a 
political issue.”45 Access to Facebook was insecure because Facebook 
had not offered more secure communications options. As the Wired 
“Threat Level” blogger wrote, “The dangers of that design decision 
became very clear earlier this month when the Tunisian government, 
via the country’s largest ISP, inserted rogue JavaScript into the html 
of Facebook.com’s homepage as users loaded it, in order to steal 
passwords of activists. It used those passwords to delete accounts 
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and pages critical of the regime.”46 In response, Facebook allowed 
users to use https, a more secure method of accessing Facebook, 
throughout its site. Facebook also devised a clever method to foil 
government infiltrators of dissident accounts. It required anyone 
logging in to an account to prove his or her identity by identifying 
that person’s friends.
Facebook proved crucial because Tunisians wanted to share 
videos of the government’s repression and the government had 
blocked other video sites.47 Videos posted to Facebook helped dis-
seminate information widely among the Tunisian population: “The 
videos—shot shakily with cameraphones—created a link between 
what was happening on the streets in the poor areas of the country 
and the broader Tunisian population. . . . Those videos, and the 
actions they recorded, became the raw material for a much greater 
online apparatus that could amplify each injury, death, and pro-
test.”48 Today, the small-town fruit- and- vegetable peddler named 
Mohamed Bouazizi who tragically immolated himself to protest 
conditions in his country is known the world over. Video of Buoaz-
izi’s mother’s protest following his death was broadcast on television 
by Al Jazeera, which “had picked up the footage via Facebook.”49
Facebook, of course, seeks to keep its services as widely available 
as possible. Dan Rose, who is responsible for Facebook worldwide 
business development, states, “We try very hard to keep Facebook 
available wherever people want to access it.” He continues, “We have 
outreach and relationships with governments all around the world. 
We can only do what we can do.”50
Of course, perhaps the most important use of Facebook thus 
far has been its use by the Egyptian revolutionaries. Wael Ghonim, 
the Google Middle East executive who helped spark the 
revolution using Facebook, thanked Mark Zuckerberg after Hosni 
Mubarak fell:
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I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him. . . . 
I’m talking on behalf of Egypt. . . . This revolution started 
online. This revolution started on Facebook. This revolution 
started . . . in June 2010 when hundreds of thousands of 
Egyptians started collaborating content. We would post a 
video on Facebook that would be shared by 60,000 people on 
their walls within a few hours. I’ve always said that if you 
want to liberate a society just give them the Internet.51
Ghonim’s account suggests that Facebook had an impact—and that 
local authorities lacked the power over the social media service that 
they would have liked. As we have seen, the Mubarak government 
demonstrated its fear of Facebook and other social media by com-
pletely switching off the Internet for the entire country.
The above review of points of tension between the law and Facebook 
in countries across the world reveals that neither the local govern-
ment nor Facebook always prevails. We see Facebook bending its 
course—for example, agreeing to independent privacy and security 
audits. We also see governments changing theirs—take, for example, 
Canada, rescinding a 1938 election law, or, more dramatically, 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak yielding power in the face of mass demon-
strations nurtured by social media.
The Jurisdictional Dance
Richard Ford compares jurisdiction to dance. Like dance, Ford tells 
us, jurisdiction exists through its performance.52 But he also means 
an almost literal dance across the border, like that of the von Trapp 
family crossing the border into Switzerland. With Facebook, we 
see both the company and governments stumbling over borders, 
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uncertain which way to step or who should lead. The jurisdictional 
dance here is hardly graceful but, rather, is characterized by what we 
might call jurisdiction confusion.
Let us return to the disliking Like controversy. When the data 
protection authority in the German state of Schleswig- Holstein 
ruled that the Facebook web analytics were illegal under German 
law, it sharply limited its ruling. It imposed its prohibition on the 
Like button only to “website owners in Schleswig- Holstein,” by 
which it seemed to mean websites owned by persons located in that 
German state. It did not command Facebook itself to no longer col-
lect information from Facebook’s social graph affiliates in the absence 
of affirmative actions by the user to share information with Face-
book. That is, even though the data protection authority ruled that 
Facebook’s practices violated German and European law, it did not 
tell Facebook to stop but restricted its ruling to German entities in 
its state.
Why did the German state authority pull its punch? A clue 
might be found in its public statement explaining its ruling. There 
the authority noted that “Facebook . . . does not have an establish-
ment in Germany.”53 Under the European Data Protection 
Directive, the physical location of the establishment is relevant to 
the assignment of both the law and the regulatory authority. 
Under Article 4 of the directive, the national law applicable to a data 
processor is the law of the state of the establishment of the data 
controller. The directive makes the establishment accountable to 
its local data protection authority. Because Facebook’s European 
headquarters were in Ireland, this might suggest that the Irish data 
protection authority would be Facebook’s appropriate regulator.
Facebook insists as much. The German newspapers explained 
that “Facebook had previously said it needed to obey only Irish law 
as it maintained a European headquarters in Dublin.” This explains 
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why the Austrian group brought its complaint against Facebook to 
Ireland. Uncertainty and confusion are the order of the day. When 
Ilse Aigner, the German consumer protection minister, announced 
that she would advocate “strict bloc- wide rules on facial recognition, 
geodata and the profiling of individual Internet users,” the 
German newspaper noted that it “remain[s] unclear how the new 
rules . . . will be applied to international companies based outside of 
the EU.”54
In the context of web services, European law itself opens up the 
possibility of jurisdiction confusion. On the one hand, the Brussels 
regulation on jurisdiction allows one to sue for torts “where the 
harmful event occurred.”55 On the other hand, the European Union’s 
Directive on Electronic Commerce declares that “information soci-
ety services should in principle be subject to the law of the Member 
State in which the service provider is established.” The preamble 
to the Directive reads as follows: “In order to effectively guarantee 
freedom to provide services and legal certainty for suppliers and 
recipients of services, such information society services should in 
principle be subject to the law of the Member State in which the 
service provider is established.”56 The two commands are, of course, 
not necessarily incompatible. A web user might have the right to sue 
a website in his or her local court yet be required to sue under for-
eign law, specifically, the law of the company’s domicile. But choice 
of forum and choice of law are usually tightly linked.
In the consolidated cases of eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and 
Oliver Martinez v. MGN Ltd., the European Court of Justice faced 
this quandary directly. The two cases involved efforts by individuals 
to sue websites based in other European countries. Understandably, 
in each case, the individuals filed suit in their home jurisdiction. 
In the first case, a German individual sought to stop an Austrian 
dating website from disclosing the fact that he had been convicted 
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of murder (the individual was now free on parole). In the second 
case, French actor Olivier Martinez sought to stop a London web-
site from alleging that he was dating the Australian singer Kylie 
Minogue.
The court sought to thread the needle—allowing the company 
to be governed by law no stricter than that in its state of establish-
ment yet permitting European citizens to bring suit in local courts 
for the harms arising to them locally. The court, in effect, separated 
the choice of law and jurisdiction inquiries—allowing suit where the 
consumer lives yet limiting protections to those offered in the ser-
vice provider’s home jurisdiction.
Facebook for its part often seeks to resist local efforts to assert 
jurisdiction: in the French bishop’s case, Facebook’s French entity 
seems to have insisted that the complaint should be lodged with the 
Facebook parent entity, rather than Facebook France. The bishop’s 
attorney, Thierry Massis, told the BNA news service that (in the 
news service’s words) “Facebook France indicated to him that it had 
no connection to the litigious page and that the bishop would have 
to pursue Facebook.com in the United States.”57
For their part, the privacy regulators are mindful of their limita-
tions. Complaining that Facebook’s Like button on non- Facebook 
sites allows tracking of users, the data protection authority in the 
German state of Schleswig- Holstein noted that it was a “small pri-
vacy agency.”58 The fact that the Irish authorities serve as Facebook’s 
principal regulator for all of Europe may redound to Facebook’s 
advantage. Given Facebook’s importance to both Irish employment 
and to government revenues, authorities will want to be careful not 
to risk their golden goose. A 2012 study commissioned by Facebook 
suggests that Facebook has contributed some 400 million euros in 
value to the Irish economy.59 Irish authorities have taken to touting 
Facebook’s decision to locate its European headquarters in their 
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country, as shown by an advertisement run by the Irish government 
in an Atlanta airport, using Facebook’s presence to try to attract 
additional foreign direct investment (fig. 3).
Often the consequences for failure to observe local law are far 
from severe, even in Germany. When Johannes Caspar of the 
Hamburg data protection authority initiated legal proceedings 
under Germany’s strict privacy laws, he noted that “Facebook could be 
fined tens of thousands of euros for saving private information of 
individuals who don’t use the site and haven’t granted it access to 
their details.”60 For a company with revenues in the billions of euros, 
such a fine might seem fairly minor.
Recall that in the French bishop case, even though Facebook 
failed to even appear in the French trial court to defend itself, the 
judgment entered against it included only a fine of 2,000 euros plus 
500 euros for each day of noncompliance after the judgment—likely 
less than the costs of hiring a lawyer to appear for the day. While the 
Irish data protection authority was considering the Europe vs. Face-
book complaint, reports suggested that Facebook might be subject 
to a fine of just 100,000 euros. In fact, Facebook’s settlement with 
the Irish authority included no monetary penalties.
The threatened consequences for noncompliance might be so 
mild as to be charming: Miffed at Facebook’s privacy policies, the 
German federal minister of consumer protection, Ilse Aigner, con-
cluded her letter to Mark Zuckerberg urging Facebook to change 
policies that she believed violated German law with these words: 
“Should Facebook not be willing to alter its business policy and 
eliminate the glaring shortcomings, I will feel obliged to terminate 
my membership.”61
While lawyers in the United States divide jurisdiction into sub-
ject matter jurisdiction (does the court have the authority to hear 
this kind of legal dispute?) and personal jurisdiction (does the court 
Figure 3. Advertisement at Hartsfield- Jackson Atlanta International 
Airport, December 2011. Photo by Anupam Chander.
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have the authority to adjudicate a claim against this defendant?), 
international lawyers divide it in a different way—into legislative 
jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction, and enforcement jurisdiction. 
The last division corresponds to the separation of powers familiar to 
students of American political structure, though international law 
does not require each of the three jurisdictional powers to be exer-
cised by different agencies. Because of the division of the world 
into territorial sovereigns, exercises of jurisdiction are regulated by 
international law. International law’s territoriality principle permits 
federal and state courts to exercise jurisdiction over occurrences in 
their territory, but events in cyberspace are by their very nature hard 
to locate either here or there. Asserting jurisdiction based on sub-
stantial effects in a state’s territory is a corollary of the territoriality 
principle itself. As Christopher Kuner notes, “The effects doctrine 
has been vehemently criticized, but seems to have become wide-
spread, at least with regard to assertions of jurisdiction over conduct 
on the Internet.”62
If each state asserts jurisdiction over the same website, it is inev-
itable that the rules for users across the world will vary. In chapter 8, 
I label this legal glocalization, with a site localized to conform to 
varying rules in different jurisdictions. Even Facebook does this 
to a minor extent by offering Germans a special set of terms of 
use and, as we have seen, turning off its automative face recognition 
in Europe.63 However, states asserting jurisdiction based on effects 
must consider rules of proportionality. Such assertions should be 
tempered, with forbearance a wise course unless the interests are suf-
ficiently strong to justify intervention. The risk is that excessive 
interventions will jeopardize the worldwide nature of the web, 
hampering communications across borders—a risk I return to in 
chapter 8.
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Who Should Rule Facebookistan?
Let’s move from the description of the current state of the law to the 
normative question of who should rule Facebookistan? Consider a 
number of possibilities:
1. Country of origin—letting the home country of the cor-
poration be its exclusive regulator;
2. Countries of reception—letting the home countries of its 
users regulate;
3. United Nations or other treaty- based entity—granting 
exclusive regulatory authority to an international treaty–
based entity;
4. Self- regulation by Facebook’s officers; or
5. Regulation by its users.
Each approach has its virtues. The country- of- origin principle 
is efficient and clear, reducing costs for compliance. The countries- 
of- reception principle is fair to users, who will often lack the 
knowledge and resources to bring claims against an enormous enter-
prise in a distant jurisdiction. A United Nations or international 
treaty–based approach would involve all the governments of the 
world in creating a single regulatory regime. Self- regulation would 
be ideal for corporations, allowing them to maximize profits, subject 
only to a loss of consumers from potential disagreements over 
policies. Regulation by users would give them maximum control 
over the site.
Each also carries flaws. The country- of- origin principle might 
lead corporations to race to the bottom, locating the country with 
the least rules from which to operate. The countries- of- reception 
principle would subject the corporation to multiple and sometimes 
conflicting regulations. As regards a treaty- based regime, it is 
difficult to imagine agreement on a single set of rules for intellectual 
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property, privacy, security, defamation, pornography, and hate speech. 
Self- regulation might lead to exploitation of consumers, especially 
if consumers were not fully aware of what happened in an opaque 
system. Regulation by users might yield policies that fail to generate 
sufficient income to provide a powerful service.
For now, the most likely disciplinary mechanisms for Facebook 
are governments and the website’s many users.64 Albert O. Hirschman 
famously characterized two options for the disaffected member 
of a community—exit or voice.65 Rebecca MacKinnon offers the 
example of Lokman Tsui, who in May 2010 quit Facebook to pro-
test its privacy practices. Yet a year later Tsui returned (even though 
he was then joining Google as a full- time employee). Facebook 
had become such a valuable tool for staying in contact with 
people with whom he had “weak ties” that leaving it was far more 
detrimental for Tsui than it was for Facebook.66 Voting with one’s 
feet might yet prove an important disciplinary mechanism if there is 
a viable and popular alternative to Facebook, such as Google Plus or 
a foreign alternative such as Mixi or Tuenty. As I have indicated 
earlier, voice has shown occasional success in changing Facebook’s 
policies.
Facebook’s terms of service would have its users resolve disputes 
with Facebook on Facebook’s home turf in California.67 It should be 
noted that California law offers far more consumer protections than 
the laws of some other states. Both a California state appeals court 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have refused to enforce 
forum selection clauses which aimed to send California consumers 
to Virginia state courts.68 But even if California law offers a 
robust set of consumer protections, many users around the world 
may lack the resources to bring claims in California. Furthermore, 
California law may provide greater protection for speech than the 
laws of other jurisdictions that may protect privacy or reputations in 
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greater measure. Finally, any contractual choice of law or forum 
would of course not be applicable to torts.
Now that it is a publicly registered corporation in the United 
States, Facebook will face yet another kind of public scrutiny—that 
of its public shareholders. A corporation that offers securities to the 
public must disclose information that is material to the investment 
decisions of those who might buy its securities. The disclosures 
become useful not only to those who might invest but also to the 
general public, who may have interest in the firm for other reasons. 
Facebook will have to inform its investors what actions might put it 
in legal jeopardy in a financially material way.
Return to the notion of Zuckerberg’s law: “ ‘When we started 
Facebook, we built it around a few simple ideas,’ said Mr. Zuckerberg. 
‘When people have control over what they share, they want to share 
more. When people share more, the world becomes more open and 
connected.’ ”69 But Zuckerberg’s law for a digital world will at times 
run afoul of the laws of countries of earth and blood. Both Facebook 
and governments must negotiate a reasonable path through this dif-
ficult jurisdictional terrain.
The fact that Facebook transcends national borders rather 
than being Balkanized into different networks (or “- stans”) for 
each country in which it operates is a key aspect of its usefulness. 
After all, human beings do not confine their relationships within 
national borders. At the same time, Facebook gains income from 
serving as many people as possible, including those outside the 
United States.
The laws of various states—from the United States to Canada 
and Europe—have influenced Facebook’s operations. In turn, Face-
book has influenced the law, putting pressure on authoritarian gov-
ernments worldwide. At the same time, US law permits a large 
measure of freedom for Facebook to set the terms of Facebookistan. 
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European and Asian states, by contrast, impose greater obligations 
on their social network spaces. The answer to the question of who 
rules Facebookistan—nation- states, Facebook—is, in the end, all of 
the above.
142
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FREEING TRADE IN CYBERSPACE
At the core of every cybertrade controversy described in this book is a 
provider in one jurisdiction supplying services to consumers in another. 
In each case there may be a conflict of laws between the provider’s 
jurisdiction and the consumer’s. The provider may lack legal prece-
dents or authoritative guidance and must innovate not only techno-
logical methods and business models but also legal structures.
Four distinctive legal challenges of electronically tradable services, 
or Trade 2.0, become apparent: (1) legal roadblocks to the free flow of 
net- work; (2) the lack of adequate legal infrastructure, as compared to 
trade in traditional goods; (3) the threat to law itself posed by the 
footloose nature of net- work and the uncertainty of whose law should 
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govern net- work transactions; and (4) the danger that local control of 
net- work might lead to either Balkanization—the disintegration of 
the World Wide Web into local arenas—or Stalinization—the repres-
sion of political dissidents, identified through their online activity by 
compliant net- work service providers.
In this and the following chapters, I discuss a framework to 
simultaneously liberalize and regulate Trade 2.0 in order to amelio-
rate the difficulties identified above. To liberalize trade, I introduce 
two principles: technological neutrality and dematerialization. Tech-
nological neutrality would require that online versions of a service 
be tested under the same legal regime as the offline version of that 
service, thus not permitting discrimination against the online ver-
sion of a service. Dematerialization would require governments and 
services- standards bodies to replace physical in- person requirements 
with online substitutes wherever possible.
To respond to the risk to law of net- work trade (the third chal-
lenge), I suggest the necessity at times of glocalization—abiding by the 
local law of the jurisdiction in which a service is consumed where that 
law does not conflict with international law. But the assertion of local 
law invites the unwelcome consequences of Balkanization and 
Stalinization. To respond to the problem of Balkanization, countries 
will need to reinvigorate efforts for harmonization—seeking to agree 
on the common legal standard or tolerating deviations from local 
rules. To respond to the problem of Stalinization, companies them-
selves must adopt policies to “do no evil” and comport with human 
rights law. In this chapter I focus on the technological neutrality prin-
ciple. I set out my arguments for the dematerialization, glocalization, 
harmonization, and do no evil principles in the remaining chapters.
An example might help illustrate these principles. If Yahoo! 
offers auction services, governments should not evaluate those ser-
vices on a stricter basis than live, in- person auction services because 
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this would have the effect of discriminating against foreign suppliers 
of auction services (technological neutrality). If auctioneers are 
required to have licenses, these should be available to the extent pos-
sible remotely, as should contracting and even dispute settlement 
(dematerialization). Where there is a strong societal commitment to 
outlawing Nazi paraphernalia, Yahoo! should not offer such material 
to those jurisdictions (glocalization). Where possible, countries 
should seek to work together to develop common standards or, alter-
natively, should recognize each other’s legal regimes as sufficient 
(harmonization). Yahoo! should refuse to use the information it gar-
ners about its users (such as the listserves they subscribe to) to assist 
totalitarian governments (do no evil).
At times, these principles remain in a productive tension with 
one another. The trade liberalization envisioned in technological 
neutrality, dematerialization, and harmonization contrasts with glo-
calization, which poses legal hurdles to trade. But the occasional 
insistence on local law will help the cause of free trade more gener-
ally, just as local health and safety standards do not automatically fall 
in order to facilitate trade in goods. Abiding by the demands of local 
law may help staunch a protectionist backlash against foreign service 
providers. If foreign service providers are seen as abusing local per-
sons and defying local law with no legal recourse, there will be calls 
for strong import restraints against Trade 2.0.
But restraint in insisting on local law is necessary. Excessive local 
regulation leads to the Balkanization of the Internet, making com-
monplace the dreaded warning, “This material is not available in 
your country.” Both glocalization and harmonization represent 
efforts to regulate Trade 2.0 rather than declare such trade to occur 
in a law- free zone.
What if a country requires a foreign service provider to turn over 
information on dissidents? Respect for a jurisdiction’s law is especially 
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inappropriate where the law violates international human rights law. 
Because they traffic in personal information, net- work providers can-
not ignore human rights. Cyberspace should help dissidents in totali-
tarian countries learn about the world and share information with 
others both outside and inside their country—not expose them to 
certain prosecution or vicious reprisal. Respect for local law entailed 
by glocalization might seem to run counter to the do no evil principle. 
However, because glocalization can only be justified by popular sover-
eignty and is limited by international law, including human rights law, 
it cannot justify comporting with demands for political repression.
In this and the following chapters, I discuss legal reform projects 
to accommodate Trade 2.0—how we can free trade. In later chapters, 
I turn to the steps we can take to ameliorate the threat to domestic 
regulation posed by Trade 2.0—how we can protect law.
While trade in goods and trade in services share the same under-
lying economic rationale, the two differ in key respects that may be 
relevant to law.1 Consider the following list of differences between 
Trade 1.0 and Trade 2.0, keeping in mind that these are often differ-
ences in degree rather than kind:
•	 The	 tangibility	 of	 goods	 makes	 it	 easier	 to	 measure	 the	
performance of a production contract.2
•	 Services	may	be	more	likely	than	goods	to	implicate	local	
cultural norms.
•	 Services	 may	 be	 more	 “footloose”	 than	 manufacturing	
because of lower capital- intensity and sunk costs.3
•	 Services	 often	 involve	 the	 transfer	 of	 sensitive	 personal	
data.
•	 Firms	 in	 both	 the	 manufacturing	 and	 services	 sectors	  
can outsource service functions, while only those in the 
manufacturing sector can outsource manufacturing.
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•	 Services	employ	white-	collar	professionals	who	have	his-
torically not faced widespread international competition.
•	 The	measure	of	the	quality	of	a	service	often	involves	not	
just the appraisal of the outcome but also the appraisal of 
the process by which the service was produced.4
•	 Unlike	 electronic	 services,	 goods	 can	 generally	 be	 con-
trolled at border checkpoints.
•	 We	have	longer	experience	in	identifying	and	restraining	
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in goods than to trade 
in services.
Unlike trade in goods, the regulation of services occurs not at 
customs houses on dry docks at border ports but rather in adminis-
trative offices scattered inland. It consists, for example, in certifica-
tion and licensing rules, rules about government procurement, 
geographical and quantitative restrictions, and rules for membership 
in private associations.5 International trade law has long recognized 
that internal regulations, not just border rules, might serve as barri-
ers to trade in goods,6 but the even more extensive diffusion of regu-
latory authority over services heightens the challenge for discerning 
protectionist from other regulatory objects in services. Dispersing 
regulatory authority through city and county halls, the chambers of 
self- regulatory associations, and state and federal administrative and 
legislative units renders the task of liberalizing trade in services par-
ticularly difficult.
The infancy of such efforts poses yet another challenge. Where 
liberalization of trade in goods has a long, rich history, the global 
effort to dismantle barriers to trade in services is barely a decade 
old. The General Agreement on Trade in Services introduced ser-
vices to the binding agenda of global trade liberalization in 1995. 
GATS, however, is far less demanding than its older cousin, GATT 
FR
e
e
In
G
 t
R
A
D
e
 In
 c
Y
B
e
R
s
PA
c
e 
147
(the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which was born from 
the ashes of a world war. Where GATT requires national treatment 
for suppliers of goods unless an exception has been carved out, 
GATS requires only the inverse: it permits discrimination against 
foreign service providers, except in those few sectors specifically 
designated by a state party for liberalization (this is called the 
“positive list” approach).7
Increasingly, regional trade arrangements offer stronger man-
dates to liberalize trade in services. Europe’s ambition to create a 
single European market remains the leading effort to dismantle 
barriers between countries. Free trade in services is also one of the 
pillars of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA- DR), as well as a goal of regional arrange-
ments including those set up by the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, the African Economic Community, and the South 
American trading block, Mercosur. All of the bilateral free trade 
agreements ratified recently by the United States—with Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Singapore, and 
South Africa—include broad obligations to liberalize services.8 
Unlike GATS, in which a country has an obligation to allow free 
trade in a particular services sector only if it specifies that sector in 
the country’s GATS adoption schedule, these bilateral agreements 
adopt a positive list approach to the sectoral commitments to liber-
alize trade in services. Such an approach assumes that all services are 
covered except those that are specifically excluded.9 The reach of 
these services agreements will thus likely prove especially broad.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first WTO dispute squarely 
involving services, Measures Affecting the Cross- Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services (United States—Gambling), centered 
on the Internet.10 This decision lays the groundwork for extensive 
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liberalization of net- work trade. Indeed, we begin to see the fruits 
of this liberalization in the second major WTO dispute involving 
Internet- mediated trade, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products (China—Audiovisual), also discussed below.
United States—Gambling
Countries that want to discriminate against foreign online service 
providers hold at least two arrows in their quiver. They can argue that 
they never committed to liberalize that service (or its online version 
only) in the first place and thus cannot be held to account for any 
discrimination against it. Alternatively or additionally, they can 
claim that online services raise concerns that offline versions of that 
service do not. We saw both these arguments deployed in the United 
States—Gambling dispute, and versions of them deployed in the 
China—Audiovisual case as well, along with a host of more specific 
defenses in each case.
Both of these arguments are premised on the notion of regula-
tory autonomy, that is, the fundamental ability of each state to gov-
ern itself. The central tension in the world trade order is that between 
a country’s authority to regulate commerce within its borders and 
that country’s commitments to liberalize imports and exports. The 
perennial difficulty for trade law is smoking out situations where 
domestic regulatory objectives mask (intentionally or unintention-
ally) policies that undermine that country’s liberalization commit-
ments for trade.
Controversy over whether a country committed to liberalize a 
particular service might seem inexplicable; after all, should not the 
parties to the trade agreement know what economic activities each 
side has agreed to liberalize? The difficulty lies in the fact that it is 
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often possible to characterize a particular service in multiple ways—
some liberalized and some not. Thus, this most basic of disputes—
not “Did a country violate its commitment?” but “Did it make a 
commitment in the first place?”—will prove a consistent thorn in 
the side of net- work. More important, changes in tradability make 
possible cross border competition in services that nation- states may 
not have anticipated when they wrote their liberalization schedules 
(which for the founding WTO members occurred in 1994, when 
the Internet was just entering popular use).
In the United States—Gambling case, the United States argued 
that it had never agreed to open up trade in gambling services, spe-
cifically excluding “sporting” from its liberalization commitment. 
Antigua, by contrast, saw gambling as part of the American 
commitment to open up “other recreational services.” The WTO 
Appellate Body recognized that the word sporting could at times 
include gambling but examined preparatory material that indicated 
that the United States had fashioned its schedule according to a 
classification list that placed gambling under “other recreational ser-
vices,” and not “sporting.” It reasoned that the other parties to the 
negotiations would have understood that gambling was covered.
The United States went on to argue that even if it had committed 
to liberalize gambling, it had met its obligations. After all, Antiguan 
corporations were welcome—like any American national—to 
provide gambling to Americans. They just had to set up shop in Las 
Vegas or another permissive American jurisdiction.11 The United 
States also insisted that, because of their differing consumer experi-
ences and regulatory risks, offline gambling and online gambling 
were two distinct services, and thus opening up one and not the 
other did not effectively deny national treatment. And the market 
access requirement, the United States argued, did not bar a total 
prohibition on a particular service.
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Seized of the dispute, the Appellate Body confined its analysis to 
the market access complaint, finding it unnecessary to resolve the 
national treatment complaint. The United States argued that its 
rules against online gambling were merely rules regulating the form 
or manner of how services are delivered, not quantitative constraints 
on services or suppliers.12 Under this reasoning, the United States 
would meet its market access commitment for a service even 
if it barred the provision of that service online. The Appellate Body 
held that a blanket prohibition operated as a “zero quota” and thus 
presented a quantitative restraint prohibited by the market access 
commitment.
Although it lost on these first two arguments, the United States 
had a final argument, the last arrow in its quiver, and this one found 
its target. GATS permits derogation where “necessary to protect 
public morals or to maintain public order.”13 This clause serves as a 
crucial regulatory safety valve, ensuring that liberalizing commit-
ments do not unintentionally jeopardize important local public 
policies. The Appellate Body accepted the American contention 
that the restraints on online gambling were necessary to protect 
concerns related to “(1) organized crime; (2) money laundering; 
(3) fraud; (4) risks to youth, including underage gambling; and 
(5) public health.” Gambling via the Internet posed special concerns: 
“(i) the volume, speed and international reach of remote gambling 
transactions; (ii) the virtual anonymity of such transactions; (iii) low 
barriers to entry in the context of the remote supply of gambling and 
betting services; and the (iv) isolated and anonymous environment 
in which such gambling takes place.” The Appellate Body agreed 
that the “distinctive characteristics” of online gambling justified the 
US discrimination against it.14
But the United States stumbled in an inconsistency: US 
law “authorizes domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service 
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suppliers, to offer remote betting services on horse races.” Post- 
ruling, the United States has stubbornly resisted resolving this 
inconsistency. As we saw in chapter 4, Antigua has received 
permission for retaliatory sanctions for this violation, consisting in 
permitting infringements of American intellectual property rights—
becoming a legal paradise for the infringement of US intellectual 
property.15
Net- work providers share an Achilles’ heel: because their ser-
vices are not delivered face- to- face, the authentication clues avail-
able through in- person presentation are unavailable. Their remote 
nature thus leads to concern about fraud by suppliers (either in rep-
resenting their credentials or in failing to perform the service as 
promised) or potential anonymity among consumers (leading to 
concerns about underage or otherwise inappropriate consumption). 
Can a state simply assert these concerns to protect its local suppliers, 
who after all can provide services face to face with greater ease than 
foreign suppliers? If so, this would mark the death knell of crossbor-
der net- work.
At first glance, United States—Gambling poses exactly this road-
block to net- work. After all, the Appellate Body held that the risks 
particular to electronically mediated services might justify ignoring a 
country’s free trade commitments (so long, that is, as the country bars 
all electronically mediated services, not just those provided by foreign-
ers).16 The WTO upheld a state’s banning of online suppliers (both 
domestic and foreign) because of the risks of underage and patho-
logical gambling, fraud, and money laundering. But even in largely 
dismissing Antiguan claims for access to the US market, the decision 
laid the groundwork for a substantial erosion of barriers to net- work.
The “chapeau” to GATS article XIV permits a public order–based 
violation of trade commitments only if it is not in fact a “disguised 
restriction” on trade in services.17 A country may not maintain an 
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infringing trade barrier if there is a “reasonably available alternative” 
that allows that country to maintain its public order or morality objec-
tives.18 Antigua might have demonstrated practical alternatives to the 
American prohibition to achieve the desired regulatory goals. Antigua 
could have shown that it had redoubled its financial crime efforts, 
strictly enforcing international anti- money- laundering principles, 
such as the international standards offered by the Financial Action 
Task Force.19 Antigua could have required independent auditors from 
large international firms to audit compliance by Antiguan gambling 
operations, helping to assure users that the computer systems and 
financial payouts were sound.20 Antigua could have shown that the 
steps it requires to add money to a gambling account (such as bank 
wire transfers) would prove nearly insurmountable for youth. And it 
could have required that gambling providers make available services 
for gambling addicts, including mechanisms for allowing people to 
limit losses or to lock themselves out.21 But Antigua did none of these 
things. Rather, Antigua mistakenly relied on America’s stubborn 
refusal to discuss alternative means to achieving its regulatory goals.
Perhaps the strongest rebuttal to the American argument that an 
online service was inherently risky comes from the US Supreme 
Court. In the case of Granholm v. Heald, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a challenge to Michigan and New York regulations barring out- 
of- state wineries from selling directly to Michigan and New York 
residents.22 The challenge involved what constitutional lawyers call 
the “dormant commerce clause.” The dormant commerce clause cre-
ates a free trade area within the United States, preventing states 
from unduly burdening interstate commerce. In Granholm, as in 
United States—Gambling, the defenders of trading restraints argued 
that these restraints were necessary to preserve local values. 
New York insisted that its rules barring the retailing of alcohol via 
the Internet were “essential” to “promoting” no less a value than 
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“temperance,” as well as the more mundane goal of “collecting 
applicable taxes.” Requiring alcohol to pass through state- sanctioned 
distribution channels, New York argued, allows it “to effectively 
monitor alcohol distribution and enforce its liquor laws.”23
The Supreme Court was not persuaded. New York and 
Michigan “provide[d] little evidence for their claim that purchasing 
wine over the Internet by minors is a problem.” The states could have 
minimized risk “with less restrictive steps,” such as requiring “an 
adult signature on delivery.” The Court held that New York’s “regula-
tory objectives” could be achieved “without discriminating against 
interstate commerce, e.g., by requiring a permit as a condition of 
direct shipping.” The states’ “other rationales, such as facilitating 
orderly market conditions, protecting public health and safety, 
and ensuring regulatory accountability . . . [could] also be achieved 
through the alternative of an evenhanded licensing requirement.” 
The fundamental question, the Court asked, is whether a state’s 
discriminatory regime “advance[d] a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alter-
natives.” While Granholm involved trade in goods, not trade in 
net- work services, both cases involved trade mediated largely by the 
Internet. The Supreme Court’s “reasonable nondiscriminatory alter-
natives” formulation comes strikingly close to the WTO’s “reason-
ably available alternative”; both give the tribunal the ability to strike 
regulations that unnecessarily restrain competition from outside 
producers. The convergence in the Supreme Court and WTO 
formulations is not a coincidence: though poles apart in their 
history and status, both institutions promote commerce among 
jurisdictions while protecting the power of those jurisdictions to 
regulate themselves.24
Of course, even the most robust alternative for achieving the 
regulatory objectives may not prevent all potential wrongdoing. But 
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neither would an outright prohibition of online gambling accom-
plish perfectly the regulatory goals. After all, underage persons can 
sneak their way into casinos; gambling addiction predated the Inter-
net; cash in casinos can be more anonymous than an offshore 
bank account, which requires extensive security measures; and orga-
nized crime is not entirely unknown in American gambling history. 
The question is whether the proposed alternative achieves the 
“desired level of protection,” not whether it promises one hundred 
percent compliance.25 In the United States—Shrimp dispute, the 
WTO Appellate Body held that an importing nation’s insistence on 
a “single, rigid, and unbending requirement” would constitute 
“arbitrary discrimination” within the meaning of the GATT article 
XX chapeau.26 Contrast District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel’s 
standard for Napster, in which she required the online service to 
remove 100 percent of copyright- infringing material, a standard 
that Napster rightly insisted was impossible to satisfy and that 
was not met even by offline distribution systems.27 The appropriate 
standard should be one where the online service should be required 
to achieve the regulatory goals at rates roughly equivalent to those 
achieved by offline versions of the service. This is a principle of techno-
logical neutrality.
Such steps would likely raise the costs of doing business 
electronically as well as the costs for governments of enforcing 
compliance. At times, the costs today may be so high as to make 
net- work economically infeasible. Perhaps governments might be 
willing to reduce compliance rates in some cases in view of the 
liberating and economizing possibilities of the electronic medium.
GATS does allow countries to liberalize trade only with respect 
to certain modes of delivery of a foreign service over others. 
The principle of technological neutrality that I assay here would 
come into play only when a country has committed to liberalizing a 
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particular service with respect to mode 1, crossborder trade. In such a 
case, to demand higher standards for electronically provided services 
than services delivered in person is to engage in outright discrimina-
tion. Such discrimination would likely violate the GATS national 
treatment commitment28 because foreign suppliers would be at a 
natural disadvantage in supplying face- to- face services because they 
are less likely to have representatives on the ground. Where the dis-
crimination against the online service acts as an effective barrier to 
online supply, it could, as in United States—Gambling, violate the 
GATS market access requirement.
This is an especially grave threat to net- work. After all, due to 
the non- face- to- face nature of the medium, it is easy to challenge 
net- work as potentially promoting fraud. But to insist on the 
complete absence of fraud on Internet- mediated services would be 
to conjure a preexisting world of face- to- face transactions devoid of 
fraud. Fraud and other regulatory leakages are a persistent fact of 
commerce and are not unique to Internet commerce. Trade law 
should not allow countries to insist on a regulatory nirvana in 
cyberspace unmatched in real space. Such discrimination against the 
electronic medium will likely disadvantage foreign suppliers, which 
are less likely to have the resources to deploy service providers on 
the ground.
China—Audiovisual
The United States was on the other side of many of these issues 
when it brought a complaint against China in 2007 for controls on 
the distribution of publications and audiovisual products, including 
controls on the distribution of material online. The United States 
charged that these controls, which required such products to be 
distributed by Chinese state- owned entities, violated China’s 
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GATT and GATS obligations, as well as the extra WTO obliga-
tions that China had taken on as a price of its late WTO entry in 
2001 (six years after the WTO was formed). The Chinese controls 
imposed greater burdens on foreign audiovisual products and publi-
cations than ones produced domestically. They also constrained 
rights to distribution to state- owned entities, ostensibly to support 
the extensive Chinese censorship regime.
As in United States—Gambling, the respondent in the dispute 
argued that it had never committed to liberalize the particular ser-
vice at issue. China conceded that it had indeed committed to liber-
alize distribution of “sound recording distribution services” but 
argued that electronic distribution of audio products were not “sound 
recording distribution services.”29 The Appellate Body disagreed, 
noting that China’s market access and national treatment commit-
ments with respect to such services were written generally, not 
specifically excluding distribution in electronic form. Thus, China’s 
commitment “would encompass distribution in electronic form.”30 
With this language, the Appellate Body signaled that liberalization 
commitment for any particular service would be interpreted to 
include delivery of that service electronically—unless the Member 
State had specifically indicated otherwise in its liberalization sched-
ule. The Appellate Body also stated that commitments should be 
interpreted in a dynamic fashion, rather than strictly interpreted 
according to the ordinary meaning at the time the commitment was 
made. The tribunal explained that an originalist approach would 
“mean that very similar or identically worded commitments could be 
given different meanings, content, and coverage depending on the 
date of their adoption or the date of a Member’s accession to the 
treaty.”31 By subsuming an electronic version of the service within a 
services commitment and by interpreting treaty commitments in a 
dynamic form, the treaty can take account of changing technologies.
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Faced with the finding that it had indeed violated commitments 
in its WTO accession protocol by requiring that audiovisual prod-
ucts be imported through specified state- owned enterprises, China 
argued that the requirement was necessary to protect public morals. 
Following the reasoning of United States—Gambling, the Appellate 
Body disagreed. The Appellate Body concluded that the United 
States had offered a reasonably available alternative to the trade 
restrictive measure—censorship by the government directly, rather 
than through state- owned enterprises. Thus, China’s breach could 
not be justified in the name of public morals.
Even if the law technically permits online service providers to supply 
services across borders, online service providers may still fail because 
of physical constraints. In the next chapter, I describe another key 
principle to free Trade 2.0, what I call dematerialization. The infra-
structure of services delivery must be reformed to permit services to 
be supplied remotely, consistent with the requirements of consumer 
protection.
158
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HANDSHAKES ACROSS THE WORLD
The merchants traversing the Silk Road were not anonymous 
agents of globalization. Rather, they were repeat players, connected 
to one another through personal histories and kinship networks. 
Goods delivered via this route would pass through many hands, 
from entrepôt to entrepôt, with each leg of the journey often 
dominated by particular tribes. In this chapter, I argue that the 
characteristics that permit net- work trade might be deployed 
to create a robust infrastructure for such trade: real- time informa-
tion transfer, low information and other transactions costs, the 
ability of individuals around the world to collaborate, and electronic 
identification. Perhaps the electronic version of the wax seal 
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or chop, used to signal authority, could even improve on the 
original.
The architecture of real- world transactions helps promote secu-
rity, privacy, monitoring, trust, and enforceability between parties, 
which in turn fosters marketplace contracts with strangers. In order 
to foster trade in services, governments, corporations, and state and 
industry associations will need to re- create security and trust in 
cyberspace. They will need to establish the electronic counterparts 
to handshakes, ink signatures, demeanor evidence, word of mouth, 
and the ready ability to seek legal redress. In this chapter I argue 
for a dematerialized architecture for cyberspace trade and describe 
incipient efforts toward that goal.
Even were legal restraints on cross border net- work entirely 
eliminated, local service providers would retain a natural advantage. 
Local persons are more likely to have obtained any certifications and 
licenses necessary to provide a service in the jurisdiction. They are 
also more likely to have access to any regulations governing the ser-
vice. Parties that meet face to face have the advantage that they can 
rely on the physical clues that promote trust among counterparties.
Despite this, mail- order contracts became increasingly com-
monplace in the last half- century, demonstrating that face- to- face 
transactions are not entirely indispensable for large- scale commerce. 
Even more dramatically, global supply chains now dominate the 
production of goods, proving the possibility of commerce across 
national borders, time zones, and oceans. Yet, undergirding these 
global supply chains are developments in the legal infrastructure, 
both between states and within states. Bills of lading and procedures 
for documentary credits established a framework for shipping 
a good and receiving payment. The International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) helped standardize shipping terms through 
“Incoterms.” The United Nations Commission on International 
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Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promoted “uniform rules which govern 
contracts for the international sale of goods” through the Conven-
tion on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).1 That convention 
regulates the formation of a contract, the obligations owed by buyers 
and sellers, the passing of risk of the good during transit, and rem-
edies for breach.
Many of these standards and rules cannot be applied to services. 
As its title indicates, the CISG is the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods. Shipping terms referring to risk passing when a 
load crosses the ship’s rail have little meaning in cyberspace. Docu-
ments evidencing the loading of a truck or ship cannot be easily 
adapted to products delivered electronically.2 The principal promoters 
of the international legal framework for goods, UNCITRAL and the 
ICC, have accordingly extended their work to electronic commerce 
and services. For its part UNCITRAL has been proved especially 
useful for domestic and global e-commerce, though few may even be 
aware of its existence or think of a UN body as promoting commerce. 
UNCITRAL developed an e- signature initiative that served as a 
model law for the United States and other nations, helping validate 
contracts made electronically.3 While it may be hard to believe in 
today’s world of ubiquitous e-commerce, not long ago it was unclear 
whether a contract entered into electronically could be enforceable.
Trade 2.0 will require electronic substitutes, where possible, not 
only for signatures but also for handshakes, facial identification, 
bureaucratic offices, education, testing, and even administrative and 
judicial hearings. This is the dematerialization of the services infra-
structure, the systems and practices that foster trust, promote social 
goals, and resolve disputes.
Net- work will flourish as the need for physical presence in order 
to provide a service recedes. Regulated professions (for example, law, 
medicine, accounting, and architecture) require the service provider 
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to obtain educational credentials, pass an examination, and conform 
the service to certain rules, or some combination of the above. The 
international trade order seeks to reduce at least the difficulties of 
ascertaining the local rules. GATS hopes to make obsolete the ritual 
pilgrimage to numerous governmental offices to obtain rules and 
applications applicable to a particular service. WTO member states 
must publish regulations governing any service covered by their 
specific commitments4 and establish inquiry points where foreign 
service providers can obtain information about such regulations.5 
Canada helpfully posts this information online,6 and many other 
countries provide an email contact point.7 Through this transparency 
requirement, GATS will foster trade by enabling foreign service 
providers to develop the ability to conform to local rules.
The European Union’s Services Directive goes substantially 
further. Not only does it mandate that information on service regu-
lation be supplied electronically,8 but it requires member states to 
“ensure that all procedures and formalities relating to access to a 
service activity and to the exercise thereof may be easily completed, 
at a distance and by electronic means, through the relevant point of 
single contact and with the relevant competent authorities.”9 
Accordingly, each of the twenty- seven EU member states, as well 
as three of the four European Free Trade Association states, have 
created a “Point of Single Contact” to serve as a portal for foreign 
service providers hoping to provide services to that state. These 
portals promise to inform foreign service providers of the rules to 
provide a service within that jurisdiction and to offer the possibility 
of completing administrative procedures online, rather than present-
ing themselves in person at the offices of different authorities in 
different countries. With this mandate, the EU will lead the way 
toward dematerialization, in the process establishing standards that 
the rest of the world will likely use as models.
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Where a service is licensed, governments should consider 
whether a foreign credential should be recognized as a substantial 
equivalent—thus eliminating the need for the service provider to 
obtain the necessary license through physical presence in a foreign 
country. Certain educational processes may be harder to mimic. The 
magic of walking the corridors of a law school may be difficult to 
re- create virtually, though Harvard’s innovative Charles Nesson has 
tried by teaching a class in a virtual re- creation of Harvard’s Austin 
Hall.10 Law schools are, however, experimenting with distance learn-
ing. Thus far, the American Bar Association has not accredited any 
fully online law schools, though graduates of online law schools 
(even unaccredited ones) may sit for the California bar under that 
state’s rules. Graduates of the for- profit Concord Law School have 
done so, with a reported first time pass rate since 2003 of 36 percent, 
with merely 32 percent passing in July 2011.11
Even largely unregulated services will benefit from the creation 
of a trust infrastructure in cyberspace, enhancing consumer confi-
dence in the service. Systems for providing authentication, security, 
and privacy will alleviate consumer concerns about online activity.
Allowing aggrieved parties to an international transaction to 
settle disputes via the Internet would substantially reduce impedi-
ments to trade. The WIPO- initiated domain name dispute resolu-
tion system demonstrates the possibility of a cybertribunal that 
efficiently processes international disputes while dispensing with 
physical presentations or evidence.12
India established the Cyber Appellate Tribunal and empowered 
the tribunal to regulate its own procedures, dispensing with the 
national code of civil procedure.13 Although this is promising, the 
procedures include the antiquated requirement that each person 
seeking redress submit “six complete sets [of the complaint] in a 
paper- book form along with one empty file size envelope bearing 
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full address of the respondent.”14 Even the e- filing option includes a 
note to “take printout of word file and submit six (6) copies of this 
application along with printouts of annexures with each application 
and single demand draft.”15 It thus should hardly be surprising that 
the tribunal has handled only a dozen or so cases since 2009. The 
few cases that have been decided do not demonstrate a clear bias 
toward local complainants, but they also suggest that the basic pro-
cedures have yet to be worked out. For example, the tribunal rejected 
a number of cases brought against “Gmail.com” seeking to compel 
information about the identity of a Gmail user. Noting that perhaps 
Google Inc., and not Gmail, was the proper defendant, the tribunal 
ruled that the complainant should have first filed a claim with the 
appropriate adjudicating officer under the Information Technology 
Act of 2000. The Indian government has named the secretary of the 
Department of Information Technology of each of the states or of 
the union territories as the adjudicating officer, but there is little 
information on how to actually file a complaint through such per-
sons. The government has posted a list of emails for each of the 
secretaries for each state or territory, some of which notably use 
Hotmail, Yahoo!, or Gmail services.
Governments do not necessarily have to provide international 
dispute resolution services themselves because private parties can 
offer to resolve disputes. It may be that any particular website, such 
as eBay or Facebook, might require its users to contractually agree to 
abide by the judgments of a private dispute resolution provider, but 
such contracts cannot, of course, bind third parties. Furthermore, 
where the agreement to submit to binding dispute resolution is 
made through terms of service that are rarely reviewed by users, 
there are reasons to be cautious about ready enforcement, especially 
when the rules may undermine consumer protections.16 Service pro-
viders might themselves volunteer to be bound by a global electronic 
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dispute resolution mechanism, in order to increase confidence of 
their users and clients through submission to a neutral and readily 
accessible third party for dispute resolution. Because many online 
disputes might arise from contractual relations, dispute resolution 
schemes can be pre- established by contract.
Dematerialization does not require automation; human beings 
would still need, for example, to conduct conformity assessments 
with the regulatory standard.17 Dematerialization might also be 
approximated by enabling foreign service providers to meet require-
ments through processes that can be engaged in at numerous loca-
tions worldwide. Certification tests can be administered in a variety 
of secure locations around the world. The Law School Admissions 
Test (LSAT), to use a familiar example, can be taken in more 
than sixty foreign countries, including Australia, China, Egypt, and 
Vietnam.
If regulations require physical presence for a signature or some 
other process, they might violate international trade law. If a country 
has agreed to liberalize trade in a particular sector, such physical 
presence requirements encumber foreign traders’ ability to provide 
that service, imposing special travel costs on the foreign trader, not 
to mention the serious obstacles of obtaining visas. Regulations that 
require a physical presence might be subject to GATS challenge on 
at least two grounds: (1) a violation of the national treatment obliga-
tion because a physical presence requirement confers advantages on 
local providers; and (2) a violation of the market access commit-
ment, where mode 1, the crossborder supply mode, has been com-
mitted to liberalization. As we saw in the discussion of United 
States—Gambling in the last chapter, a nation insisting on physical 
presence can plead the need to protect public morals, maintain pub-
lic order, or protect life, but that plea can be tested for a “reasonably 
available alternative.” As the legal and technical infrastructure of 
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net- work grows through increased dematerialization, a physical 
presence requirement will be harder to defend.
While dematerialization will mean that a local service provider 
will face competition from abroad, it simultaneously expands that 
provider’s potential market. For consumers, dematerialization will 
mean a wider selection of service providers from which to choose, 
improving quality or price, or both. A handshake, a pat on the back, 
and eye contact are all activities that help define our humanity, but 
they may not be always possible or necessary for all transactions that 
make up our contemporary lives.
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GLOCALIZATION AND HARMONIZATION
The footloose nature of net- work increases the likelihood that a ser-
vice provider might relocate to take advantage of regulatory environ-
ments it finds favorable. The fear is that this mobility might lead to 
a race to the bottom, as providers search out the jurisdiction with 
minimal or even no regulation.1 Will service providers relocate to 
offshore havens where they can escape law yet still offer services via 
the Internet? This is not merely a theoretical possibility, as we saw in 
chapter 4. Antigua did not attract gambling operators only on the 
strength of its ample sunshine and beautiful beaches.
The bottom of such a race might well be found in the self- 
declared principality of Sealand. Established on a floating platform 
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used for British air defense during World War II, Sealand provided 
“the world’s first truly offshore, almost- anything- goes electronic 
data haven.”2 Through its web hosting company, forthrightly named 
“HavenCo,” Sealand offered “the ‘freedom’ to store and move data 
without answering to anybody, including competitors, regulators, 
and lawyers.”3 Free, as in without regulation.
Do Sealand and its ilk spell the death of law? Might entire coun-
tries set themselves up as Sealands, offshore havens from law itself ?
Thus far, with few exceptions such as online gaming, net- work 
has not migrated en masse to offshore regulatory havens.4 More 
important, there may be significant virtues in the regulatory compe-
tition that might arise from multiple jurisdictions with diverse 
regulations (including no regulation). Where earlier scholars saw 
regulatory competition as inexorably resulting in a calamitous dereg-
ulation, today’s scholars have identified potential virtues in the pro-
cess. Rather than a race to the bottom, they predict a race to the top 
or, alternatively, a race to the global welfare- maximizing ideal.5 Reg-
ulatory competition might pressure regulators to bring regulation to 
global standards or allow private parties to locate the best- tailored 
rules to govern a particular transaction. Competition might lead to 
the optimal regulation, maximizing social welfare. Regulatory com-
petition “has the potential to discourage harmful regulatory laxity as 
well as extreme regulatory rigor.”6 The Internet might turbocharge 
regulatory competition: by permitting individuals to select service 
providers from around the world, the Internet might greatly enlarge 
the domain of laws subject to regulatory competition, effectively 
making optional what had been mandatory services law.
The optimistic story of regulatory competition in cyberspace 
faces at least two objections. First, states are unlikely to be sanguine 
about the widespread avoidance of local law. The possibility of the 
evasion of mandatory law is the focus of the first half of this chapter. 
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Second, the race to the optimum is likely only where a company will 
internalize the costs of either regulation or deregulation.7 Many 
argue that this is the case with respect to the choice of where to 
incorporate a business, where the promoters’ decision to incorporate 
in a jurisdiction with lax shareholder protections makes it more dif-
ficult to convince people to invest in that business.8 But this happy 
scenario will not often obtain with respect to services regulation. 
Take for example government protections for personal information 
collected by corporations: because of limitations and biases in human 
cognition and also because of collective action problems, we should 
not expect private markets to achieve efficient practices regarding 
the use and disclosure of customer information.9 Few of us take the 
time to fully understand privacy policies; furthermore, privacy reali-
ties may be entirely invisible despite lots of effort. Thus, companies 
may not fully internalize the costs of their information use and dis-
closure practices and might choose regulatory regimes with little or 
no privacy protections. This same defect may exist with respect to a 
wide swath of services regulation. To make matters worse, the coun-
try that deregulates may not suffer the brunt of the ill effects of 
deregulation if the principal markets for the deregulated service are 
abroad. The offshore haven might sit back and collect taxes while 
letting the social costs of the activity fall on distant lands. Although 
the regulated jurisdictions might seek to bargain with the haven for 
a more congenial outcome (or, borrowing from an earlier era, even 
engage in gunboat diplomacy), the fruits of such negotiations are 
uncertain at best.10
Such a race to the bottom arises because of the existence of 
highly liberal regimes, lacking consumer and other protections. There 
is a second potential race to the bottom in net- work, this one arising 
out of the reality of highly repressive regimes. Companies may sub-
mit to the repressive demands of totalitarian regimes in order to 
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supply services to their populations. In the competition to supply 
such markets, companies might race to the bottom by censoring the 
information they supply and even spying on the local population in 
order to satisfy the authoritarian regime.
To disrupt these races to the bottom, I offer two principles: 
glocalization counters the race to the deregulated bottom, while do no 
evil counters the race to the oppressive bottom. I consider the do no 
evil mandate in chapter 9 in connection with China. This chapter 
describes the glocalization principle and its limits.
Glocalization
Globalization, the worry goes, will sweep away local culture in favor 
of a mass commercialized, homogenized world. Indeed, the Internet 
is likely to increase this tendency, giving individuals ready access to 
media originating outside their countries.11 Sociologists offer glocal-
ization as an antidote—a way to embrace globalization without shed-
ding local difference.12 Glocalization, a portmanteau rooted in the 
seeming opposites “global” and “local,” refers to “the simultaneity—
the co- presence—of both universalizing and particularizing tenden-
cies.”13 I use it here with reference to law. Globalization of services 
threatens to sweep aside local law through the use of offshore regula-
tory havens. Legal glocalization would require the creation or distribu-
tion of products or services intended for a global market but customized to 
conform to local laws—within the bounds of international law.14
Although the concept of insisting on local law may seem ano-
dyne, the streets of Strasbourg and Berlin swelled to defend this 
principle when it was threatened.15 As originally drafted, the 
European Union’s proposed Services Directive would have man-
dated a “country of origin” rule within the union, under which a 
European could supply his or her services to any country within the 
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EU under the rules of the home, not host, country, at least in 
the absence of compelling public health or security rationales to the 
contrary.16 Thus, a French service provider would be governed ordi-
narily by French law even while supplying services in Germany. This 
would apply equally to Polish plumbers and English e- commerce 
providers. The head of the European Trade Union Confederation 
charged that this directive would “fire the starting gun on a race to 
the bottom.”17 He worried that a country of origin rule would create 
“flags of convenience,” as European corporations would reincorpo-
rate in states with relatively lax regulation. Such complaints had 
resonance: opposition to the country of origin principle helped 
derail the EU Constitution in 2005 and later led to that principle’s 
retreat within the EU.18
Even before the Services Directive, the European Court of 
Justice had argued that requiring local certification of foreign suppli-
ers would be unduly burdensome, as such suppliers would have to 
satisfy multiple authorities. The Court has repeatedly held that mem-
ber states should accept the sufficiency of the services regulation of 
other member states but has generally allowed them nonetheless to 
derogate from this requirement based on public interest.19 In elec-
tronic commerce, the EU has made plain its preference for home 
country regulation, requiring countries to defer to a foreign service 
provider’s home regulation except where necessary and proportionate 
to protect the public interest.20 Such country of origin rules might be 
easier to adopt in the EU, where supranational directives have laid the 
groundwork for widespread legal harmonization. GATS, however, 
eschews this interpretative approach, explicitly “recognizing the right 
of Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the sup-
ply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy 
objectives,”21 and requiring nations to accept foreign credentials only 
voluntarily.22
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Proponents of a country of origin principle often analogize the 
receipt of a crossborder net- worked service to travel to a foreign 
land. This raises a metaphysical question: Where does an event in 
cyberspace occur?23 Is the provider, like a foreign sales representative, 
traveling (virtually) crossborder into the country of the consumer? Or 
is the consumer, like a tourist aboard a cruise ship, traveling (virtually) 
to the country of the provider?24 If the metaphor of the virtual tour-
ist holds, then that person should expect that service to be governed 
by the provider’s home.25 After all, states do not typically interfere 
with a person’s consumption while abroad.26 In the case of United 
States—Gambling (described in chapters 4 and 6), the WTO Appel-
late Body presumed without discussion that offering online gam-
bling services is the equivalent of the provider traveling crossborder.27 
This seems wise: the alternate characterization, as consumption 
abroad, allows consumers to opt out of local mandatory law with the 
click of a mouse or the tap of a finger (rather than the more onerous 
boarding of a vessel) or, worse, subjects them to foreign law without 
the notice of entry into a foreign jurisdiction that would normally 
attend foreign travel. This traveling provider characterization also 
supports the argument for glocalization—requiring the foreign ser-
vice provider to comply with local law—rather than requiring the 
consumer’s home jurisdiction to relent in favor of the consumer’s 
purported choice of (virtual) foreign travel.
Local law, after all, reflects local mores (however imprecisely, 
given defects in the political process). Allowing services to be pro-
vided according to the law of the home jurisdiction of the service 
provider would displace the local law of the service consumer, 
subjecting that consumer to a foreign rule. Of course, where a 
particular local rule is merely a default or optional rule, subject 
to change contractually, there is nothing offensive per se in 
the choice of a foreign rule. But with respect to mandatory law, 
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democracy supports glocalization, at least until We the People elect 
to subject ourselves to foreign rules.28
In 2006, the European Parliament suggested that it would 
replace the “country of origin” principle in the draft Services 
Directive with the “freedom to receive services.”29 This is an appeal-
ing recharacterization of international trade in services, focusing 
attention on how liberalized trade empowers consumer choice. 
Indeed, management guru Kenichi Ohmae has characterized 
globalization as simply “consumer sovereignty.”30 But while global-
ization heightens consumer choice, it may at the same time 
make the consumer vulnerable to exploitation. This is because it is 
nation- states—their laws and their courts—not nongovernmental, 
supranational organizations, or even private associations, that serve 
as the principal protectors of consumers in today’s world. To displace 
national sovereignty with consumer sovereignty would be to elimi-
nate consumer protections in favor of “buyer beware.” Some netizens 
would prefer the benevolence of technologists to national govern-
ments—but this is likely to result in either a technocracy—rule by 
system operators—or a plutocracy—rule by corporations.
The focus on consumers suggests that we may relax our concerns 
with respect to merchants, whom one presumes to have a greater 
degree of sophistication and economic interest with respect to 
contractual terms with foreign suppliers. Sometimes merchant- to- 
merchant agreements might implicate consumer protections, in which 
case they merit examination. As I describe below, the European Union 
regulates the onward transfer of personal data by European companies 
for processing outside the European Union, subjecting even these 
merchant- to- merchant agreements to stringent scrutiny.
Glocalization’s assertion of municipal law in the face of global 
information flows thus stands in contrast to the world envisioned by 
cyberspace enthusiasts, who would deny the applicability of local law 
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to a universal cyberspace.31 Glocalization simultaneously confounds 
the desires of globe- trotting corporations, which seek to extend their 
markets without the troublesome impediments of local law.32 The 
cosmopolitan, borderless world promised by both business strate-
gists and cyberutopians seems yet remote—at least when such a 
world would defeat local law. The flat world of global business and 
the self- regulated world of cyberspace remain distant ideals.
Yet reasserting national sovereignty in the face of net- work need 
not stymie globalization. Indeed, it will strengthen globalization 
against a retrenching backlash.33 If crossborder flows of information 
grossly undermine our privacy, security, or the standards of locally 
delivered services, they will not long be tolerated. Even the promise 
of more efficient production and its concomitant cost savings might 
not rebuff protectionist impulses bolstered by the emergence of 
well- publicized examples of crossborder net- work abuses. Some 
smaller states may well have conceded their own powerlessness in 
the face of cyberspace. Taiwan, for example, has apparently brought 
few (or perhaps even zero) cases against foreign corporations or 
individuals for activities (such as intellectual property infringement) 
in cyberspace. The principle of glocalization would perhaps 
strengthen the resolve of small states to assert their own law in 
cyberspace when necessary to protect important local concerns. 
Glocalization will also spur workers worldwide to train according to 
the requirements of the world’s most demanding jurisdictions. This 
may spur human capital investment throughout the world and raise 
standards worldwide.
Whether a net- work provider will respond to glocalization 
efforts by offering a generalized service acceptable to all (a “one- 
size- fits- all” service) or a service tailored to each regulatory regime 
(a “bespoke” service) will depend largely on the economics of deliv-
ering variations of that service. In some cases, a net- work supplier 
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will conclude that a bespoke service is warranted because a tailored 
service supplies profits in excess of the additional costs of tailoring. 
In other cases, a service provider may decide that it is not cost- 
effective to do so, and will thus prefer a one- size- fits- all service. For 
example, an American digital bookseller might remove the novel 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover from its offerings worldwide rather than 
implement technology to block its transfer only to those few juris-
dictions that label the book indecent. Such a result would indeed be 
unfortunate, though we might note that cyberspace is filled with 
those who would make less craven decisions, willing to risk the 
wrath of repressive regimes to disseminate information.34 Indeed, 
efforts to block a classic book are exactly the kinds of activities that 
will likely prove futile and thus unlikely to succeed. The Pirate Bay, 
described above in chapter 4, is one such enterprise, gleefully 
snubbing authorities everywhere. WikiLeaks is another, disclosing 
information that authorities and corporations seek to suppress. 
Reporters once traced WikiLeaks through its Internet Protocol 
address to Sweden at the servers run by the founders of The 
Pirate Bay.
Return to the French orders to Yahoo! in California to desist 
from supplying Nazi material to French men and women, which we 
discussed in chapter 2. As California legal scholar Neal Netanel 
writes about a similar German law, “Germany’s citizens, we may 
assume, have democratically chosen to prohibit the dissemination of 
neo- Nazi speech in their country. Indeed, German law combating 
neo- Nazism lies at the heart of Germany’s postwar constitutional-
ism, born out of the trauma of that country’s totalitarian past and 
designed to forge a ‘militant democracy,’ a liberal state capable of 
resisting those who would attack the constitutional order and foment 
ethnic hatred.”35 Yahoo! did not contest French (or German) author-
ity to offer such a rule to regulate life in France (or Germany). 
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Rather, it told the French courts that they should not try to impose 
that rule on a global Internet corporation. Yahoo! argued that a 
French order would represent French efforts to impose its law on the 
world. Yahoo! worried that tolerating the French imposition would 
launch a parade of requests to remove material, whittling down the 
World Wide Web into a small, rump set of offerings acceptable to 
states ranging from China to France to Singapore to North Korea. 
The freest information medium in the world would rapidly become 
its most heavily regulated. The French court, however, satisfied itself 
that this was not inevitable; that technology would permit Yahoo! to 
offer a conforming service to French citizens yet simultaneously 
offer a nonconforming service to others, at least with 70 to 90 per-
cent accuracy in identifying a user as French.36 The French court 
relied on an expert panel including American Internet pioneer Vint 
Cerf to conclude that the Internet Protocol address of a user would 
likely give away his or her location. This technology of “geolocation” 
would permit a company to glocalize. Later in this chapter, I describe 
an international law rule that would allow France to rightfully insist 
on applying its hate speech regulations to Yahoo!’s US operations 
only where they pose a substantial harm in France.
If France has a right to insist on its anti- Nazi policy with respect 
to Yahoo!’s offerings in France, must US courts assist? After all, who 
has more enforcement authority than a service provider’s home 
courts? For all the recent concern about US exceptionalism when it 
comes to foreign and international law, the United States has long 
followed a practice of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments 
as long as they are not at odds with American public policy. In the 
classic 1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot, a French person sought to 
recover through US courts a French judgment against US parties 
arising out of a commercial dispute.37 An Irish immigrant, Hilton 
had begun his business importing Irish lace and then moved to 
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importing other items, including the French gloves that led to a 
French civil judgment against him.38 The Supreme Court held that a 
US court could enforce the foreign money judgment as a matter 
of comity, which the Court described as “the recognition which 
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or 
judicial acts of another nation.” Procedural differences between the 
two jurisdictions would not necessarily derail recognition, as long 
as the foreign court had subject- matter jurisdiction and offered 
an opportunity for a full and fair trial in an impartial process. But 
the Court found another stumbling block in French law: because 
French courts would refuse to honor a similar American judgment, 
comity did not require a US court to honor the French judgment 
at issue. Since Hilton, however, the reciprocity condition for 
recognition and enforcement has largely been forgotten in US 
jurisprudence.39
Before a US court, Yahoo! argued that the general rule favoring 
recognition was unavailable because of a constitutional constraint. 
Yahoo! argued that the First Amendment prevented a US court 
from enforcing the French order. The question presented was diffi-
cult: Does the First Amendment protect the speech of an American 
on American soil transmitted to a French citizen on French soil? A 
panel of eleven federal circuit court judges seemed uncertain and 
divided, and a majority cobbled together out of minority views dis-
missed the case as either lacking in personal jurisdiction or unripe. 
Judge William Fletcher wrote that defining the “extent of First 
Amendment protection of speech accessible solely by those outside 
the United States is a difficult and, to some degree, unresolved 
issue.”40 Judge Fletcher seemed to imagine a perfect geolocation- 
followed- by- glocalization regime, in which Yahoo! could, if it so 
chose, tolerate the offer of Nazi materials within the free- speech 
zone of the United States while barring it in France.
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The scenario painted by Judge Fletcher is appealing: a US court 
would simply prevent a US provider from supplying to France speech 
barred in France while allowing the US provider to continue supply-
ing that speech at home. But as the French court itself observed, 
geolocation is imperfect (though improving). For example, geoloca-
tion might mistakenly label a Frenchman as a Virginian if he uses 
Virginia- based AOL, a company with subscribers around the world. 
That mistake, of course, would not raise a First Amendment concern 
because it would simply allow more speech to hit French shores.
But geolocation technology might also mistake an American as 
a French man or woman, if he or she uses a service that uses IP 
addresses allocated to a French provider or perhaps if he or she com-
municates in French. A personal experience illustrates the problem. 
When I tried to access the video service Hulu to watch a favorite 
NBC comedy, the site reported, “Sorry, currently our video library 
can only be streamed from within the United States.” This was a bit 
odd because I was sitting in a hotel in Washington, DC. Perhaps the 
error arose because the hotel was part of a Canadian chain and thus 
perhaps relies on a Canadian Internet service provider. The example 
shows that American enforcement of a foreign speech restriction 
can reduce speech in the United States. This is the negative spillover 
effect on speech.
The broader point is this: enforcing a foreign rule may cause it to 
spill over into the domestic arena. Thus, states should not lend a 
hand to enforce a foreign rule if that rule would violate public policy 
at home. More generally put, states should assist foreign states as a 
matter of comity or in the hope of inducing reciprocity in the future, 
but only where such assistance would not run afoul of local public 
policy.
As the Yahoo! case demonstrates, the one- size- fits- all approach 
might have a tendency to ratchet standards up, reducing what is 
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available to everyone. Even glocalization by the United States does 
not stop this. The First Amendment after all does not require Yahoo! 
to convey Nazi material but merely permits it to do so. As a private 
corporation, Yahoo! is free (thankfully) to choose to divest itself of 
this material. This is true not only with respect to speech. Under 
pressure to follow strict European privacy rules, Yahoo! could decide 
to implement them throughout its global sites if it found that the 
costs of segregating information about Europeans from information 
about others could not be justified by the advantages of more lax 
privacy rules. As in the speech example, the US rules do not bar a 
company from treating private information with great care and pro-
cessing and disclosing it only with permission. This parallels the 
regulatory spillover that arises in the goods context as well—the 
strict safety rules of one jurisdiction, say on the content of the paint 
used in consumer products, might lead global suppliers to apply 
those rules throughout their production for all markets. This is simi-
lar to what some have called the “California Effect” in areas such as 
automobile emissions.41
A web of states enforcing their own rules and enforcing each 
other’s rules where consistent with local policy will reduce the juris-
dictional evasion made possible by the Internet. The difficulty, as we 
have seen, is that enforcing a foreign rule on local Internet providers 
will likely have spillover effects in the local jurisdiction. In some 
cases, this may not be alarming, but in cases involving free speech, 
for example, this will be clearly deleterious.
Countries have been reluctant even to commit to enforcing a 
choice of court agreement, when two parties agree to settle any dis-
putes in a particular court. The proposed Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements would enforce non- consumer contrac-
tual choices of one nation’s courts to hear disputes arising out of the 
contract.42 Despite the narrowness of the disputes covered by this 
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treaty—after all it only applies to non- consumer crossborder 
contracts—to date only one state, Mexico, has adopted it. Perhaps 
this is because the Convention would only permit a state to disre-
gard a foreign choice of court where the result would be “manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the State.”43 By contrast, the 
widely subscribed United Nations Convention enforcing arbitral 
awards allows a state to refuse to enforce if “contrary to the public 
policy” of that state.44 Leaving states clear escape valves from 
an international obligation to enforce a foreign law will enhance 
states’ willingness to enter into the international obligation in the 
first place.
Harmonization
Glocalization raises a fistful of important concerns:
1. Balkanization—the creation of borders in cyberspace, 
thereby risking the advantages of global information and 
services sharing;
2. Stalinization—the imposition of the world’s most repres-
sive rules on cyberspace, in aggregated form;
3. incursions upon sovereignty, as efforts to regulate foreign 
service providers lead to extraterritorial assertions of  
prescriptive and adjudicative power;
4. futility—the difficulty of stamping out undesired infor-
mation in cyberspace; and
5. the costs of compliance with multifarious and potentially 
conflicting local laws.
These are serious concerns, and they require ameliorative doctrines 
that I classify under the general heading of harmonization. I argue 
that the consequences of unrestrained glocalization require states to 
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harmonize their laws and procedures wherever possible. The harmo-
nization principle is just as important as the glocalization principle 
itself. While these concerns counsel very substantial limits on the 
glocalization principle, they do not undermine its central raison 
d’être: preserving the possibility of self- regulation in a net- worked 
world.
Both international law and US law establish significant metes 
and bounds for glocalization. Common perception notwithstanding, 
neither jurisprudence authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction on the 
basis of effects alone. International law typically limits state exercise 
of prescriptive (the right to legislate) and adjudicative (the right to 
resolve disputes) authority over conduct outside its territory only 
where the effect on its own territory is “substantial.”45 As Yale legal 
scholar Michael Reisman describes, international law seeks “to 
resolve systematically” conflicts of laws “by allocating to particular 
states the competence to make or apply law to particular persons, 
things or events that are simultaneously” subject to “the control 
of two or more states.”46 The goal is not to eliminate overlapping 
jurisdictional authority but to manage it. In related fashion, the 
American Law Institute’s principles for transnational intellectual 
property disputes permit courts faced with a ubiquitous alleged 
intellectual property infringement to choose the law of the state 
with the closest connections with the dispute.47
For its part, the due process clause of the US Constitution 
restrains judicial power, limiting a state’s extraterritorial reach even 
in the face—quite literally—of an explosion on that state’s soil. In 
the classic American case of Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 
involving a car that caught fire in Oklahoma, the Supreme Court 
denied an Oklahoma court jurisdiction over that car’s New York 
distributor because that distributor lacked sufficient other ties to 
Oklahoma. Even though the distributor could have foreseen that the 
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car might cause injury in Oklahoma (or anywhere in the continental 
United States), the Supreme Court declared the distributor off- 
limits to Oklahoma courts in the absence of more concerted ties to 
Oklahoma. The Court declared, “Every seller of chattels [does not] 
in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process.”48 We 
can recast this maxim for the digital age: every net- work provider 
does not appoint electrons as his or her agent for service of process. 
In recent cases involving the Internet, US circuit courts allow a state 
to assert jurisdiction over a foreign person only if there is “something 
more” than effects alone, typically some kind of known targeting of 
someone in that state.49 A tragic motorcycle accident in California 
led the Court to revisit the Worldwide Volkswagen issue in the case 
of Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 
now in the context of a suit between a Taiwanese tire manufacturer 
and a Japanese tire valve manufacturer. The Supreme Court again 
repudiated the assertion of state court jurisdiction, this time because 
the California court failed, among other things, to “consider the pro-
cedural and substantive policies of other nations.”50 As we move 
from Worldwide Volkswagen to the World Wide Web, we may do 
well to remember the lessons learned from earlier globalizations.
It was technological change, and the changes that technology 
wrought on commerce, that led the United States to abandon strict 
territorial limits on the assertion of jurisdiction in the mid- twentieth 
century.51 The Supreme Court has observed that technological 
progress has spurred interstate (and international) commerce, 
necessitating expansion of jurisdictional grounds: “As technological 
progress has increased the flow of commerce between the States, the 
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar 
increase. At the same time, progress in communications and trans-
portation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal 
less burdensome.” Yet the Court has refused to abandon limits on 
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personal jurisdiction entirely: “It is a mistake to assume that this 
trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts.” The Court explained such restrictions as 
“more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation,” but rather “a consequence of territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States.”52 Limits on the assertion of jurisdic-
tion are constitutional restraints on the power to impose one’s law 
on others. Due process limits on personal jurisdiction function 
as limits not only on adjudication but on legislation as well. They 
constrain the domain of the local law.
Antitrust law has long grappled with the globalization of 
production. The early jurisprudential attitude was to confine US 
antitrust law only to acts occurring within the United States. When 
asked to hear a challenge to an effort to monopolize banana exports 
in Costa Rica, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in the 1909 
case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. that “it is surprising 
to hear it argued that” acts outside the jurisdiction of the United 
States “were governed by the act of Congress.”53 To apply US law, he 
continued, would be “contrary to the comity of nations.”54 But the 
courts and Congress came to recognize that refusing to apply 
American antitrust law abroad could dramatically undermine that 
law at home, as foreign anticompetitive practices would spill over 
into the United States. As Harvard professor Kingman Brewster 
pointed out in an influential book, antitrust law author Senator John 
Sherman himself worried about “jurisdiction- hopping and evasion,” 
advising that such problems could be met by attaching the putative 
evader’s property in the United States (a solution that is often 
unavailable with net- work).55 In the 1976 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of America, a federal court of appeals famously offered a test 
that sought to balance the competing interests of various states in 
determining whether to assert both prescriptive and adjudicative 
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jurisdiction over alleged foreign anticompetitive acts. The American 
lumber company Timberlane sued Bank of America and others 
for actions abroad that allegedly harmed Timberlane’s efforts to 
export lumber from Honduras to the United States. Judge Herbert 
Choy articulated a “jurisdictional rule of reason” that required 
the court to consider seven factors before asserting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction:
1. “the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy”;
2. “the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the loca-
tions or principal places of business of corporations”;
3. “the extent to which enforcement by either state can be 
expected to achieve compliance”;
4. “the relative significance of effects on the United States as 
compared with those elsewhere”;
5. “the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or 
affect American commerce”;
6. “the foreseeability of such effect”; and
7. “the relative importance to the violations charged of con-
duct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.”56
The American Law Institute largely adopted this flexible approach 
in its influential Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law but 
added a crucial final factor:
8. “the importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system.”57
As markets widened across the globe, it became necessary to extend 
US antitrust law overseas in order to protect Americans—but to do 
so in a way consistent with the needs and rights of the international 
community.
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These cases show how the law has responded to the globalization 
of the production of goods. In the cases described above, 
covering the diverse range of goods subject to international trade—
automobiles, motorcycles, bananas, lumber—the Supreme Court 
did not insist on local adjudication or local law, even where there was 
harm ultimately felt within the United States. In these cases, at least, 
the US courts have largely avoided provincialism, favoring instead 
due consideration of foreign and international interests.
This willingness to forbear in the interests of comity and the 
international order will prove essential with respect to services as 
well. The risks of Balkanization, the incursions on foreign sover-
eignty, and the costs of compliance with multifarious and potentially 
conflicting municipal laws all counsel restraint. An early US govern-
mental study warned of the dangers of overregulation, worried 
that unnecessary content regulation of the Internet by states “could 
cripple the growth and diversity of the Internet.”58 We will need 
an extraterritoriality jurisprudence for Trade 2.0 modeled on 
Timberlane and its progeny. Of course, a multifactor standard such as 
the one in Timberlane does not promise the predictability of sharp 
rules. Yet such a common law approach may be the most suited to 
navigating the uncertain waters that trade in net- worked services 
will bring. As Judge Choy noted in Timberlane, “At some point the 
interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony 
incentive for restraint too strong.”59 Common law courts seem far 
better suited to determine these points than legislatures demarcating 
sharp rules. A case- by- case analysis can more readily implement the 
international version of the golden rule applied to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: a nation- state should assert jurisdiction only when 
such an assertion is universalizable, that is, when it would feel 
comfortable with other nation- states also asserting jurisdiction in 
similar cases.
G
Lo
c
A
LIZ
A
t
Io
n
 A
n
D
 H
A
R
M
o
n
IZ
A
t
Io
n
 
185
I have assumed here that applying domestic law to foreign 
service providers supplying services via the Web to domestic con-
sumers is an extraterritorial assertion of law. But should not efforts 
to regulate transmissions as they cross into this country be seen as an 
uncontroversial exercise of intraterritorial authority? The difficulty is 
that the persons who must modify their behavior are abroad; thus, 
the enforcement of a national rule against such persons will require 
an extraterritorial change of behavior. (This would not be the case if 
the regulation were effected only through domestic intermediaries 
such as ISPs or through targeting domestic users of the foreign 
service, and no liability was attached to the foreign provider—but 
censorship at the ISP level is likely to chill speech beyond even what 
is intended.) Given the direct demand to a foreign service provider, 
concerns about extraterritorial application of both US law and US 
judicial power appear appropriate. Cyberspace does not allow clean 
demarcations of political boundaries, with an American space here, 
a Brazilian space there, and so on. Requiring a foreign net- work 
provider to comply with local law entails a command to a party 
outside one’s borders. In this sense, such regulation has an extrater-
ritorial component.60
However, courts should not require a clear legislative statement 
of extraterritorial intent before applying a rule to net- work sourced 
from outside the country. Because most US law does not have an 
explicit extraterritorial application mandate, requiring clear legisla-
tive statement would simply serve to allow service providers (and 
perhaps consumers) to avoid the bulk of US law.
Just as US law should not be asserted carelessly against foreign 
service providers on behalf of domestic parties, US law should not 
be available to foreigners without a substantial US nexus. Again, 
here an antitrust case offers guidance. In F. Hoffman- LaRoche Ltd. 
v. Empagran, the Supreme Court said that efforts to extend US 
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antitrust protections to foreigners smacked of “legal imperialism.” 
“If America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the 
international marketplace for such ideas,” the Court reasoned, we 
should not impose these policies on foreign countries nonetheless. 
The Court accordingly refused to hear the claims of foreign 
plaintiffs where their foreign injuries are “independent of any 
adverse domestic effect.”61 Of course, if international law declares 
the defendant’s actions illegal, then allowing a suit to proceed (for 
example through an Alien Torts Statute claim) would further the 
international order, not undermine it.
Choice of law also restrains excessive assertions of local law—
and thus excessive parochialism. The lex fori—the law of the forum—
need not have a stranglehold on the judicial imagination. Conflict of 
laws rules empower courts to select a foreign rule depending on 
the relative interests at stake of each jurisdiction.62 The intensity of 
multijurisdictional transactions arising out of Trade 2.0 will require 
states to fortify such efforts rather than obstreperously insisting on 
the local rule. States must forgo an insistence on local law where the 
local interest is dwarfed by the foreign interest or is otherwise mini-
mal.63 Such forbearance will attract reciprocity from sister states. 
Moreover, it is necessary to alleviate the international conflicts that 
cyberspace trade will generate. As with the jurisdictional calculus, 
courts must be sensitive to the “needs of the interstate and interna-
tional system,”64 though judges should not embrace what they 
believe to be a “better” foreign law nor innovate a substantive set of 
new customs to govern Trade 2.0 disputes where a mandatory local 
law already exists.
Extravagant actions against foreigners have at times drawn legal 
responses from their home countries. Sufficiently noxious assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction will be met with blocking statutes and 
other retaliatory measures by sister states.
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Glocalization is unnecessary where (1) a state has agreed on an 
international standard (harmonization, in a strong sense); (2) a state 
has accepted a foreign regime as satisfactory for local purposes 
(recognition, which functions as a kind of middle level of harmoniza-
tion because it sanctions certain alternative governing rules); or 
(3) a state determines that the relative interests do not justify 
enforcing its local rule (a weak, discretionary form of one- off  
harmonization).65 Forbearance acts as a weak form of harmoniza-
tion because, by not asserting jurisdiction, the locality is essentially 
yielding to a foreign law and in that sense is permitting that conduct 
to be governed by that law. Efforts to harmonize laws across nations 
and standards among professional associations will prove essential to 
preserve a global cyberspace in the face of national regulation.
Harmonization of services regulation is one of the goals of recent 
trade agreements. GATS permits members to “recognize the educa-
tion or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certifi-
cations granted in a particular country.”66 It goes further to mandate 
that states agree on disciplines to ensure that licensing and technical 
standards are not unduly “burdensome” and “based on objective 
and transparent criteria.”67 NAFTA similarly acknowledges the 
possibility that a party might recognize, “unilaterally or by agree-
ment, education, experience, licenses or certifications obtained in the 
territory of another Party or of a non- Party.”68 ASEAN has recently 
adopted mutual recognition arrangements with respect to nursing 
and engineering, with the intention that a certification in one juris-
diction will be recognized in another.69 Regional recognition 
arrangements might pave the way for recognition of the law or 
licensing of countries outside the region.70 With respect to harmo-
nization, NAFTA also encourages the parties to “develop mutually 
acceptable standards and criteria for licensing and certification of 
professional service providers.”71 The WTO’s Technical Barriers to 
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Trade (TBT) Treaty makes broader demands still, requiring states to 
use international standards where consistent with regulatory aims, 
and requiring states to give “positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members, even if these 
regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that 
these regulations adequately fulfill the objectives of their own regu-
lations.”72 US recognition of foreign judgments’ jurisprudence is 
similarly permissive, allowing recognition even where a foreign 
court’s procedures differ from ours.73 This recognition jurisprudence, 
of course, applies to foreign judicial judgments, not foreign certifica-
tions and standards. Moreover, the TBT Treaty, for its part, explicitly 
excludes services from its ambit.74 WTO negotiators should seek to 
expand the TBT to cover services.
This will require harmonization projects, not only for the proce-
dural aspects of transnational net- work described in chapter 7, but 
also in substantive areas. A dramatic example of a harmonization 
project shows the possibilities: the SEC recently permitted certain 
foreign issuers of securities in the US markets to use International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) accounting standards 
without reconciling them to the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards widely adopted in the United States.75 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has been considering allowing American 
companies to use IFRS as well domestically. If it does so, this 
would mean adopting international accounting standards even for 
American companies at home. This move to harmonize our rules 
seems a natural result of recognition because it would otherwise 
give a foreign company the option to choose between two standards 
(the American standard or the recognized foreign or international 
standard), leaving an American company in a disadvantageous 
position of having no option (being forced to use the American 
standard). States have incentives to harmonize standards because of 
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the benefits of economies of scale and the possibilities of lower con-
sumer prices, though, of course, regulatory capture by protectionist 
interests remains a significant concern.76
Moving toward international standards for certain services may 
involve deference to the results of technocratic legal processes. Some 
have critiqued such transnational processes as undemocratic, but I 
have argued elsewhere that the voluntary nature of national acquies-
cence to such processes makes them compatible with democracy.77
With glocalization and harmonization in reasonable relative 
measures, the Internet will offer the world’s most important platform 
for regulatory competition. In the face of this competition, states 
may modify their own laws, finding that their laws are unnecessary, 
ineffective, or even inferior to foreign laws. Services regulations are 
especially likely to undergo rationalization, as they have never before 
faced foreign competition. Industry and consumer groups will estab-
lish sets of best practices and global standards in certain services, and 
governments may defer to such standards. Governments will find it 
in their own interests to seek international coordination because of 
the difficulty of finding national solutions to global problems.78 
Equally important, private parties are seeking to establish transna-
tional rules and standards that will govern parts of Trade 2.0.79 We 
are likely to witness the emergence, in certain domains, of a new lex 
mercatoria, a set of shared basic rules cobbled together through the 
common law, private coordination, statutory convergence, and treaty 
harmonization, thereby reducing Balkanization, incursions on sover-
eignty, and costs of global legal compliance. In yet other domains, 
there is likely to exist a preference for legal diversity, or at least 
disagreement on where to find legal harmony.
Jurisdictional evasion can demonstrate the injustice of laws, 
putting pressure on localities to justify their repression of an activity 
legal elsewhere. A famous 1967 United States constitutional case 
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serves as an example. Loving v. Virginia involved an interracial 
Virginia couple who traveled to another jurisdiction to marry. When 
newlyweds Mildred and Richard Loving returned home, they were 
arrested, charged with leaving the state to evade the law with intent 
to cohabitate upon return. The Supreme Court sided with the 
Lovings, declaring the Virginia antimiscegenation rule unconstitu-
tional, indeed “designed to maintain White Supremacy” by 
specifically forbidding whites to intermarry with others.80 In Loving, 
it was a superior legal order that compelled Virginia to rewrite its 
repugnant law. The international legal order lacks a Supreme Court 
able to impose its views on national courts, but the World Trade 
Organization serves as a significant disciplinary mechanism. As set 
out in chapter 6, the WTO can sanction protectionist services regu-
lation, though as the example of the United States vis- à- vis Antigua 
shows, some states might simply be content to suffer the sanction 
rather than change their law.
The European Union has sought to leverage control over 
domestic entities to control of information processing elsewhere. 
Recognizing that European privacy laws are often significantly more 
protective than those elsewhere and recognizing the usefulness of the 
outsourcing of data processing, the EU has sought to regulate the 
processing of data about Europeans by service providers outside 
Europe.81 Under the EU’s Data Protection Directive, data collectors 
within Europe may send data to foreign processors only if the out-
sourcer is in a country that the EU recognizes as providing sufficient 
privacy and security safeguards (currently, Andorra, Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jer-
sey, and Switzerland, and, under a weak Safe Harbor, the United 
States)82 or the outsourcer accepts a model contract protecting pri-
vacy. The model contract requires the outsourcer to permit third- 
party audits of its facilities and data, to submit to European law as 
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governing its privacy practices with respect to the information, and 
to respect any related ruling of the courts of the data exporter’s home 
jurisdiction.83
Regulatory theorists Daniel Esty and Damien Geradin suggest 
the following goal for countries facing international competition: 
“Regulatory systems should be set up with enough interjurisdictional 
cooperation (or harmonization) to ensure that transboundary exter-
nalities and other market failures are addressed, but with a sufficient 
degree of regulatory competition to prevent the resulting govern-
mental structure from becoming an untamed, overreaching, or inef-
ficient Leviathan.”84 The framework I have suggested here is driven 
not by market failure alone, but my ultimate counsel is similar.
Governments should respond to the net- work trade by rational-
izing their laws wherever possible, engaging in international stan-
dards projects and recognizing the adequacy of certain foreign 
standards and enforcement, while not jettisoning efforts to ensure 
that net- work providers comport their service with local public 
policy. Even with such efforts, the imperfection of enforcement will 
always mean that there will remain some room for evasion and thus 
a potentially useful regulatory challenge.
Harmonize where possible, and glocalize where necessary. Such 
a maxim does not answer difficult questions of when to prefer one or 
the other, but it does establish a framework for understanding what 
is at stake.
The Silk Road originally established to carry precious goods 
ultimately carried Buddhism, transmitting it from its home in 
the Indian subcontinent to China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. In the 
next chapter I suggest that the Electronic Silk Road offers the 
world’s best route for bringing political and cultural information to 
the peoples of totalitarian states. Perhaps like its Silk Road anteced-
ent, the Electronic Silk Road will help China find enlightenment.
192
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LAST STOP
Middle Kingdom
Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, Renren, Sina, Tudou. China is full of inno-
vative and successful Internet companies, many worth billions of 
dollars. Yet of these companies, only one, Alibaba, is a global trader—
and then only to offer Chinese manufactures to the world. Most 
of these companies do not even bother to offer a version of their 
website in English or in any language other than Chinese. Even 
when listing their stock on the New York exchanges, they evince 
only an ambition to conquer China, not the world. Tencent describes 
itself as “a leading provider of Internet and mobile & telecommuni-
cations value- added services in China.” Baidu tells us that it is “the 
leading Chinese language Internet search provider.” Compare the 
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prospectuses from Silicon Valley. Google describes itself as “a global 
technology leader . . . that improve[s] the lives of billions of people 
globally.” Facebook declares its mission “to make the world more 
open and connected.” Zynga reports that it is “the world’s leading 
social game developer with 230 million average monthly active 
users . . . in 175 countries.”
If Chinese companies seem content within China, China itself 
figures prominently in the business desires of many Silicon Valley 
enterprises. China now boasts the world’s largest population of 
Internet users, with ever- increasing income. When American 
companies have raced into China, they have often been heavily 
criticized for assisting the Chinese government in suppressing infor-
mation and in repressing political dissidents.
In this chapter I take up two puzzles involving the ancient heart 
of the Silk Road. First, why did not China, the champion of inter-
national trade in goods, not also become a champion of trade in 
services? Second, when Silicon Valley enterprises offer services in 
China, must they also become complicit in political repression?
Great Firewalls
Why has China not translated its success in the outsourcing of 
goods to the outsourcing of services? Even while Chinese factories 
have made that country the capital of outsourcing in manufacturing, 
China has greatly lagged India in the outsourcing of services. This 
may seem puzzling given three natural advantages, both of which 
China shared with India: (1) a large home market that should 
permit Chinese companies to develop economies of scale without 
braving an international market; (2) the existence of a large labor 
pool, including well- regarded institutions of higher learning; and 
(3) the existence of a diaspora concentrated especially along the 
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American West Coast, which should give Chinese companies 
crucial information about the American market and American 
companies crucial information about Chinese suppliers.
Yet Chinese entrepreneurs have been unable thus far to replicate 
their manufacturing success in services. In 2011, China exported 
$182 billion of commercial services while importing $236 billion, a 
deficit of $54 billion. We might offer three possible explanations for 
China’s relatively weak international services trade. Most obviously, 
language barriers have made it difficult to recruit sufficient numbers 
of Chinese employees fluent in Western languages, especially English. 
Second, the government’s fear of the open Internet has stymied infor-
mation flows into and out of China. Uncertainty about information 
flows cannot be tolerated in a time- sensitive services environment. 
Furthermore, the services outsourcing often involves the transmission 
of sensitive personal or corporate information. Those outside China 
are likely to be less than keen to transfer personal data for processing 
to a country with few restraints on governmental snooping. It might 
prove difficult for companies to reveal to their customers that their 
personal data were being processed in China.
The fact that China has a better physical infrastructure than India 
has not proven as helpful as one might have expected. Indian compa-
nies have compensated for an inadequate municipal power supply by 
establishing their own power generation systems on their campuses. 
A neglected road infrastructure does not present a huge bottleneck 
for delivering services electronically. Of course, electronically medi-
ated services require an excellent telecommunications infrastructure, 
but India has been able to build such an infrastructure. Because of its 
desire to control information flows, China was more reluctant in the 
1990s to allow the free- for- all of private communications networks. 
Before undersea Internet cables tying India to the West became 
widely available, Indian IT companies relied on satellite links.1 
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Authoritarian countries eager to control information flow are far less 
willing to allow private companies to set up satellite links or other 
private and often encrypted channels of communication.
As the list of Internet companies at the beginning of this chapter 
indicates, the Chinese Internet itself is flourishing. Add to that list 
companies such as Youku, Netease, Shanda, Ctrip, Taobao, and Sohu, 
all wildly popular and highly profitable enterprises. The largest of 
the Chinese Internet firms, Tencent, is listed on Nasdaq, and boasts 
a market capitalization of $51 billion as of March 2012. Baidu has a 
market value close behind at $49 billion. Sina has a market value 
of $5 billion, RenRen $2 billion, DangDang $0.5 billion, Sohu 
$2 billion, YouKu $3 billion, and Tudou $1 billion (the last two have 
announced plans to merge). But these companies face an enormous 
roadblock, exemplified by market leaders Tencent and Baidu: 
Tencent’s and Baidu’s main websites exist only in Chinese. Indeed, 
this is true of most of these Chinese Internet companies. Ctrip, a 
travel portal, does offer services in English, but simply to serve 
foreign travelers to China. The popular Chinese social network 
kaixin001.com is available only in Chinese, as if the only people that 
one wishes to network with are Chinese- speaking. As this demon-
strates, the ambitions of Chinese Internet enterprises are still lim-
ited to serving the Chinese market. That this market is growing has 
allowed them to become hugely profitable nonetheless, but it does 
limit their ultimate growth potential. They do not seek to go toe to 
toe with Silicon Valley companies outside China. This lack of a 
global presence might in the long run erode their success in China 
itself. As Chinese people themselves become increasingly globalized, 
they will increasingly turn to companies that can better connect 
them with the world at large, not just China.
Chinese Internet companies may have oddly benefited from 
censorship. China has banned some very popular services such 
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as Facebook and Twitter, and Google’s services are typically 
blocked. Such acts of political repression have the effect of eliminat-
ing the principal competition for local Chinese Internet entrepre-
neurs. But such protectionism, even if a by-product of another 
governmental policy, does not often build companies ready for the 
world, and it denies consumers access to some of the world’s best 
enterprises.
One strategy for globalization is to purchase established Western 
Internet companies, using the money they earn in China to try to 
gain a foothold abroad. This seems a risky strategy. In 2011, Tencent 
purchased a majority interest in American online game company 
Riot Games for the princely sum of $231 million in cash. The risk of 
failing to meld corporate cultures seems quite high. Presumably, the 
American shareholders remained minority shareholders in the sub-
sidiary to incentivize the American management in companies in 
which the major value is in human capital. However, as the control-
ling shareholder, the Chinese parent will bear significant fiduciary 
duties to the subsidiary’s minority investors, raising risks of legal 
challenges. Whatever the merits of an acquisition strategy (and 
whatever the form it takes), it remains the case that most Chinese 
companies have thus far focused their energies on China itself.
In sum, China’s political repression harms its global ambitions 
when it comes to cybertrade. The Great Firewall of China not only 
keeps American Internet companies out of China, it keeps Chinese 
Internet companies in.
Do No Evil
The Internet offers a global information platform that should 
increase what Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen call human 
capabilities, perhaps especially so for people in repressive societies. 
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Because foreign service providers lie beyond the easy reach of repres-
sive governments, they can provide a crucial channel to gather and 
disseminate suppressed information. Where local television, radio, 
and newspapers must of necessity follow local diktats, foreign infor-
mation providers can both distribute and supply information largely 
without jeopardizing either life or property.
Yet in the wrong hands, the Internet can bring the specter of a 
pernicious Big Brother closer than ever possible in George Orwell’s 
time. Dissident pamphleteers who might have hid behind the ano-
nymity of discreetly placed writings may find their tracks harder to 
hide in cyberspace. When allied with willing Internet service pro-
viders, websites, software providers, and financial intermediaries, a 
government can gain an omniscience heretofore unknown. Foreign 
service providers might yield to political and economic pressure 
from the government and, instead of providing channels for com-
municating suppressed information, assist the state in rooting out 
dissidents. As we saw above in chapter 2, China, for example, has 
relied in part on evidence gleaned from online activities to identify 
and jail political dissidents.
I have suggested that in the right circumstances, states should be 
able to insist that foreign Internet providers comply with local law. 
Does this mean that Google and Yahoo! should bend to the demands 
of repressive governments? No. I have justified glocalization on the 
right of the people to choose their own law through their duly 
elected national organs. Glocalization accordingly does not support 
a requirement to tailor one’s service to the demands of an unelected, 
repressive state targeting dissidents.
This will require corporations to try to avoid becoming the sur-
veillance arm of the repressive state. In some cases, this might mean 
keeping one’s employees or assets out of that state, so there is no risk 
of effective local retaliation by the repressive government. In other 
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cases, it might mean avoiding learning or keeping information that 
might jeopardize political dissidents. It would mean adopting the 
Safe Server Strategy described in chapter 2, wherein a net- work 
provider locates its computer servers in a jurisdiction that protects 
speech and privacy.
Some hope to establish Iceland as a haven for new media, with 
laws that protect journalists, bloggers, whistleblowers, and their 
sources. The Icelandic Modern Media Initiative would create a 
“Switzerland of bits,” in which websites, their promoters, and their 
users could count on friendly source protection, communications 
protection, freedom of information laws, and libel protection.2 The 
idea would be that if a repressive government or an annoyed private 
party sought to obtain information about, or to censor or sanction, a 
speaker, the law would generally prove speaker- friendly.
Should we then leave foreign corporations free to choose 
to ignore a government’s demands because those corporations 
disagree with those laws? Consider, for example, French constraints 
on Nazi paraphernalia and Australian, Japanese, and Singaporean 
constraints on pornography. Should service providers located 
outside these jurisdictions be free to declare these rules repressive 
and flout them? The choice of which norms to follow should 
not be left entirely to a corporation’s management—especially 
because management’s judgment may well be colored by the color 
of money.
International law supports corporations that refuse to abet 
political repression. The United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights rejects incursions on freedom of speech unless they 
secure “morality, public order and the general welfare in a demo-
cratic society.” The reference to “democratic society” suggests that 
“public order” concerns cannot be inconsistent with democracy 
itself. While the Universal Declaration does not constitute binding 
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international law, it nonetheless offers “the primary source of global 
human rights standards.”3
Respect for human rights could be translated, at least minimally, 
into the mandate Do no evil. Google has famously adopted a variant 
of this imperative as a corporate principle. We can understand do no 
evil as a kind of Pareto principle, whereby the corporation’s presence 
does not, at the very least, make people worse off, in terms of human 
rights. Not doing evil is not the same as doing good and thus is not 
necessarily a sufficient criterion for corporate action. But it is the 
very least we can insist on for corporations.
Consider the actions of Google in China. In 2006, Google 
launched a Chinese- language version of its site that would, unlike its 
previous Chinese- language version, be hosted from servers in China 
itself. Access to Google’s servers outside China had been uncertain 
and slow, due in part or entirely to Chinese blocking, and this move 
would allow Google to expand its presence in China. In moving its 
servers to China, Google abandoned its Safe Server Strategy in 
order to be able to provide its services to Chinese consumers with 
the least delay. With servers on Chinese soil, Google, however, would 
find it difficult to avoid Chinese governmental mandates for censor-
ing results. Google, accordingly, took a number of steps to lessen the 
risk of doing evil: (1) it informed Chinese users of Google.cn when 
their search results were censored; (2) it continued to offer its uncen-
sored services through the Google.com site; and (3) it did not offer 
services that allowed users to create content, such as blogs and 
email.4 The last condition suggests that Google structured its direct 
Chinese presence to avoid learning information about dissident 
activity, information that it might, under Chinese law, be required to 
divulge to authorities. It thus tried to avoid falling into the trap into 
which Yahoo! fell and which subjected Yahoo! to a federal lawsuit it 
ultimately settled.
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In 2010, Google retreated from mainland China. It denounced 
both Chinese censorship and the infiltration of the email accounts 
of Chinese human rights activists. No longer willing to abide 
Chinese government demands for censorship, it pulled its Chinese 
services to Hong Kong, where it is not required to engage in similar 
censorship. Google’s services in China remain censored—but the 
censorship seems to be accomplished at the ISP level rather than 
through Google’s services themselves.
In 2008, working with human rights organizations and other 
civil society groups, three new media companies—Google, 
Microsoft, and Yahoo!—established a set of voluntary principles to 
govern their response to government pressures that may infringe on 
the freedom of expression or privacy. Rather than requiring compa-
nies to withdraw from repressive states, the Global Network Initia-
tive permits companies to remain as long as they have procedures in 
place to protect freedom of expression and privacy, including human 
rights impact assessments of their operations around the world. The 
initiative also commits its signatories to independent reviews of firm 
practices related to privacy. What the initiative requires in practice 
remains to be seen, though Google’s challenge to Chinese repression 
at the beginning of 2010 was a watershed moment in honoring its 
initiative commitment. The initiative’s principles declare it a work in 
progress, and experience will likely require change. Perhaps most 
important, it allows member companies to share intelligence and 
strategies, allowing them to better identify objectionable govern-
mental requests and formulate responses.
Although the Initiative is a welcome effort at self- regulation, it 
is subject to at least four principal critiques.5 First, because of its 
voluntary nature, a large number of companies remain outside its 
purview. Even those who did commit to the initiative could 
fall short of its obligations and would be subject only to the social 
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sanction of “naming and shaming.” Second, “I’m sorry, but I’ve signed 
on to a set of principles,” is hardly an excuse likely to prove effective 
when a company is forced to defend against a repressive government 
order. Third, a voluntary arrangement will not stand against a legal 
requirement—even in the new media company’s home country. 
Finally, the private initiative lacks the legal sanctions available to 
enforce a statutory obligation. But despite these concerns, the initia-
tive is an important development for information service providers 
in a world sadly too marked by information repression.
The Intersection of Cybertrade and Human Rights
Proponents of human rights have often found themselves at odds 
with free traders. The desire to liberalize the flow of goods across bor-
ders in service of efficient production has at times been insufficiently 
attentive to the rights of workers and the health of the environment. 
Cyberspace, however, may offer a context in which the desire for free 
trade and the wish to promote political freedom go hand in hand. As 
the Chinese example shows, the bugaboos of repressive governments 
today are search engines, electronic bulletin boards, blogs, Facebook, 
YouTube, and microblogging services such as Twitter and Weibo. 
These technologies allow ordinary individuals to communicate out-
side the mainstream media channels that often prove subservient to 
governments. By liberalizing trade in cyberspace, international trade 
law can bolster the circulation of information that authoritarian 
regimes would repress. In this section, I want to sketch a few ways in 
which international trade law might help assist the cause of political 
freedom around the world. Unexpectedly, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services might emerge as a human rights document.
Human rights law has typically sought to regulate the produc-
tion of goods in order to avoid the exploitation of labor (or, relatedly, 
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the environment). But with respect to trade in services delivered 
over the Internet, the nature of the work and the presence of an 
often highly educated workforce significantly reduce fears of worker 
exploitation. This does not mean that labor rights are no longer of 
concern with respect to trade in services, but those concerns are less 
with sweatshops, scandalously low wages, child labor, or perilous 
working conditions than with the right to organize, the right to 
speech, and the right to privacy. In China, young men are living and 
working in dormitories playing video games to earn in- game cur-
rency and goods that can then be exchanged for real- world currency 
through third- party markets.6 But this practice, which does raise 
potential issues of sweatshop conditions, is thus far the exception 
rather than the rule. In trade mediated via cyberspace, human rights 
law comes to bear in a largely novel fashion: to further the right of 
individuals to share and receive information. Trade in services shifts 
the locus of human rights attention from the production process to 
its delivery and consumption.
Human rights norms require that nations provide their citizens 
not only with the right to free speech within their nation but also 
with the right to impart information “regardless of frontiers.” This 
formulation is repeated in both the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The declaration describes the right to “impart information and 
ideas through any media regardless of frontiers,” and the covenant 
subsequently reiterates the “freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.” Because 
of its nature as an international treaty, the covenant carries more 
binding force than the declaration. China has signed but not 
ratified the covenant. The covenant makes clear that a country’s 
inhabitants have the right both to send and to receive information 
from another country and thus imposes obligations on both 
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countries to allow the information exchange. Like the freedom of 
speech guaranteed by the US Constitution, the international free 
speech norm tolerates regulation within appropriate bounds. Indeed, 
the covenant explicitly contemplates it, permitting limitations set 
forth by law and necessary to support public order. As history’s best 
medium for transmitting information worldwide, the Internet will 
test the limits of such regulation of cross border information flows.
International trade law puts pressure on state repression of infor-
mation through two principal mechanisms. First, the transparency 
obligations of GATS require what is often absent in authoritarian 
states—a set of public rules that governs both citizens and govern-
mental authorities. GATS article III requires WTO member states 
to publish regulations governing services and establish inquiry points 
where foreign service providers can obtain information about such 
regulations. A publication requirement written for the benefit of 
foreigners may prove useful for local citizens, who will be given the 
opportunity to understand the rules that bind them—and the oppor-
tunity therefore to challenge those rules or their interpretation.
Second, the market access and national treatment commitments 
provide opportunities for foreign information service providers to 
disseminate information that local information service providers 
might eschew. Censorship by itself may not necessarily constitute 
either a market access or a national treatment violation. But consider 
three scenarios: What if a country (1) declared foreign blogging sites 
off- limits, or (2) required foreign information service providers to 
route their offerings through special traffic cops, or (3) required local 
Internet service providers to deny access to certain foreign services 
in toto? In cases like these, the censorship measures could run afoul 
of a country’s market access and national treaty obligations. Of 
course, GATS permits derogation where “necessary to protect public 
morals or to maintain public order.”7 But as we saw in the Antigua 
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case, any derogations must be “necessary” for the public morals 
or public order goal and there must be no “reasonably available 
alternative” to the trade restrictive measure. Furthermore, there is a 
substantial question as to whether the repression of political speech 
that promotes peaceful challenges to the existing government con-
stitutes a cognizable public order or public morality goal under the 
World Trade Organization system.
If one considers the array of recent efforts to censor material 
mediated by the Internet, it seems clear that some of them would fall 
afoul of the “reasonably available alternative” requirement articulated 
in the United States—Gambling case (and described in chapter 6). 
That is, the stated public order or public morality goals could have 
been achieved at the desired level of protection by less trade- 
restrictive means. Consider, for example, the shuttering of Blogger 
because of one or two offending blogs or the disabling of YouTube 
because of one video some found objectionable or the shutting off of 
access to Wikipedia presumably because of a few politically charged 
(but truthful) entries.8
Could the United States bring a WTO claim against China 
for discriminating against Google? Once we understand Google as 
an exporter of services, such possibilities come into play. As it cur-
rently stands, the WTO seems to lack the power to order a local 
regulation dismantled because it runs afoul of human rights law.9 
However, a review of China’s GATS accession schedule reveals a 
broad array of commitments to liberalize this type of cross border 
trade, including in professional services. China promises both mar-
ket access and national treatment for many services delivered cross- 
border. However, the schedule limits liberalization of “on- line 
information and database retrieval services” to joint ventures, with 
a maximum foreign participation of 30 percent. A note requires 
“all international telecommunications services . . . [to] go through 
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gateways established with the approval of China’s telecommunica-
tions authorities.”10 The requirement that such services must go 
through approved gateways cannot, however, camouflage discrimi-
natory measures or even impediments to market access. Such gate-
ways function like customs houses: insufficient staffing at a customs 
house could be grounds for a WTO claim. Because they rely on 
highly subjective and inconsistent judgments, Chinese actions regu-
lating information might also run afoul of the GATS transparency 
obligation.11 It is difficult to predict whether the United States 
would win a GATS claim against Chinese actions that interfered 
with cross border supply of net- work by companies such as Google, 
but the very possibility of such claims has a disciplinary effect on 
potential regulations.12
The US complaint in China—Audiovisual against Chinese con-
trols on the distribution of publications and audiovisual materials in 
that country stopped short of a direct effort to use trade law to 
improve freedom of expression. The United States did not question 
whether China’s vast censorship apparatus could in fact restrict the 
importation of a wide variety of material. Joost Pauwelyn argues that 
rather than accepting censorship as advancing the cause of public 
morals, the WTO should ensure that any measure purportedly 
advancing public morals complies with “basic and universally 
accepted principles of free speech.”13 Panagiotis Delimatsis observes 
that the United States oddly pressed the possibility that government 
officers perform the censorship directly rather than delegate it to 
dispersed state- owned enterprises, a retrograde step for free speech.14
It is unlikely that GATS will help dismantle all restrictions of 
repressive regimes. For this reason, we must seek to nurture a corpo-
rate consciousness among information service providers of their role 
in liberation or oppression. Goods manufacturers have at times 
adopted corporate codes of responsibility, appointed corporate 
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responsibility officers, and bonded themselves through independent 
monitors. Silicon Valley and Bangalore companies that seek to ser-
vice the world need human rights lawyers, not just privacy officers 
and mergers and acquisitions counsel. At the very least, corporate 
counsel for Internet enterprises must include human rights in their 
bailiwick, if not to avoid doing evil, at least to avoid being subject to 
suit or public rebuke.
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AFTERWORD
In the 1955 classic Indian film Shri 420, Raj Kapoor walks a 
dusty road from a rural village toward cosmopolitan Bombay, 
singing a song that would come to symbolize patriotism in the face 
of globalization:
Mera joota hai Japani
Yé patloon Inglistani
Sar pé lal topi Rusi—
Phir bhi dil hai Hindustani
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(O, my shoes are Japanese
These trousers English, if you please
On my head, red Russian hat—
My heart’s Indian for all that.)1
Salman Rushdie begins his Satanic Verses with the song, sung by 
Bollywood star Gibreel as he falls (magically safely) from an explod-
ing airliner toward the English Channel. The philosopher Jeremy 
Waldron begins his discussion of minority cultures and cosmopoli-
tanism by citing Rushdie’s defense of Satanic Verses, which embraces 
the hybridity and mongrelization arising from cultural interaction. 
Waldron celebrates the cosmopolitan who feels no loss of identity 
“when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, 
listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equip-
ment, follows Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation 
techniques.”2 The human interaction made possible by cross border 
net- work is far more intense than that made possible by Russian 
hats, English trousers, or Japanese shoes. The clothes after all do not 
make the man or woman.
Trade has made and remade the world for millennia. The addi-
tion of services to global trade flows will remake the world yet again. 
In an age when Indians tutor Koreans to speak English, Ghanaians 
process citations for quality- of- life offenses in New York City, and 
Chinese citizens use Silicon Valley search engines to learn about 
China, the effect on human lifestyles, livelihoods, and relationships 
is likely to be profound.3 One Ghanaian who processes New York 
citations notes, “I am very used to the rules and regulations of New 
York now. . . . So I think I can live there.”4 While these developments 
hold much promise, human rights, cultural norms, privacy and 
security are all at risk in this net- worked world. Trade 2.0 will 
require us to grapple with the most difficult questions of human 
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relationships—of opportunities, obligations, transgressions, and 
betrayals—crisscrossing borders. The Economist magazine declares, 
“The internet is as much a trade pact as an invention.”5 This trade 
pact can be undone, its commercial promise eroded by unnecessary 
or protectionist regulations. But a free trade zone should not be free 
of law. The trade made possible by the web must be as free as possible 
within a legal infrastructure to protect consumers.
Concluding her chronicle of the travels of a humble T- shirt in 
the global economy, Georgetown business professor Pietra Rivoli 
embraces the power of trade. She notes that some early Christians 
distrusted trade, with Augustine of Hippo declaring that “active 
traders . . . attain not the grace of God.”6 Augustine was hardly alone 
in his distrust of trade. At the turn the sixteenth century, after ruling 
the seas with four- hundred- foot treasure ships, the Chinese emperor 
declared it a crime to go to sea in a multi- masted ship.7 In Japan, the 
sakoku policy limited trade from the seventeenth into the nineteenth 
century, yielding only to Commodore Matthew Perry’s gunboats. In 
the twentieth century, developing countries such as India, when 
freed from imperial powers, retreated from trade as well, preferring a 
policy of “import substitution,” in which foreign goods would be 
manufactured locally. All of these nations have since embraced trade 
in dramatic fashion, in each case to the great benefit of their peoples.
Trade creates a web of relationships that can enrich the lives 
(and finances) of both parties. Of course, trade can also be corrosive, 
exploiting people who have few opportunities, despoiling the 
environment, or undercutting local producers through unfair com-
petition. Trade in services poses different risks than trade in goods, 
threats to privacy and security, and risks associated with the quality 
of a service. In this book, I have tried to find a middle ground 
between isolation and unregulated trade, embracing free trade and 
also its regulation.
A
Ft
e
R
W
o
R
D
210
As I worked on this manuscript over a winter holiday from 
teaching, two encounters brought the subject of the book close to 
home. At my California law school’s annual holiday party, I ran 
across a retired colleague, a wonderful scholar who had chaired the 
committee that shepherded me toward tenure at the beginning of 
the millennium. I asked him, “What are you doing with your time?” 
He answered that he was writing an iPhone app to help people 
develop a training regimen for the triathlon. Visiting my parents a 
few days later, I asked the same question of my father, who had 
also recently retired, he from teaching English literature at a North 
Carolina university. My father—for whom I have long served via 
phone as a kind of outsourced IT help desk—told me he was teach-
ing two English courses online.
These two men, in their sixties and seventies, respectively, were 
now well on their way to becoming Internet traders. Some budding 
triathletes would certainly lie beyond our shores and download my 
colleague’s app via the iTunes global online store. And some stu-
dents of my father’s online courses might someday come from 
abroad, streaming and downloading lectures and readings, and 
uploading assignments and exams.
For the bulk of human history, geography was destiny. My own 
parents had both the inclination and resources to defy this destiny 
for increased opportunities in the West. They left their own parents 
behind to begin life again in a strange land. A Gallup world poll 
suggests that some 1.1 billion people would move abroad for tempo-
rary work. Some undoubtedly would move abroad for the adventure, 
but others for the economic opportunities not available at home. 
Many cannot move abroad, because of the lack of resources or visas, 
or because of family obligations at home.
Today, geography holds fewer limitations. Take a couple minutes 
away from the book. Type in www.MapCrunch.com. After reaching 
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the site, click “Go.” Using Google’s amazing Street View service, the 
site “teleports” you instantly to a randomly selected street in the world. 
You can look around this new location, walking down the streets of 
São Paulo or Sydney. Often, one finds oneself gazing down a rural 
road—almost always it seems filmed on a glorious sunny day. To my 
eyes, the world looks both familiar and exotic, and also quite beautiful.
While I have focused on economic ramifications of Trade 2.0, a 
more fundamental change is afoot as well. Facebook relationships 
crisscross political borders, newspaper stories generate discussions 
involving a global audience, and, as this book’s cover depicts, Twitter 
conversations span the world. Those with Internet access (and who 
live outside the Great Firewall of China and other totalitarian states) 
can search the storehouse of the world’s information, accessing 
knowledge bases that far surpass the traditional encyclopedias 
available only to a small fraction of the world’s population.
The nation- state plays a central role in this book, as the primary 
mechanism for consumer protection. Inevitably, however, the day- 
to- day engagement with the world made possible by cyberspace is 
hastening the day that our energies are directed beyond the confines 
of the nation- state. The increasing pressure on states to justify 
national deviations from international standards and the increasing 
difficulty of practically enforcing such differences will encourage the 
emergence of a set of global best practices. If we manage it well, the 
worldwide web of cyberspace will bind us more tightly together, 
increasing capabilities and understanding across the world.
The opportunity to participate in global trade makes our fate less 
circumscribed by the land into which we are born, without requiring 
the painful dislocations of migration. At the same time, the World 
Wide Web binds our fates more closely together, making possible 
both commerce and other interaction across humanity itself.
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GLOSSARY
A cheat sheet for Global e- commerce
BPO Business process outsourcing, the performance of a specified business 
process by a third- party service provider.
darknet A peer- to- peer file- sharing network designed to promote 
anonymous communications by, among other things, hiding the Internet 
Protocol address of users.
Data Protection Directive The European Union’s 1995 directive, which 
imposes both strict privacy obligations on data collectors within the EU  
and obligations as well on the transfer of information to processors outside 
the EU.
dematerialization The replacement of physical in- person requirements 
with online substitutes wherever possible, such as for signatures,  
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authen tication, bureaucratic offices, education, testing, and even 
administrative and judicial hearings.
denial- of- service (DoS) or distributed denial- of- service (DDOS) attack A 
popular means of disabling access to a website by barraging a website with 
information requests, thus overloading it.
digital products Films, music, audiobooks, computer games, and software in 
electronic form.
DMCA The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, which outlaws 
the circulation of devices that might circumvent access and copy controls 
and also offers safe harbors for Internet intermediaries from copyright 
infringement claims.
DNS The domain name system, which allocates authority for matching 
a single alphanumeric string (in various languages) to a single computer.
GATS The General Agreement on Trade in Services, one of the principal 
WTO agreements, effective in 1995.
GATT The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, first effective in 
1947 and then instituted as part of the WTO system in 1995.
geolocation Identifying where a web user is physically located through such 
clues as IP address, web browser language, log- in credentials, cookies, or 
mobile or wireless access information.
Global Network Initiative A nongovernmental organization founded in 
2008 by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, civil society organizations, investors, 
and academics to promote freedom of expression and privacy on the 
Internet.
glocalization The creation or distribution of products or services intended 
for a global market but customized to conform to local laws—within the 
bounds of international law.
harmonization Concerted efforts by nations to agree on common standards, 
or where common standards are lacking, not imposing conflicting standards 
unless justified by substantial local policy grounds.
ICANN The Internet Corporation for Assigned Numbers and Names, 
based in Marina del Rey, California, established through a contract with the 
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US Department of Commerce in 1998 and with directors appointed by a 
loose group of regional Internet backbone companies and civil society 
organizations.
ICC The International Chamber of Commerce, an international business 
organization based in Paris, which includes task forces to promote 
international electronic commerce.
Incoterms Terms used to standardize commercial shipments of goods, 
promulgated by the ICC.
IP Internet Protocol, or intellectual property.
ISO The International Organization for Standardization, the international 
standards- setting body composed of representatives of national standards- 
setting bodies, based in Geneva.
ISP Internet service provider, typically used to refer to the company 
providing Internet access to a home or business.
IT Information technology.
ITU The International Telecommunications Union, a United Nations body 
composed of more than 190 countries and 700 industry and academic groups.
License Raj A private economy characterized by licenses and bureaucratic 
red tape in post- independence India until approximately 1990.
LPO Legal process outsourcing, the performance of law- related services 
by a third- party provider.
mode 1 Delivery of a service from the territory of one WTO Member into 
the territory of another Member (e.g., by the Internet).
mode 2 Delivery of a service in the territory of one WTO Member to the 
service consumer of another Member (e.g., by travel by the consumer).
mode 3 Delivery of a service within the territory of a country by a foreign 
service provider with a local commercial presence (e.g., by establishing a 
local office or subsidiary).
mode 4 Delivery of a service within the territory of a country by a foreign 
service provider who is physically present (e.g., by physical travel of the 
provider).
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Nasscom New Delhi–based trade association representing the Indian 
software and services since 1988.
net- work Information services delivered remotely through electronic 
communications systems.
OECD The Organisation of Economic Co- operation and Development, 
based in Paris, consisting of 34 countries generally with advanced market 
economies, with a work program seeking to enhance the digital economy.
recognition Governmental action declaring that qualifying under a foreign 
law suffices for domestic law purposes. This can be done either unilaterally 
or mutually.
registrar One of the companies authorized by the top- level domain 
administrator (such as ICANN) to make changes to that top- level domain’s 
registry.
registry The authoritative database matching mnemonic domain names to 
Internet Protocol addresses for a particular top- level domain, such as .com 
or .US.
root server The computer holding the authoritative database matching 
mnemonic domain names to Internet Protocol addresses for a particular 
top- level domain, such as .com, .edu, or .us. The contemporary architecture 
mirrors this database across multiple physical locations.
Safe Server Strategy Locating a computer server where one believes it will 
be beyond the reach of unfriendly governments.
Services Directive The EU’s directive seeking to better achieve the goal of 
one market for the supply of services across Europe.
TBT The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, one of the WTO 
agreements, effective in 1995. The TBT regulates technical standards for 
goods but does not extend to services.
technological neutrality The principle that the online service should be 
required to achieve regulatory goals at rates roughly equivalent to those 
achieved by offline versions of the service.
top- level domain (TLD) The term given to the last portion of the domain 
name, such as .com, .edu, and .US, with each domain name entry in a 
particular TLD subject to control of a single authority.
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trade plus The broader legal environment through which trade occurs, 
including trade rules represented in the WTO and regional and bilateral 
agreements, as well as contracting and private- private dispute resolution and 
trade conventions such as Incoterms.
Trade 2.0 Electronically tradable services, also called “net- work.”
TRIPs The Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement, 
one of the principal WTO agreements, effective in 1995.
UNCITRAL The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, which convenes alternately in New York and Vienna and which 
promulgates model codes and other legal material to promote international 
trade, including uniform rules on electronic signatures that have been 
embraced by jurisdictions such as the United States.
Web 2.0 Web- based services such as Facebook and YouTube that rely on 
individuals to contribute content.
WIPO The World Intellectual Property Organization, headquartered in 
Geneva.
World Trade Organization (WTO) A treaty- based body based in Geneva, 
established at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
and coming into being in 1995.
WTO Work Program on Electronic Commerce A work program, initiated at 
the WTO Ministerial in Geneva in 1998, that seeks to examine trade- 
related issues of global electronic commerce.
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1. Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 17, WT/DS31/
AB/R, June 30, 1997 (“A periodical is a good comprised of two components: 
editorial content and advertising content. Both components can be viewed as 
having services attributes, but they combine to form a physical product—the 
periodical itself ”).
2. China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 36, WT/
DS363/AB/R, Dec. 21, 2009.
3. See Jagdish Bhagwati, “International Trade in Services and Its 
Relevance for Economic Development,” in The Emerging Services Economy, 
ed. Orio Giarini (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 3; and Joseph Francois and 
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Bernard Hoekman, “Services Trade and Policy,” Journal of Economic Literature 
48 (2010): 642, 643.
4. Apple introduced the iTunes music store in April 2003. By April 
2008, Apple was the biggest music retailer in the country. http://www.apple.
com/pr/library/2003/04/28Apple- Launches- the- iTunes- Music- Store.html; 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes- Store- Top- Music- 
Retailer- in- the- US.html.
5. Bobbie Johnson, “Google Urges UN to Set Global Internet Privacy 
Rules,” Guardian, Sept. 14, 2007; Peter Fleischer, “The Need for Global 
Privacy Standards,” Sept. 14, 2007, http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/ 
2007/09/need- for- global- privacy- standards.html.
6. These are the words of Grateful Dead lyricist turned Electronic 
Frontier Foundation–founder John Perry Barlow. See “A Declaration of 
Independence of Cyberspace,” Feb. 8, 1996.
7. See, e.g., Niall Ferguson, “Sinking Globalization,” Foreign Affairs 84:2 
(2005) (“From around 1870 until World War I, the world economy thrived in 
ways that look familiar today. The mobility of commodities, capital, and labor 
reached record levels; the sea- lanes and telegraphs across the Atlantic had 
never been busier, as capital and migrants traveled west and raw materials and 
manufactures traveled east”).
8. See Anupam Chander, “Next Stop, Kazaakhstan? The Legal Globe- 
Trotting of Kazaa, the Post- Napster File Sharing Company,” Findlaw.com, 
Oct. 24, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021024_
chander.html; Michael Tarm, “KaZaA! Youths from Cyber- Savvy Estonia 
Write the New Napster, Delivering a Blow to the Global Entertainment 
Industry,” City Paper—The Baltic States (March–April 2003), http://www.
citypaper.ee/kazaa.htm. Kazaa’s founders would go on to create Skype fol-
lowing a similar model, incorporating their London- operated company in 
Luxembourg and relying on Estonians for programming. Ivar Ekman, “Skype 
Is 2nd Jackpot for Scandinavian Duo,” International Herald Tribune, Sept. 13, 
2005. Skype itself turns out to be a boon to net- work firms, which can now 
use it to engage in cheap international communications.
9. Nils Pratley, “The Porn Princess, the Indian Computer Whizz and the 
Poker Bet That Made $10bn,” Guardian, June 3, 2005.
10. World Bank, World Bank Atlas, 36th ed. (Washington, DC: World 
Bank Publications, 2004) (“The services sector now accounts for two- thirds 
of global economic output”).
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11. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2012 (2012), 19. It is 
likely that this figure undercounts cybertrade in services because national sta-
tistical accounts have yet to fully recognize the kind and volume of trade that 
is occurring.
12. Geza Feketekuty, International Trade in Services: An Overview and 
Blueprint for Negotiations (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 299–308.
13. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex, 1B, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
14. Article 14 of the EC Treaty.
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Ch. 12, U.S.–Can.–Mex., 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); Central America–Dominican Repub-
lic–United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Cen. Am.–Dom. Rep., arts. 
2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 7.2, 9.1(1)–(3), 11.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.9(1), Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 
514 (2004).
16. Jagdish Bhagwati et al., “The Muddles Over Outsourcing,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 18:4 (2004): 93, 112 (concluding that outsourcing, 
defined as services traded internationally at arm’s length, has “effects that 
are not qualitatively different from those of conventional trade in goods [and] 
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17. Paul Samuelson, “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm 
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